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ABSTRACT

Four articles and two review papers are presented on themes relating to educational leadership within institutions, organizations, and networks and to the development and promulgation of ideas within academic disciplines. Three of the articles explore the opportunity structures that promoted the rise of two college presidents and one powerful educational administrator: (1) M. Carey Thomas in "'Putting a Woman in Sole Power': The Presidential Succession at Bryn Mawr College, 1892-1894" (Cynthia Brown); (2) Arthur Morgan in "'Forcing Them to Be Free': Antioch College and Progressive Education in the 1920s" (Judith Sealander); and (3) Abraham Flexner in "Abraham Flexner and the Politics of Educational Reform" (Steven Wheatley). A fourth article, "Exile and Return: Political Science in the Context of (West-) German University Development from Weimar to Bonn" (Rainer Eisfeld), focuses on the New Deal, wartime, and postwar experiences of German emigre intellectuals to the United States. The two essay reviews are: "Mixed Blessings: Science and Specialization in American Medical Education" (Ellen More) and "Lawrence Cremin on American Higher Education: A Review Essay" (James McLachlan). (JDD)

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1988

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On the cover: Abraham Flexner. Photo courtesy of Chris Hoolihan, History of Medicine Librarian at the University of Rochester Medical Center.

Introduction to Volume Eight

JOYCE ANTLER
Brandeis University

THE ARTICLES IN THIS VOLUME OF THE *History of Higher Education Annual* touch on several diverse but interrelated themes. These themes relate to educational leadership within institutions, organizations, and networks, and more loosely, in the development and promulgation of ideas within academic disciplines. The articles explore the opportunity structures that promoted the rise of two college presidents, M. Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr and Arthur Morgan of Antioch, and one powerful educational administrator, Abraham Flexner of the Rockefeller Foundation. They probe the qualities of leadership that led to success or failure over time. While the changes in American life spawned by the organizational, bureaucratic, and scientific revolutions of the Progressive period form the backdrop of these three articles, a fourth article focuses on the New Deal, wartime, and postwar experiences of German emigre intellectuals to the United States. This article, too, emphasizes the association between significant developments in higher education and broader social and political change.

Cynthia Farr Brown examines the struggle over the succession to the presidency of Bryn Mawr College in the early 1890s. Focusing on the relationship between M. Carey Thomas' educational goals and political strategies, Brown argues that Thomas' victory over the evangelical, male-dominated board of trustees represented a major shift at Bryn Mawr to a modern, secular academic tradition of excellence. This tradition would be not only female-centered but feminist. One of the first women leaders openly to pursue and gain academic power at the presidential level, Thomas exploited her strategic role as Bryn Mawr's first dean and skillfully used personal relationships, monetary inducements, and other advantages to consolidate her position. A "minister of rationalism" who threatened the trustees' vision of "guarded," paternalistic, and religious-oriented education for women, she won the presidency, and served for the next 28 years. Her victory secured a new foothold for the professionalization of undergraduate and graduate education for women in the Progressive period.

Twenty-five years later, Arthur Morgan succeeded to the presidency of Antioch College. An engineer attracted to utopian experiments, he quickly replaced Antioch's moribund board of trustees with a group of corporate patrons. The new trustees were inspired by Morgan's vision of a new "college of proprietors" that would link school to society through an innovative, "cooperative"



M. Carey Thomas upon her return from Europe. Courtesy of Leo Dolenski, at the Bryn Mawr College Archives.

work-study plan and provide a national model of advanced higher education. In her article on progressive education at Antioch in the 1920s, Judith Sealander analyzes the achievements and failures of Morgan's 14-year tenure. Aiming to apply scientific, progressive methods to higher education, Morgan radically transformed the college's curriculum. He combined required studies in literature, mathematics, history, and science with moral training, physical exercise, and vocational training through paid, off-campus apprenticeships. Creativity was emphasized through the goal of developing the "whole" person. But freedom was to be reached through structure, not the reverse. Morgan came to judge the Antioch he created harshly, seeing its imperfections as evidence that he had failed to create the community of his dreams. To the faculty, which like the curriculum, Morgan had largely created, he was a dictator, rigid in his attempts to compel others to freedom. By the 1930s, Morgan's corporate sponsors also became disillusioned and viewed Antioch's program, students, and faculty as radicals. They were wrong: during the 1920s and 1930s, Morgan's changes narrowed access to Antioch education (blacks were excluded) and reshaped career choices in harmony with conventional middle- and upper-class aspirations. Sealander rejects either-or explanations of the progressive school as an ideal community that catered to the development of individual initiative and social harmony, or one which in its focus on "scientific" training fostered business and industrial values. Her examination of Morgan's leadership gives needed attention to the complexity of progressive education at the college level, where research has been relatively scarce.

Steven Wheatley's article, "Abraham Flexner and the Politics of Educational Reform," focuses attention on another Progressive Era reformer whose success was less than total. Indeed, Wheatley suggests that Flexner's philanthropic career displays the "rising and falling action of a Shakespearean drama." Ultimately he sees Flexner as a "tragic" character. Through his famous report calling for the reform of medical education, Flexner promoted an essentially progressive vision of academic organization. More important, he created a "policy process," centered in philanthropic foundations, to implement his ideas. Seeing this work as a substitute for government action, Flexner became one of the first managers of a national educational policy and developed enormous power as the sole distributor of basic resources for careers in academic medicine. Yet while Flexner despised bureaucracy, at least in theory, his practical acceptance of the principle of elite management left him unequipped to deal with opposition to what others saw as his own centralized and rigid leadership. Highlighting Flexner's dismissal from the Rockefeller Foundation and his difficulty in managing the structures he had established, Wheatley takes issue with recent interpretations of Flexner that view him as a "scholarly technician," capitalist func-

tionary, or exemplar of the closed politics of bureaucracy. To Wheatley, Flexner's career exemplified the open tension between democracy and bureaucracy: his failure to resolve this tension accounted for his untimely political demise.

Rainer Eisfeld also addresses the problem of change within educational institutions. His article traces the evolution of the discipline of political science within Germany from the 1930s through the 1960s. According to Eisfeld, the political theory of exiled German intellectuals in the United States focused on two models; the first, an anti-fascist, anti-Stalinist, but primarily an anti-communist and anti-socialist view of totalitarianism; the second, a more positive pluralist vision of a "world community" of democrats. As visiting professors at Federal Republic universities, where some of them were also appointed to distinguished chairs in political science, they shaped the development of the discipline. Eisfeld focuses on the "Freiburg" and "Berlin" schools, mentored by the exiles Arnold Bergstraesser and Ernst Fraenkel, respectively, which established themselves throughout West Germany's universities. Despite differences between them, Eisfeld asserts that the schools shared a single paradigm shaped by the experience of exile: thus the East-West conflict, framed as totalitarianism vs. pluralism, determined the conceptual framework of West German political science, and replaced more critical analyses of German fascism. In this way, the "discovery of America" by West German political theory ensured that normative judgments would triumph over historical, structurally analytic ones. Only in the 1960s—due to the dual assaults of a university-based, radical political movement disenchanted with the United States, and the influence of more modern American political science approaches, such as behaviorism and systems theory—did the exiles' paradigm begin to dissolve.

The volume closes with two essay reviews. Ellen S. More discusses three books that chart the development of American medical education over several centuries. James McLachlan then reviews the contribution of Lawrence Cremin's grand three-volume history of education in the United States to our understanding of higher education.

We hope you will agree that these articles and reviews reflect the vitality of an important field of scholarship.

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Exile and Return: Political Science in the Context of (West-) German University Development from Weimar to Bonn

RAINER EISFELD[1]
University of Osnabrück

> "We, the undersigned German university and college lecturers, today publicly declare that we see in the assumption of power by Adolf Hitler and in the unification of those national forces wishing to be involved in the regeneration of the German people the correct way to put an end to the immense misfortune and impoverishment of the German people ... The marxist-bolshevist influences on the spirit of our people must cease. Therefore we declare ourselves ready to contribute with all our might to the work of reconstruction undertaken by the government of the *Reich* so that the great task now begun may be helped to a joyous final victory for the sake of Germany ..."

(Declaration of 300 German university and college lecturers on the occasion of the election to the *Reichstag* on 5th March, 1933, published under the headline "German Intellectuals Support List 1" in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of the previous day)

> "All science is indissolubly linked to the intellectual nature of the nation from which it has grown ... The power of science as a force for international solidarity arises only through the concerted action of individual nations' popular encouragement of science. The untrammelled intellectual development and cultural freedom of nations can prosper only on the basis of equal rights, equal respect and equal political freedom, in the atmosphere, therefore, of a genuine and general peace. Convinced of this, German science appeals to the educated of the world to view with the same sympathy they expect for

> their own nations the struggle of the German nation united behind Adolf Hitler for freedom, honour, justice and peace."

("Declaration by the academic staff of German universities and colleges in favor of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist state", published by the National Socialist Teachers Association Germany (Saxony branch) on the occasion of the referendum of 12th November, 1933 on Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. The "Declaration" was signed by 950 academics, including Theodor Litt, Hans Freyer, Arnold Gehlen, Werner Weber, Wilhelm Flitner, Egmont Zechlin, Friedrich Delekat, Wilhelm Vershofen and Karl C. Thalheim.)

> ". . . No power on earth could force the men of German science wishing in our rally today to declare themselves for Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist state into statements or actions with which they disagreed. They speak today enjoying full freedom of conscience. Their noble spirit causes them to impress upon the educated of all nations that they declare their support for Adolf Hitler with the joyous pride of free men."

(Gauobmann Arthur Göpfert, "Führer" of the Saxon Teachers' Association at the opening of the rally at which the "Declaration" was presented. Amongst the professors addressing the rally were Martin Heidegger and Ferdinand Sauerbruch.)

I.

IN THE NOW ALMOST twenty year old judgment of Eugen Kogon (the author of "The SS-State"), the science of politics did not develop into a "science of democracy" in post-war West German universities. All too quickly that science got caught up in the general restoration that took place on as well as off the "eagerly renovated" campuses.[2]

More than any other subject, political science owed its establishment as an academic discipline after 1945 to the common desire of exiled social scientists, American occupation officers, and social-democratic politicians to overcome through education those authoritarian attitudes and patterns of behavior that had paved the way for the National Socialist takeover of power.

And in no other case, moreover, with the possible exception of psychoanalysis, did the very universities that believed they had survived the Third Reich as the "bearers of an old and at heart healthy tradition" so strongly resist the institutionalization of a discipline.[3]

Eugen Kogon's observation thus characterizes not only the link between the development of this subject and universities in general during the first two decades of the Federal Republic of Germany. Kogon also suggests a collision between the impulses for change stemming from returning emigres and the intellectual and institutional inertia of those who had remained in Germany. After 1945, the latter group continued to set the tone of social and political life. These scholars had contributed to the demise of the German university during the national socialist period, having compromised, whether out of conviction or self-interest, with National Socialism. Allied denazification policies after World War II displaced them only partially, and at best temporarily. Because their persistence on many faculties affected the subsequent development of those same faculties in the Federal Republic, a brief analysis of the academic context to which the exiles returned is necessary.

II.

Research has established beyond doubt that the emotionalized barbarism of the Nazis by no means lacked its intellectual thinkers; that Hitler found compliant professors; that among German's "Bekennern" (i.e. "professors") resentful discontent had allied itself with science long before 1933; that the majority of the "mandarins" of the German intelligentsia had with a mixture of arrogance and self-pity encouraged political irresponsibility; and that humanist intellectualism had remained isolated within the universities of both the Empire and the Weimar Republic.[4] Behind the failure of the universities in the face of National Socialism lay an academic hostility towards politics and an aloofness with regard to democracy. Many professors had little or no confidence in the open resolution of conflict, but expected much from the authoritarian state—both for universities and for society as a whole.

Two witnesses, beyond suspicion of support for Nazism, may be adduced here as representative of many others. Shortly before the curtain came down in 1933 the expert in constitutional and canon law, Rudolf Smend, referring to the "bargaining of sectional interests," "an ultimately anarchic juxtaposition of political groups," called for an "active national unity," in which "we can all together find our common historico-moral vocation."[5] Smend's attack was as

concrete as his demands were vague. Nonetheless three years before he had already indicated in which direction his sympathies were pushing him, when he declared that the socialist and communist student groupings were "as much of a contradiction of the true essence of a university as their very parties themselves." In contrast, Smend acknowledged the *völkisch*—racially nationalistic—section of the student body to have—"at least in intention"—a "truly academic attitude." These students sought a "new national solidarity," a political stance "justified intellectually" rather than "predetermined by class or other criteria."[6] In exactly the same way the educationalist and philosopher Eduard Spranger considered "the nationalist students' movement still [in the autumn of 1932] to be at heart genuine, if outwardly undisciplined." And when, in his subsequent conflict with the Prussian and the Reich government, Spranger published the grounds for his application to resign (shortly afterwards withdrawn), he was not willing to dispense with the statement that he had, "oppressed by the Left, for years hoped for the time" when he would see an audience in front of him which was "united with him in national consciousness and love of state and nation."[7]

As scholars Smend and Spranger were highly respected even before 1933. In addition to the anti-republican sentiment that distinguished them and their like, the fear of a premature end to their own careers caused many academics to accommodate themselves to National Socialism. The economist Karl C. Thalheim has revealed this motive:

> Above all, it is those quotations in which I voiced opinions about Jews which I can read again today only with deep sorrow and agonising shame . . . I never believed in the terrible—in the full sense of that word—nonsense in those words. I never was an anti-semite . . . (But) whoever wrote and believed in such things bears less guilt than the one who wrote but did not believe . . . Worn down by the protracted struggle (for my academic career) I capitulated. The evil things I wrote then to win the favour of those in power were the consequence of this capitulation.[8]

Thalheim was a signer of the "Declaration" already quoted above—during a phase when German Fascism, concerned with the consolidation of its power, could still use such declarations for domestic and foreign purposes. Between March and November, 1933 the number of academics who supported national-socialist policies more than trebled. During the rally at which the declaration was presented the Berlin anthropologist Eugen Fischer, ignoring the

beginnings of the Jewish boycott, the newly inaugurated concentration camps, and the book burnings, described the takeover of power as a "moral revolution" in which "no nation on earth could emulate us."[9]

In view of this, it is not sufficient either to note that until 1938 about one third of the teaching staff of German Universities—in the social sciences nearly 50%—were dismissed, forced into retirement or transferred, or to observe in consequence how significant the experience of exile became both for the emigrants and for their subjects.[10] *An investigation limited to these aspects would quite literally cover only one third to one half of the truth. It would be difficult not to regard it as something of an alibi.*

III

The case of Thalheim may serve as a convenient example for the second theme of these introductory remarks: the persistence of "tainted" academics in post-war West Germany. Thalheim did not discuss his own part voluntarily; indeed, he only reacted after excerpts from his earlier publications had appeared in the (probably not by accident privately printed) series *Braune Universitaet—Deutsche Hochschullehrer gestern und heute (The Nazi University—Germany Academics Yesterday and Today).* In 1945, the U.S. military government dismissed Thalheim. After 1951, however, he again taught at the Free University of Berlin as an eminent expert on the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. He was a member both of the committee of the venerable *Verein fuer Sozialpolitik* (Society for Social Policy) and of the advisory committee of the *Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft* (Institute for Political Science).

By 1951, those academics who had lost their posts in the wake of denazification returned en masse to the West German universities. These academics described themselves as *ausgesperrt* (locked out) or *amtsverdrängt* (driven from office), and believed they "were despite everything still jointly responsible for Justice and Morality at German universities." Three (often conflicting) pressure groups established during 1950-51, supported by the *Hochschulverband,* the professional association of the majority of West German professors, pushed for a return of academics who had been expelled from the universities of the Middle and East European countries occupied by the Third Reich, of Eastern Prussia, or the GDR, or had been ousted from office by denazification procedures: The *Notverband amtsverdraengter Hochschullehrer*

(Emergency Association of University Teachers Driven from Office, with 533 members in 1952); the *Verband heimatvertriebener Hochschullehrer* (Union of Expellee University Teachers, in 1951 grown out of the *Verband der Angehoerigen der ehemaligen Deutschen Karls-Universitaet Prag*, or Union of Members of the German Caroline University of Prague); finally, the *Verband der nichtamtierenden (amtsverdraengten) Hochschullehrer* (VNAAH, Union of University Teachers Without Posts [Driven from Office]), whose eight regional associations and eighteen university groups comprised "those colleagues driven from office within the Federal Republic." This association brashly continued to insist that the allies' "extremely radical administrative interventions of 1945" had not only "done serious damage to the common good of German science" but, if not undone, would "lead to exceptional tensions and complications in national and academic life."

It is true that the *Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz* (WRK—the Committee of West German university presidents) advised all faculties to examine carefully the former political attitudes of those who claimed to have been *amtsverdraengt*. But inasmuch as the VNAAH was able to demonstrate publicly "its conviction based on diverse experience" that the position of the WRK did not coincide with "that of the majority of German university teachers," the WRK could, in the end, only mount rearguard defenses against an activity which Herbert Grabert, dismissed from his post as lecturer at the University of Tuebingen in 1945 and founder of the VNAAH, described thus:

> If they [i.e. those *amtsverdrängt*] wished to to achieve something, they could not give up hope or develop into an oppositional group. What they took to Bonn and the parliaments of the *Länder* was a demonstrable crisis, a politico-cultural mission, a clear aim and a willingness to cooperate second-to-none. Outstanding public law experts created the firm legal foundation for the preparatory talks and for the detailed negotiations. Their opinion gave rise to a body of literature facilitating a wide dissemination of proposed solutions which were well-founded in law, so that no West German parliamentarian could still have been ignorant of the legal position of university teachers driven from office. Over and above this, at the expense of much money and energy, calls for help, pamphlets, plans, statistics and more memoranda and resolutions were thrown into the battle."[11]

These aims were encouraged by two factors. The first factor was socio-

psychological—a "class-solidarity" that developed on all levels into a national solidarity with the victims of the chaotic implementation of denazification.[12] The *Persilschein*, a white-washing certificate of political good conduct (preferably by clergy, or Social Democratic Party members), epitomized a widespread German rejection of what was felt to be an inflexible and bureaucratic political purge. The second factor was political—the intensification of the Cold War which furthered an active acceptance of the new German state by "letting bygones be bygones."[13]

As a result of American strategy in the growing East-West conflict and the concomitant policy of the Adenauer government, the denazification fiasco coincided with the military and political rise of West Germany. If, however, anti-communism, the creation of "an intellectual and moral defensive front against the threats to humanity emanating from the caprice of totalitarian systems,"[14] was to be the domestic political integrating factor for the future, then reappraising the national-socialist past and dealing with associated conflicts could no longer be serious aims. In 1951 industrial and other defendants sentenced by the Nuremberg military tribunals were pardoned; in 1951 too, the new NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, Dwight D. Eisenhower, professed his respect for the conduct of German officers during the Second World War. In the same year the law demanded by Article 131 of the Constitution was passed. Conceding claims to state benefits and employment to civil servants "entitled to reinstatement" it was—in the words of Felgentraeger, the chairman of the *Hochschulverband*, —also meant "to protect the justly acquired rights of expellee and dismissed university lecturers." Two years later, on the initiative of the Free Democratic Party, the *Bundestag* supplemented the law with a regulation tailor-made for university lecturers. The Federal Compensation Office at the Federal Ministry of the Interior registered these lecturers in lists, which all universities were obliged to consult as a priority when making new appointments to professorial chairs. The law provided for quotas in posts and salaries, which amounted, for a public sector employer, to 20 percent of total salaries and appointments each.

IV.

Those who had been in exile profited from no comparable policy or lobby. Their existence continued to be an uncomfortable reminder, a willingly suppressed memory. By 1953, only 17 percent of exiled professors and 13 percent of emigres of non-professorial status had returned to a West Germany university. Although many exiles had political, professional or personal reasons

for not wishing to do so, they were hardly overwhelmed by invitations to return; frequently they were not wanted at all. True enough, the very first rectoral conference of the British Zone, held in Göttingen on September 26-27, 1945, decided unanimously that:

> University teachers dismissed or exiled as a result of national-socialist legislation are in all suitable cases to be restored to the status of German university teachers, if academically employable, in their old posts, or if these are occupied, in ones of equivalent status. In the case, however, of reduced employability, they should receive the appropriate provision, in particular emeritus status. If applicable, their old posts should be held open for them. The realization of this commitment to solidarity is a debt of honour owed by all German university administrations, universities and faculties.

Almost more significant in these lines than the ringing final words are, however, the qualifications that start with the word "suitable." Rudolf Smend, who as rector of the University of Göttingen chaired the conference, prepared the ground for them:

> Moreover, not every one of the professors in question is capable of reappointment. Some have in the meantime reached retirement age, others have overcome severe illnesses, resided abroad and perhaps had no opportunity to continue their academic work. A reappointment of such professors is therefore only possible after an examination of their suitability for reappointment: they must be completely and unequivocally employable.

Such *a priori* qualifications ensured that the debt of honour did not get out of hand. As Hans-Joachim Dahms concluded, they led faculties to treat lists of emigres like "lists of special offers," from which they desired "only to pick out the 'best buys,'" without considering that "debt of honour" could only mean "compensation for injustice in every individual case."

The rectors made their unamimous statement *after,* according to the minutes, the representatives of the British military government had "emphasised that they considered a formal decision of the conference on this matter most desirable." Five months later, at the third Northwest German Rectoral Conference in Goslar on February 25-27, 1946, the British Education Officer College

declared that "nothing that had been done in this respect since September 1945 indicated a desire to reappoint." He added that it was not necessary to take a new decision: it was merely a matter of "carrying out what had already been decided in Göttingen." In response, the Rector of the University of Münster, the prelate and former Centre Party politician Schreiber, voiced exactly that tendency whose consequences have already been described: one had to consider "whether those professors expelled from the East did not have a greater priority."[15]

Political science which, under the influence of the short-lived American re-education strategy (referred to in this article's opening paragraphs and again below), had been more strongly influenced by those in exile, was openly attacked as "to a certain extent, a counterpart" to communist ideology and its destruction of the traditional notion of the state.[16] This was written by the same Ernst Forsthoff, author of *Der totale Staat (The Total State)* in 1933, who had been one of these academics that eagerly supported the new system and, "usually in the same year or not very much later, . . . [had been] appointed professors, thereby filling the very substantial gaps left by the so-called political and racial purge."[17] From 1949 onwards, after lying low for three years in the Schleswig-Holstein civil service, he once more taught as professor in Heidelberg. The indifference to the plight of the exiles was, quite simply, also the result of the failed denazification of West German universities.

V.

After both the First and the Second World War attempts had been made in Germany to encourage a systematic change in the "unpolitical" attitudes and modes of behavior that had favored first the defeat of the militarized authoritarian state and then the socio-psychological degeneration into fascism. This was to be achieved by the creation of facilities for political education on all levels. The impulse for their development was to be provided by the foundation (later re-establishment) of a *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (DHfP—German Institute for Politics) in Berlin. In concrete terms, however, there was an important difference not only with respect to the supporters of these aims, but also to the demands that were made of the new[18] subject: If political education after 1918 had still been expected to "serve the creation of national and social solidarity and the recovery of Germany," after 1945 its task appeared to consist "in helping to provide the knowledge and behavioral climate necessary for a 'democratic fresh start.'"[19]

In 1919, the liberal educationist Rühlman demanded an independent

institute for political science in the capital of the *Reich* with the function of "selecting and educating political leaders"—in addition to lectures in civics for the students of every faculty and a special training for teachers in this new subject.[20] Theodor Heuss, a student of Friedrich Naumann, seconded the call:[21]

> German politics, forced into a system of humiliations by external force and through its own fault, knows only *one* issue: the struggle for national liberation . . . The *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* wishes to be an important tool in the reconstruction of the German state . . . by assembling willing support from all social classes, professions, and parties, fitting them for their patriotic task by instruction and example . . . What it can achieve is create an atmosphere of national solidarity and become a source from which the manifold attempts to foster the citizenship and political understanding of various classes in society can derive uniform support.

Opened in 1920, the DHfP originally resembled an adult education establishment that offered evening classes. The development of a core of regular students resulted in an increase in academic seriousness. In 1927/28 an advanced level course of one and a half years supplemented the main course (in the meantime grown to two years in length, with an optional final examination). After 1930, the DHfP conferred a diploma; in 1932, a research department was set up. It is not unreasonable to attribute this growth in academic forms and scope to the desire of the predominantly liberal to social-democratic sponsors and lecturers of the DHfP, in contrast to the right-wing conservative trend in universities, to fight with the weapons of scientific analysis on behalf of the Weimar democracy.[22]

At first the DHfP was financed by Prussia, the *Reich*, and grants from industry (Bosch, Siemens). After 1926 the Rockefeller and the Carnegie foundations became involved. This involvement reflected the growth of American interest in Germany and vice-versa, as the role of reparations agent went to the USA, and as a vigorous export of capital from America to Germany commenced after the signing of the Dawes plan.[23] The solemn inauguration of a Carnegie Chair at the DHfP in 1927 initiated the "scientific planning and academic preparation of a political decision"—the Kellogg Anti-War Pact (1928) named after the American Secretary of State to which Britain, France and Germany were signatories.[24] As Erich Jäckh, also a pupil of Friedrich Naumann, founder and first President of the DHfP, wrote after 1945, "the 'German-American union of ideas' which is now bringing Germany and America together in the Atlantic Alliance

was thus anticipated."[25] That union of ideas was only part of a wider process continuing during the period of exile and culminating (for political science as well) after the founding of the Federal Republic:[26]

> The beginnings of the development which made the link with the USA a *sine qua non* for the German bourgeoisie were already clearly visible in the twenties. In *this* respect, if in no other, one can regard the national-socialist period as a temporary interruption of a continuity. . . . The historical role of the Emigration consisted to a large extent and on various levels in facilitating further the close West German-American partnership of the fifties. . . . That is the socio-historical significance of the Emigration, the effect of which at first sight appears to be limited solely to the history of ideas.

Heuss was the DHfP's first Director of Studies. At least for a time the political spectrum amongst the lecturers and on the governing body ranged from the DNVP to the Social Democrats; but "without doubt at that time its emphasis lay with the political centre, especially the DDP."[27] It was no accident, though, that the original principle of a "delimitation vis-a-vis party radicalism of the right and the left"[28] was breached in the direction of the right only. Apart from the representatives of the DNVP, which after 1925 was radicalized in a *völkisch* sense hostile to the republic, the DHfP appointed Hitler's future State Secretary Lammers to a lectureship in 1932.[29] This was the beginning of the end for the DHfP in its original form. The institute avoided nazification in 1933 through the self-dissolution of the sponsoring organization, not least because—in the noble, at that time already rare words of Jäckh in his letter of resignation to Lammers:[30]

> . . . nationalization now means something different: the application of the new Civil Service regulations to my previously free institute; i.e. the exclusion of my nine Jewish lecturers and employees. . . You know yourself how I have made no secret of my view that the present persecution of Jews, which I condemn, is an injustice as ungerman as it is inhuman.

But even German fascism in power had a use for an emasculated political science. As was declared at the opening of the Party Institute for Politics of the NSDAP in the same year, the discipline was to provide "an intellectually elevated

stratum of combative and thinking party comrades, a core team steadfastly and successfully to stand up for National Socialism in all the storms of political life."[31] The DHfP continued to exist under the aegis of the *Reich* Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. In 1937, it was reconstructed as an institution with *Reich* immediacy ("Hochschule fuer Politik"). Finally, in 1940, the (D)HfP was merged with the *Auslandshochschule* (Institute for International Studies)—originally the Institute of Oriental Languages, founded by Bismarck for the linguistic and general training of recruits to the Foreign Service.

The new body became the Faculty of *Auslandswissenschaften* (International Studies) of the University of Berlin.[32] The Dean, directly responsible to and appointed by the Ministry of Science (and not the rector of the university), was Franz Alfred Six, director of Department VII of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA): "Ideological Research and Analysis." Arnold Bergstraesser (of whom more below) had supervised his doctoral thesis at the University of Heidelberg. Instruction at the new faculty was either in the form of a main or supplementary course, often for Secret Service work. "On the basis of a mighty and creative foreign policy and a new German *Grossreich,*" noted Walter Frank, political science was conceived as the "history of the world power politics"[33] of that Third Reich which sought to found its unlimited power on the total enslavement of all its subjects.

VI.

'Political' scholars—those intellectuals dealing with problems of state and society (historians, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists) whom the National Socialists compelled to leave their homeland—suffered, in the words of Franz L. Neumann,[34] the triple fate of a displaced person: as human beings with property, family, and friends; as scholars adjusted to a common intellectual heritage; finally, insofar as they had stood up in their own country for greater freedom and human dignity, also as political beings.

The "paradox of the emigre political scientists" was that most of them (originally lawyers, sociologists, and economists) "only became political scientists in the true sense in America." This phenomenon makes it so difficult to calculate even roughly the number of exiled political scientists. An indirect estimate may be inferred from the 1948 annual statistics of the American Political Science Association: Of the APSA's 2766 members, 80 had been born in Germany; 32 in Austria.[35] Many DHfP lecturers went into exile. Neumann, for example, had taught labor law at the DHfP and was simultaneously legal adviser to the Construction Workers' Union (in 1932/33 also to the SPD). Between

1933 and 1938 other exiles who had been under political and/or "racial" threat included: Ernst Fraenkel, who had shared a law practice with Neumann, had acted, like him, as legal advisor to the SPD (and also the Metal Workers' Union), and had, as a Jewish veteran of the Great War, been allowed to practice in a restricted way until 1938; Arnold Bergstraesser, also lecturer at the DHfP, after 1932 Professor for Political Science and International Studies at Heidelberg; John H. Herz, dismissed as trainee barrister in Düsseldorf; Karl Deutsch, before 1938 spokesman of the social-democratic students' association at the Caroline University of Prague; Hans J. Morgenthau, presiding judge of the labor tribunal in Frankfurt; Karl Loewenstein, private lecturer and lawyer in Munich; Ossip K. Flechtheim, dismissed in 1933 from the Justice Ministry and until his emigration member of the illegal socialist group *Neu Beginnen* (New Start) and Otto Kirchheimer, practicing law and like Neumann and Fraenkel active in the trade union movement.

These exiles all chose—sometimes after arduous detours through various European countries—the USA as their destination. Others found the escape route even more tortuous, the stations on the way more unusual, and the final country of destination more remote. Thus Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, after 1972 Professor of Political Science in Mannheim, rose between 1938 and 1949 from book-keeper to director of the State Mining Company in Tarija, Bolivia. Siegfried Landshut, before 1933 and after 1951 a respected interpreter of Marx and de Tocqueville at the University of Hamburg, went with his family to Palestine and was for five years staff officer in the British headquarters in the Near East.[36]

It was, however, exile in the United States that exerted the greatest influence on the development of science, on individual political perception, and for a time, even on the politics of German post-war reeducation strategies. Inside the United States, this meant contributing to the development of new, and the sophistication of existing, approaches. The exiles worked in the areas of comparative government, international relations, and, not least, the problematic conceptions of totalitarianism. After the onset of the Cold War, these conceptions increasingly substituted analyses of fascism (such as Neumann's "Behemoth" and Fraenkel's "Dual State)."[37] Morgenthau founded the realist school of foreign policy studies that stressed national interests instead of idealistic declarations. Deutsch applied approaches from communication and educational theory to processes of national and international government, conflict and cooperation. Herz analyzed the effects of the development of nuclear weapons on the international system. Hannah Arendt and Carl J. Friedrich, among others, increased the prestige of the totalitarian paradigm. These are some notable examples of the influence exiled academics exerted on American political

science. Their influence often had, in contrast to the empirically-based research in the USA, a stronger historical and theoretical bias. This influence was altogether "too subtle, too diffused"—and of course too diverse—"to be easily identified or measured."[38]

The consequences of exile for post-war West German developments can be identified more clearly. The starting point was the cooperation between emigre social scientists and American government departments, and later with occupation authorities in Germany. This cooperation dated from 1942-43 when the newly inaugurated Office of Strategic Services (OSS) set up a department for research and analysis. First Franz L. Neumann, then Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, Hajo Holborn (incumbent of the second Carnegie Chair at the DHfP, endowed in 1931), John H. Herz, and Karl Deutsch found employment there. The department evaluated secret service information on the enemy and processed it "into contemporary historical analyses, the high standard of which did not fail to influence the liberal American intellectuals installed by the 'New Deal' in the secret service and the bureaucracy."[39] Immediately after the defeat of Germany and Japan, the OSS was dissolved. The State Department took over the research and analysis department and renamed it Office of Research and Intelligence. Neumann remained head of the German policy section until 1948. Karl Loewenstein and Otto Kirchheimer were advisers for OMGUS, the American military government, until 1950, and then for the Office of the American High Commissioner in Germany (HICOG). Ernst Fraenkel advised the American military government in Korea.

Most of these scholars had not remained immune to Marxist and socialist ideas in Weimar Germany. They had been closely involved with the left wing of the Trade Union movement and the Social Democrats. One might therefore have expected their influence after 1945 to have favored—to use Neumann's words—"basic social-democratic structural reforms: the nationalization of key industries, the democratization of the civil service and the judiciary and the complete destruction of the educational privileges of the possessing classes."[40] One might at least have expected to detect his influence in a concept of political science that, starting from historical and structural analyses, promoted an educational reform based on two notions: that political equality is impossible without social equality and that democracy is conceivable only as social democracy. The economic and foreign policy interests of the USA frustrated both influences, increasingly directed, as they were, towards the conservation rather than the change of existing structures. In addition, these influences were frustrated by the awakening (or hardening) of corresponding attitudes amongst the majority of emigre scientists that exulted from their experiences in American exile.

It was already clear to Neumann himself, when he publicly called for structural reforms, that military government provided the most unfavorable preconditions imaginable for extensive attempts at democratization. He also saw that, quite apart from the intensification of the East-West conflict, such attempts collided with the American preference for the re-establishment of a free-enterprise system. Indeed, the U.S. cooperated with those forces in West Germany that opposed nationalizations.[41] At the same time, the social studies component of the education system, which followed the American model and included political science, was emasculated into little more than "an introduction to society." Political conflicts, especially the removal of social disadvantages, remained a minor topic even where education and training received new impetus.[45]

By this time, exiled social scientists had long since established "almost as a law" that conservative attitudes—conservative in the widest sense—were more continuously preserved, if not reinforced, than "left" attitudes.[43] Several sources fed this tendency to conservatism:

- the mass deprivation of the world depression had not brought about the collapse of capitalism in Germany but favored the transfer of power to fascism;
- the "New Deal," the Roosevelt experiment, seemed to demonstrate clearly that a capitalist economy too could be controlled and modified into a welfare state;[44]
- the Stalinist show-trials, and especially the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact "destroyed the illusion that a total socialization was predestined to lead to a 'true,' because classless, democracy."[45]

These conclusions resulted in a deep scepticism regarding both grand theoretical edifices as guides to action and the contribution that social science could make to the advancement of society. This generation had "seen the future of socialism still before them." Fascism and Stalinism compelled them to "look into the abyss." Scars remained; now they "shied away from the fire that once had burned them."[46] Even Neumann who still searched for "an answer to that terrible question, why human freedom and happiness disappeared at precisely that stage when mature technical civilization provided greater opportunities than ever before for their realization,"[47] betrayed a continuing "uncertainty regarding comprehensive theories of contemporary society and the political institutions sustaining them."[48]

Reduced expectations of structural, system-transcending changes were not the only result of exile in Roosevelt's USA and of the simultaneous oppression—even towards emigres—in Stalin's USSR. Exile also resulted in an anti-communism, the "uncompromising nature" of which contributed after

1945 in West Germany to "refining and upgrading the old disreputable anti-bolshevist scaremongering into anti-totalitarianism" and to providing a cover for the traditional "anti-communism fostered by national-socialist propaganda."[49] The foundations for the concept of "totalitarianism" with its equation: "red = brown" were laid during exile in America.

The "discovery of America" by West German political theory and philosophy derives from the experience of intellectual exile. Until the Second World War, the 1789 concept of democracy influenced by Rousseau, not the 1776 model derived from John Locke, had molded German debates on the subject. The French Revolution, a "radical caesura in world history," completely obscured the significance of the American Revolution.[50] The termination of this collective "repression" was equally connected with the massive American economic, military, and political presence in Western Europe after 1948, with the predominance of the American occupation force in West Germany and its influence over the future economic order even before the foundation of the Federal Republic,[51] and, last but not least, with a widespread emotional willingness to identify with, and idealize the USA as the leading victorious power. "The USA took the place of the *Führer,*" note Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich.[52]

Thus the process of restoration in the Federal Republic meant, not so much the execution of an anti-national-socialist duty imposed by a thought-through settling up with the past, but rather a fixation on the "opponent beyond the 'Iron Curtain' and the Wall" (Fraenkel 1964).[53] Fraenkel later observed that "at that time the Cold War had reached its height. It not only determined international activities but also the domestic policy of the Western world."[54] Accordingly, the slow establishment of political science took place against the background of a scholarly ethos that allowed for two models. An admittedly anti-fascist and anti-stalinist, but in practice anti-communist and anti-socialist view of totalitarianism provided the negative model and "a world community of democrats (of liberal, parliamentary extraction)" offered the positive model.[55]

VII.

In 1947 at the University of Goettingen, the Educational Adviser to the British Commander-in-Chief offered a series of lectures "designed for the general political education of all students." At the same time, the University of Marburg held a colloquium for students of all faculties on basic political questions. A year later, Marburg introduced compulsory lectures on citizenship.[56] The University of Heidelberg, in 1948, organized a *Dies Academicus,* that was to

establish "a living connection between the ever more isolated segments of our whole intellectual life." As part of the program, representatives of all faculties took a "Scientific Look at National Socialism." In 1950, the University of Bonn, "concerned for a clarification of our spiritual situation and for the independent formulation of opinion," presented a series of lectures on current political affairs as well as on "basic questions of scientific and political orientation in the world."

At the same time, the University of Marburg stated in the university calendar that it would only accept applicants who "could guarantee to have a positive attitude towards their future responsibility for the renewal of the nation in a freedom-loving and xenophilic sense." As political entry conditions that had sought to exclude incriminated National-Socialists disappeared, this statement disappeared as well. After 1950-51, new regulations affected applicants from the GDR—officially *Ostzone*—and also political refugees. In this way, too, the East-West conflict set its stamp on the universities, replacing a critical reappraisal of German fascism.

During that period, the *Studium generale*, with its emphasis on history and politics, that emerged at many universities faded into the background again. It was replaced by the specialized discipline of political science based on a "conceptual consensus."[57] In November 1947, in a memorandum to the American military government Hajo Holborn recommended the resurrection of the DHfP. It would return to its pre-1933 status as an institute closely linked to the universities but independent, "so that entry to its courses could be controlled more liberally."[58] Otto Suhr, the social-democratic chairman of the West Berlin city council and subsequent Mayor, pressed for the re-establishment of the Institute. He became its first director. Its opening on December 15, 1949 fell symbolically enough, in the middle of the Berlin Blockade, a period in which, Suhr noted, the city "could only remain alive with the protection of the Western allies."[59]

In 1949, the Hessian government arranged for an OMGUS-promoted tri-zonal conference at Waldleiningen on the subject of "Political Science in German Higher Education." Karl Loewenstein provided the initiative. As adviser to the American military government, Loewenstein attempted to "interest German universities and university administrations in 'political science.'"[60] By 1948 three chairs of political science had been founded in Hessen: in Frankfurt, Marburg and Darmstadt. Consistent with the American concept of re-education through social studies,[61] the conference invitation presupposed that "the traditional German education system was to be renewed by means of a social input." The invitation added that "political instruction was to reach its culmination in the university curriculum, and, moreover, for everyone."[62] Representatives of the three western military governments, of the Justice and Education ministries

of the *Länder* and of several universities attended the conference. The assembly resolved that the incorporation of the political sciences into the curricula of universities and similar establishments was essential and urgent. Demands were made for research funds, the establishment of separate professorial chairs and the inclusion of the discipline in the curricula of all students (if necessary as an examined subject).

When the WRK considered these demands during its Tübingen discussions on October 11-13, 1949, the reactions wavered between obvious caution, rejection, and aggression. The Erlangen rector suggested that the universities had "simply been steamrollered." His Tübingen equivalent spoke of the root-and-branch rejection of the Waldleiningen resolution at his university. Rector Tellenbach (Freiburg) accused the Waldleiningen conference of "amateurishness in its treatment of the substance and hubris in its attitude to people." Still, he added, "every opposition to Waldleiningen arouses the greatest suspicions amongst politicians at home and abroad." The rectors would have to develop concrete proposals so that they would not "be outplayed in the future." For the Munich rector, chairs of political science were comparable only to those in theology: they would "always be one-sided." In this atmosphere Rector Freudenberg (Heidelberg) noted that a "gentleman from the American education service" told him that in the USA the subject of political science had "at certain universities already reached a state of hypertrophy which was unwelcome even there." The WRK set up a commission to investigate university study in the area of social and political science. The commission's report was then gently laid to rest in Hanover on March 2-3, 1950 with the following resolution:

> In West Germany there are a number of positive and promising initiatives, including a fresh one emanating from student circles themselves. It appears at the moment that the main duty of universities lies in the protection, supplementation and evolution of what has been achieved in research and teaching . . . Present favourable developments could only be harmed by compulsory lectures and examinations and the application of party-political considerations to the selection of lecturers.[63]

In 1951 the *Deutsche Vereinigung für die Wissenschaft von der Politik* (German Society for Political Science) was founded and its executive office localized at the DHfP. HICOG, the office of the American High Commissioner (which had taken over from OMGUS), enabled the Society to set up a first research fund.[64] Three major events had taken place in 1950 to pave the way for

its founding:

- the introduction of regular cooperation between the Free University of Berlin and the DHfP through a (research) institute for political science.[65] This was a prelude to the integration of the DHfP, which (once more) was particularly devoted to adult education, into the Free University as a more conventional inter-faculty institute, the "Otto Suhr-Institut" or OSI, in 1959.
- a DHfP conference on "Science Within the Framework of Political Education." At the end of the conference, there appeared the categoric statement: "There is indeed an independent science of politics." This discipline was then defined in terms of "normative and institutional questions:"[66]

> This science is especially concerned with the acquisition, the use and the loss of power, with its ethos and its decline. This includes the treatment of the politically crucial problems of the mass age, of domestic political structure, international relations and the application of its results to daily political practices.[67]

- finally a conference in Königstein on "Teaching and Research in Political Science," where both representatives of the High Commissioner and social scientists exiled in America—*inter alia* Carl J. Friedrich, Franz Neumann and Karl Loewenstein—helped to formulate its conclusions.[68]

Subsequently, emigre academics taught repeatedly as visiting professors at the universities of the Federal Republic. In several cases, these emigres were appointed to chairs, as in the case of Friedrich (Heidelberg) Bergstraesser (Freiburg), Voegelin (Munich), Fraenkel (Berlin). Although opposition persisted, the WRK finally gave its blessing to the first wave of chairs in political science in 1954. A second wave followed after a spate of neo-nazi and anti-semitic graffiti swept through nearly all West German cities in late 1959 and early 1960. The Conference of Education Ministers reacted by deciding to promote political education with greater vigor. The third and last stage in the establishment of the subject coincided with the foundation of new universities from Bremen via Bochum to Konstanz at the beginning of the 1970s.

VIII.

An obituary on Arnold Bergstraesser (1964) stated:

> His most pressing concern was, following the interruption of efforts made during the first republic, to obtain for political science the dignity of a classical university discipline and thereby its integration into the traditional structure of the German University. Under the conditions of a new beginning, this is only possible by assembling at certain universities a large number of students, by fostering them intensively and leading them to doctoral and post-doctoral qualifications.[69]

thereby its integration into the traditional structure of the German University. Under the conditions of a new beginning, this is only possible by assembling at certain universities a large number of students, by fostering them intensively and leading them to doctoral and post-doctoral qualifications.[69]

As the new generation of academics took degrees and were appointed to chairs elsewhere, two "schools," "Freiburg" and "Berlin," established themselves throughout West Germany's universities. Representative of the former school are Manfred Hättich (Mainz, later Munich), Wilhelm Hennis (Freiburg), Gottfried-Karl Kindermann (Munich), Hans Maier (Munich), Alexander Schwan (Berlin), also, to a certain extent, Dieter Oberndörfer (Freiburg), and Kurt Sontheimer (Berlin, then Munich). The latter school is represented by Wolfram Bauer and Günther Doeker (both Berlin), and Winfried Steffani (Hamburg). The two schools so influenced each other conceptually and programmatically that until the caesura of the 1967-68 student revolt one could speak with only minor reservations[70] of a *single paradigm molded by the experience of exile* for political science in the Federal Republic.

Whether there was a greater normative-ontological emphasis as in the Freiburg, or a more pronounced liberal parliamentary one as in the Berlin school, this paradigm concentrated on:

- classical political theory—either that of the "good" commonwealth of classical antiquity, or else in the sense of the liberal, enlightened *bonum commune* typical of the "western" democracies;
- the institutions and decision-making processes of parliamentary-representative systems of government including political parties and pressure groups;
- the distinction of the western political system from that of "totalitarian rule."

For both Fraenkel and Bergstraesser—the dominant mentors of the early postwar period[71]—the experiences and impressions of exile in the United States overshadowed the beliefs that they had supported until their emigration. In the

Weimar Republic, Fraenkel and Bergstraesser had stood at opposite ends of the political spectrum: on the one hand (the SPD left wing) the trade-union lawyer Fraenkel), on the other the conservative Protestant Bergstraesser, a supporter of the notion of the powerful state as advocated by Max Weber.[72] It was anything but foreseeable, when they emigrated within a short time of each other in 1937-38, that 25 years later, Fraenkel would declare that Bergstraesser, founder of the Freiberg school, had become "an uncontested authority at other schools too."[73]

During the Weimar Republic, Bergstraesser adhered to the foreign policy represented by Stresemann. This foreign policy, not unjustly described as "liberal imperialism," maintained the revisionary aims of Germany in the East while seeking reconciliation in the West.[74] Accordingly Bergstraesser rejected the "acceptance of the notion of rapprochement as an indispensable principle of politics:[75]

> To come to an agreement with respect to these questions (of German policy), e.g. the question of disarmament, the Eastern frontier and the union with Austria, would mean today making the will of the enemy one's own, i.e. in practice giving up the right to determine for ourselves our own national policies.

Max Weber had always declared that "the interests of national power exceeded in importance all other questions of government;" that "parliamentarization and democratization were for him primarily a means to create the domestic preconditions for an effective German world policy."[76] Bergstraesser echoed Weber: Germany had the "*duty*" to be a world power, "for internal as well as external reasons."[77] He, no less than Weber, supported a functionalist view of democracy. In 1933, he declared that he had "felt for many years that nothing but dictatorship would restore order and confidence in Germany."[78] In a speech which belongs in the same category as the "Declaration," the text of which heads this essay, Bergstraesser set out his views thus:[79]

> With the exception of the Socialist parties, the whole population of Germany felt the need of increasing the authority of the State . . . The abuses of democratic institutions in Germany led to this lack of action, which became a genuine danger to national life . . .
>
> In comparison with the days of the "pluralist" party system the administration's real influence has increased very

> much since the foundation of the authoritarian state . . . The work of officials has become free from considerations which are not essential for the problem itself . . . Purely tactical reasons of Party policy will not obtrude themselves as was formerly the case . . .
>
> The organization of the professional groups and the new adjustment of the relations between capital and labor have been arranged by the assistance of the Party organization . . . The government is consequently (in its economic policy) not bound to consider plans of demagogic origin whose execution would be a disadvantage for the whole . . . Thus despair is destroyed and confidence created among those who had previously too many reasons to suppose that some few individuals were utilizing the common ill to their own advantage.

Bergstraesser made this speech although, on May 6, 1933 he had been given compulsory leave pursuant to the "non-Aryans" article of the so-called Law of Restoration of the Civil Service. Only under the provisions of another section of the same law (Bergstraesser was a World War veteran) was his leave—which would have meant removal—temporarily suspended and then revoked.[80] In 1934-35 Bergstraesser still lectured on the "*diktat* of Versailles."[81] As chief examiner of the doctoral thesis of the subsequent RSHA departmental chief, *SS-Oberführer* and Dean of the International Studies Faculty in Berlin, Franz Alfred Six, Bergstraesser approved the thesis entitled "Die politische Propaganda der NSDAP im Kampf um die Macht" ("The Political Propaganda of the NSDAP in the Struggle for Power"). In this thesis Six wrote:[82]

> The struggle for the propagation of the national-socialist ideology amongst the German people is to be seen as the victory of the racially superior, more valuable elements in German humanity over the racially inferior and base elements . . . The East Galician, the fat greasy Jew, the big-shot, the social-democrat's cloth cap and the grinning of the subhuman communist were, thanks to the determined propaganda of the national socialist movement soon engraved on the memory of the masses.

Six was condemned to 20 years imprisonment in Nuremberg in 1948, but released in 1952. Extracts from his dissertation were published in 1966 in

the series *Braune Universität*. Editor Rolf Seeliger argued in the introduction that in the case of the *Doctor nazi causa* the professors who judged the thesis positively on behalf of the faculties, and the faculties themselves that granted the degrees, bore no less of a responsibility for the contents than the doctorands themselves.[83]

In 1932 Bergstraesser had cooperated in the withdrawal of the *venia legendi* of Emil Julius Gumbel, a severe critic of the judiciary *(Vier Jahre politischer Mord [Four Years of Political Murder]; Verräter verfallen der Feme ['Traitors' in the Hands of Kangaroo Courts])* and a vehement pacifist. Gumbel's books were burned on the bonfires of May 10, 1933.[84] On August 27, 1936, Bergstraesser, denounced as a "Jewish half-breed," was deprived of his own *venia legendi*. During his exile, he was criticized because his contribution to an outline of German history published in 1944 had not drawn any systematic conclusions on the structural origins of National Socialism from his earlier sympathy for it.[85] After his final return to the Federal Republic in 1954, no considered appraisal of these matters took place during his lifetime (i.e. with his possible participation). Instead, he was acclaimed as the co-founder of the Students' Union and then of the German Academic Exchange Service before 1933,[86] the director of the research institute of the *Deutsche Gesselschaft für Auswärtige Politik* (German Society for Foreign Policy), the co-initiator of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerika-Studien* (German Society for American Studies), the holder of the Konrad Adenauer Medal and the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. Where there was so much light, no shadow should fall.

IX.

In 1933, Bergstraesser had claimed:

> It was not true that the German people did not want dictatorship and did not "charge" the National-Socialist Party to exercise it. On March 5, 1933, the National Socialists gained 44 percent of the vote and the Nationalists, who also wanted dictatorship, gained 8 percent, giving the two parties a majority in the *Reichstag*.[87]

But Fraenkel's comment on the "elections," not Bergstraesser's is more pertinent:[88]

> Let the government in future derive its legitimacy from its mere power. Referring to the voice of the people will be out of the question after having forbidden them to express their will freely. A government monopoly on the wireless, a ban on opposition speeches, those are methods we expect from the Balkans.

Fraenkel viewed the very assumption of power by Papen's government, eighteen months earlier, as "a rejection of social and economic parity by employers which cleared the way for the political struggle of the working class for the establishment of its class objective, which can no longer be parity but its supremacy.[89]

Fraenkel analyzed the political, socio-economic, and socio-psychological processes—the end of the monarchy, inflation, the "proletarian influence" on the state—that first "pulled the rug from under the feet" of the German *Judiciary* and then drove it into opposition against the republic.[90] He argued that "owing to the virtual elimination of economic competition the power of the *employers* in society had already been strengthened so considerably before 1929 that the aim of a balance in society based on parity" between political and social forces "could not longer be achieved."[91] This had been the underlying principle of the Weimar constitution as opposed to the pre-war monarchy. Finally he concluded that the "dialectal democracy"—the *form of the state* adopted by "enlightened high capitalism" to alleviate class differences—no longer functioned in the Weimar Republic because of the "detachment of the middle classes from capitalist leadership and ideology" in favor of National Socialism.[92]

Economy and society, the state, and the judiciary: for the Fraenkel of the Weimar Republic the increasingly bitter "class struggle from above" meant only one thing: "the overthrow of capitalism."[93] Fraenkel wrote, "Malfunctions of democracy in a society of class cleavages prove that the classless society is the prerequisite of genuine democracy."[94] The transition of Fraenkel's anti-fascist educational work before 1933 into illegal work after 1933 was inevitable.[95] He wrote (under the pseudonym of "Fritz Dreher"),

> Socialism suffered an ignominious collapse in Germany in 1933. It can only become a political force in Germany again if it first becomes a moral force. The reign of terror of the Third Reich is a tremendous opportunity for Socialism to become a moral force. Only through illegal work, visibly illegal work, can Socialism regain the prestige that it lost completely in 1933,

> and without which a rebirth or rather a new birth of socialism in Germany is impossible.

The intensification of the national-socialist terror and the decline of organized resistance, his own emigration, and finally the outbreak of the Second World War rendered Fraenkel deeply sceptical of the "disorganized, disillusioned and disorientated working class" in Germany.[96] The shock of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact—"the day of bitterest affliction,"[97]—the ray of hope provided by the New Deal, finally America's entry into the war all led him to conclude that it was only the "Anglo-Saxon democracies that have saved the world from sinking into the night of tyranny." Fraenkel observed:[98]

> Whoever rejects the Russian solution must be concerned to establish the link between the memory that is the German working-class movement and the present struggle of the Anglo-Saxon democracies for the liberation of Europe and therefore also for the German working-class . . . [This can] have a future only by trusting in and cooperating with the Anglo-Saxon democracies [1943].—The experience of the "Roosevelt revolution" accounted for the willingness to cooperate in the establishment and development of a pluralistic model of democracy such as I hoped for for post-Hitlerian Germany [1973].

Discontinuity and change were stronger than continuity in both Fraenkel's and Bergstraesser's case. For Bergstraesser, the interest in France during the period before his exile[99] "diminished markedly and was replaced by an intensive concern to smooth the way for academic research into the USA in Germany."[100] For Fraenkel, who after 1945 "made no secret of his emotional commitment to the USA," the "theory of dialectic democracy as the parameter of a democratically regulated class struggle" was widened into "a general conception of pluralism." Fraenkel's stress on "social multipolarity" and "abstaining from establishing an *a priori* hierarchy of conflicts depending on their significance and impact," arose from his experiences in New Deal America.[101] At the same time, Fraenkel and Bergstraesser both elevated the concept of totalitarianism to the *absolute* opposite of their own concept:

> The democratic order has in the course of the last 130 years aided the creation of its opposite: the totalitarian order of

> society. The liberties, which in a state governed by freedom and the rule of law are guaranteed by the separation of powers, are in a totalitarian system abolished by the forced union of these powers. Thinking, in so far as it touches upon areas of principle, artistic activity and spiritual experience itself are limited and perverted by political injunctions imposed dictatorially by the desire for world-revolution.

These words, although Bergstraesser's,[102] could have come from Fraenkel.

X.

Quite rightly it has been judged[103] that:

- on the one hand, Ernst Fraenkel's concept of pluralism as an analytical parameter was "probably the most important product of the early stage of Political Science and the contribution *par excellence* of the discipline to the political theory of parliamentary representative systems of government";
- on the other hand, those representatives of the subject who came from Bergstraesser's Freiburg school or were influenced by it formed for a decade the strongest group within West German political science;
- both schools came together in a considerably de-historicized understanding of political science as a "synoptic" one-sidedly normative discipline, more or less akin to moral philosophy, rather than including historical and structurally analytical arguments.

The dissolution of the exiles's political science paradigm began with the reception of the behavioralist and systems theory approaches of "modern" American political science in the mid-1960s.[104] The new methods, however, did not cause the conflict that accompanied this dissolution. Their source lay rather in the abandonment of the basic normative consensus in the face of a university-based political movement. Students of sociology and political science played an influential part in this movement, while professorial assistants in the discipline became its radical spokesmen.[105] The Vietnam War undermined acceptance of the United States as a positive model and the "Soviet system" as its negative totalitarian counterpart. The accession to power of the Grand Coalition, with its reduction of the Opposition's effectiveness, the passing of the emergency powers legislation, and the growing rejection of the traditional, ossified professorial hierarchies at universities challenged hitherto unquestioned institutions.

The protest movement demanded the inclusion of Marxist theories,

opened a debate on parliamentary and direct democracy, confronted the concept of pluralism with the question of the persistence of class divisons in capitalist society, and suggested that not only "totalitarian" states operated an imperialist foreign policy.

In a countermove, Ernst Fraenkel applied the theorems of pluralism and totalitarianism to the political disputes in higher education. "Pluralist university democracy"[106] seemed to him to be endangered by "an integrated plan of campaign." The protest movement was nothing more than a "dogmatically bound recipient of orders from a certain political direction," that was "led and driven forward by relatively small, cohesive and disciplined groups."[107] Three years later Fraenkel warned[108] against the study of political science if it

> was done by indoctrination, which, at best, is suited to a red seminary . . . Some university statutes—this is especially true of Berlin—make it child's play for a power hungry revolutionary clique to control key academic disciplines and through them wield unsuspected political influence even outside the universities. Faculties of Political Science could conceivably turn out to be veritable breeding grounds of pestilence.

The emotionally laden vehemence of Fraenkel's reaction arose from his existential experiences of the Nazi reign of terror and of life-saving emigration. These experiences led also to a moral identification with the USA as the exponent of western democracy[109] that he passed on to the first generation of pupils. The emigres who determined the West German political science paradigm had overrated Roosevelt's "New Deal." The paradigm gradually collapsed as the Vietnam war suffocated Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" and as the problematic features of the "American Empire" became apparent.

Fraenkel's prevalent, pluralistic model, wedded to current concepts of liberal-representative democracy and the welfare state, survived what David Easton termed "the new revolution" in political science. But the events of the sixties had irrevocably shattered, for a part of the political science community, their earlier commitment to the ongoing socio-economic and political system. A radical alternative emerged from critical assessments of the (not least economic) constraints on the organized representation of interests, on the approximate equality of the chances for political influence and control. This alternative, socialist pluralism, largely coincided with participatory democracy. It combined, as far as possible, representative institutions with socio-economic and

political self-government.[110] Through socialist pluralism, the classical aims and problems of democratization, envisaged by the radical critiques of liberalism, reappeared in new garb. With its emergence, political science in West Germany finally re-entered the arena of normative dispute which, sooner or later, had to catch up again with a subject so decidedly analytical *and* normative.

NOTES

1. Dedicated to the memory of Eleonore Sterling and Fritz Levy. Eleonore Sterling, who emigrated in 1938 and returned to the Federal Republic in 1952, wrote a study on the early history of anti-semitism in Germany (*Er ist wie Du*, Munich 1956). In 1968 she occupied the present author's post at the then *Pädagogische Hochschule Osnabrück*. She died in the same year. Fritz Levy, a cattle dealer from Jever (Lower Saxony), fled abroad in 1938 and returned in 1951, settling as the last of the Jewish community that had lived in his home town since 1698. His house was set alight by persons unknown; he himself lost an eye in an assault. Solitary and unconventional, committed to the welfare of the town's youth, he was elected to the town council of Jever. Hounded by the conservative majority of the population and their mouthpiece the *Jeversche Wochenblatt* he took his own life in 1983, aged 82.

2. Eugen Kogon, *Keine Sturmtruppe der Revolution*. In: FAZ., 18. 10. 1969, p. 12.

3. Studienausschuss für Hochschulreform 1948: *Gutachten zur Hochschulreform* ('Blaues Gutachten'), quoted from Rolf Neuhaus (ed.), *Dokumente zur Hochschulreform 1945-1959* (Wiesbaden, 1961), p. 291; also Hermann Heimpel, *Probleme und Problematik der Hochschulreform* (Göttingen, 1956), p. 7.

4. Cf. Frederick Lilge, *The Abuse of Learning. The Failure of the German University* (New York, 1948); Leon Poliakov, Josef Wulf, *Das Dritte* and *Reich und seine Denker* (Berlin, 1959); Jenö Kurucz; *Struktur and Funktion der Intelligenz während der Weimarer Republik* (n.p., 1967); Hans Peter Bleuel, *Deutschlands Bekenner. Professoren zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur* (Bern/München/Wien, 1968); most comprehensively Fritz K. Ringer: *The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Academic Community, 1890-1933* (Cambridge, 1969).

5. Rudolf Smend, *Bürger und Bourgeois im deutschen Staatsrecht* (Berlin, 1933), p. 17s.

6. Rudolf Smend, *Hochschule und Parteien*. In: *Das akademische Deutschland*. vol. 3: *Die deutschen Hochschulen in ihren Beziehungen zur Gegenwartskultur* (Berlin, 1930), pp. 153-162, esp. p. 159, 161s.

7. Eduard Spranger: *Mein Konflikt mit der national-sozialistischen Regierung 1933*. In: *Universitas*, 10 (1955), pp. 457-473, esp. p. 457, 465.

8. Karl C. Thalheim: *Stellungnahme*. In: Rolf Seeliger (ed.), *Braune Universität. Deutsche Hochschullehrer gestern und heute*. vol. IV. (Munich, 1966), pp. 27-38, esp. p. 36, 38.

9. Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund Deutschland/Sachsen (ed.), *Bekenntnis der Professoren an den deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen zu Adolf Hitler und dem nationalsozialistischen Staat* (Dresden, 1933), p. 3.

10. Cf. Helge Pross, *Die Deutsche Akademische Emigration nach den Vereinigten Staaten 1933-1941* (Berlin, 1955), p. 12; Matthias Greffrath (ed.), *Die Zerstörung einer Zukunft. Gespräche mit emigrierten Sozialwissenschaftlern* (Reinbek, 1979), p. 7.

11. On the quotation cf. Herbert Grabert, *Hochschullehrer klagen an. Von der Demontage deutscher Wissenschaft* (Goettingen, 1952), p. 36s. On details relating to the three professorial pressure groups, see in particular the addenda to the protocols of the *Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz* for 1951-52. I am grateful to Dr. Kalischer for allowing me to consult the archives of the WRK in Bonn.

12. Karl Loewenstein *Justice*. In: Edward H. Litchfield et al. *Governing Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, 1953), pp. 236-262, esp. p. 248.

13. Federal Minister of the Interior Robert Lehr on February 13, 1951, quoted from Falko Kruse: *NS-Prozesse und Restauration*. In: Redaktion Kritische Justiz, ed., *Der Unrechts-Staat. Recht und Justiz im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 164-189, esp. p. 175.

14. State secretary Hans-Joachim von Merkatz on September 17, 1952, quoted from Kruse (note 13), p. 172.

15. The details on the numbers of professors and non-professors returning are from Helmuth Plessner, ed., *Untersuchungen zur Lage der deutschen Hochschullehrer*, vol. III: Christian von Ferber, *Die Entwicklung des Lehrkörpers der deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen 1864-1954* (Göttingen, 1956), fig. 22, p. 145s. On the quotation by Hans-Joachim Dahms, cf. id.: *Verluste durch Emigration. Die Auswirkungen der national-sozialistischen "Säuberungen" an der Universität Göttingen—Eine Fallstudie*. In: Jahrbuch für Exilforschung, Vol. IV (Munich, 1986), pp. 160-185. I am grateful to Dr. Jürgen Fischer (Bonn), the former general secretary of the WRK, for permission to consult the protocols of the first (zonal and north-west German) Rectoral conferences. Fischer is editing these protocols for the research project supported by the Volkswagen Foundation on "Higher Education in the Federal Republic of and Germany and Berlin (West) 1945-1976." I am also grateful to Frau A. v. Lossow for archival help.

16. Cf. Ernst Forsthoff, *Rechtsstaat im Wandel* (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 61.

17. Hermann Weinkauff, *Die deutsche Justiz und der Nationalsozialismus*, quoted from Gerhard Mauz, *Ernst Forsthoff und andere . . .* In: Karl Corino, ed., *Intellektuelle im Banne des Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg, 1980), pp. 193-203, esp. p. 199.

18. References to the tradition of a general theory of government in Germany and its cessation after 1871 can already be found in Franz Neumann, *Die Wissenschaft der Politik in der Demokratie* (Berlin, 1950), p. 5f.

19. This accurate resumee in Bernhard Blanke, Ulrich Jürgens and Hans Kastendiek, *Kritik der Politischen Wissenschaft* 1. (Frankfurt and New York, 1975), p. 53s.

20. Cf. Paul M. Rühlmann, *Eine freie Hochschule für politische Wissenschaften in Berlin*. In: do.: *Wege zur Staatsgesinnung* (Charlottenburg, 1919), pp. 156-160, esp. p. 157.

21. Theodor Heuss, *Denkschrift zur Errichtung einer Deutschen Hochschule für Politik*. In: *Politische Bildung: Wille/Wesen/Ziel/Weg. Sechs Reden, gehalten bei der Eröffnung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik* (Berlin, 1921), pp. 33-37. Cf. similar sentiments in the speeches of *Reich* ministers Koch and Simons, *Ministerialrat* Richter (Prussian Ministry of Science, Art and Education) and of the retired *Staatsminister* Drews, chairman of the governing body of the DHfP (ibid.).

22. Cf. Blanke, Jürgens and Kastendiek (note 19), p. 51s.

23. Cf. on this the studies of Werner Link, *Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1921-32* (Düsseldorf, 1970), and his *Der amerikanische Einfluss auf die Weimarer Republik in der Dawesplanphase (Elemente eines 'penetrierten Systems')*. In: Hans Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina, and Bernd Weisbrod, eds, *Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 485-498.

24. Described in great detail by Ernst Jäckh, *Die 'alte' Hochschule für Politik 1920-1933*. In: do. and Otto Suhr, *Geschichte der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik* (Berlin, 1952), p. 19s.

25. Jäckh (note 24), p. 12.

26. Joachim Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA* (Düsseldorf, 1971), pp. 299, 298 (Emphasis not in the original).

27. Blanke, Jürgens, and Kastendiek (note 19), p. 48.

28. Hans Simons (Director of DHfP) 1930, quoted from Hans-Heinz Schneider, *Die "alte" Hochschule für Politik*. In: *Das Otto Suhr-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 5-34, esp. p. 15.

29. Cf. Schneider (note 28), p. 16.

30. Jäckh (note 24), p. 21.

31. Josef Wagner/Alfred Beck (ed.): *Hochschule für Politik der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei. Ein Leitfaden* (Muenchen, 1933), p. 1.—On the (D)HfP between 1933 and 1940, see Arnulf Kutsch: *Rundfunkwissenschaft im Dritten Reich* (Munich, 1985), pp. 37-39.

32. Cf. Erich Siebert, *Entstehung und Struktur der Auslandswissenschaftlichen Fakultät an der Universität Berlin (1940-1945)*. In: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universität Berlin, *Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe*, 15 (1966), pp. 19-34. I am grateful to Dr. Carsten Klingemann (University of Osnabrück) for drawing this article to my attention.

33. Cf. Siebert (note 32), pp. 25, 26 (here the quotation from Frank). Schneider (note 28), p. 31, does not go beyond the comment (incorrect in its dating) that "after a complete reorganization by a state commissioner the Institute was continued as a state-run institution with predominantly national-socialist lecturers for another two years and was then incorporated into the University of Berlin." Similarly Jäckh (note 24), p. 6: "Only two years later events had developed as the President (i.e. Jäckh himself) had prophesied when he told both Hitler and Goebbels that the Institute, as a mere party school run by the Propaganda ministry, was indeed

doomed, both internationally and nationally." Even if political science was indisputably manipulated and reduced in scope, its continued existence seems to have complied with the needs of the national-socialist regime. Further research will have to clarify to what extent manipulation meant that problems were dealt with in a merely propagandistic way. The question is controversial; cf. the debate in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 1985-86 (vol. 26, no. 4; vol. 27, no. 2 and 3) with contributions by Johannes Weyer, Kurt Lenk, and Hubertus Buchstein/Gerhard Göhler which, for reasons of space, cannot be discussed here.

34. Cf. Franz L. Neumann, *The Social Sciences*. In: do./Henri Peyre et al., *The Cultural Migration. The European Scholar in America* (Philadelphia, 1953), pp. 4-26, esp. p. 13.

35. Gerald Stourzh, *Die deutschsprachige Emigration in den Vereinigten Staaten: Geschichtswissenschaft und Politische Wissenschaft*. In: *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*, 10 (1965), pp. 59-77, esp. p. 70.

36. Cf. in addition to the above biographical details vol. 2 of the biographical handbook by Roeder/Strauss, the galley proofs of which were kindly placed at my disposal by the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* (Munich).

37. Similarly H. Stuart Hughes, *Franz Neumann Between Marxism and Liberal Democracy*. In: Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration. Europe and America, 1930-1960* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 446-462, esp. p. 453; Radkau (note 26), p. 273s.

38. Neumann (note 34), p. 23.

39. Ulrich Borsdorf/Lutz Niethammer, *Zwischen Befreiung und Besatzung. Analysen des US-Geheimdienstes über Positionen und Strukturen deutscher Politik 1945* (Wuppertal, 1976), p. 11. On the other details of this paragraph cf. ibid. and op. cit. p. 16s. and Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950* (New York, 1972), p. 168s.

40. Franz L. Neumann, *Military Government and the Revival of Democracy in Germany*. In: *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, 2 (1948), pp. 3-20, esp. p. 7.

41. Neumann (note 40), pp. 5, 20.

42. This summary from Jutta B. Lange-Quassowski, *Neuordnung oder Restauration?* (Opladen, 1979), p. 246.

43. Radkau (note 26), p. 280.

44. Of the same opinion are, for instance, Neumann (note 34), p. 18; Ernst Fraenkel: *Anstatt einer Vorrede*. In his *Reformismus und Pluralismus*. Falk Esche and Frank Grube, eds. (Hamburg, 1973), pp. 11-26, esp. p. 26.

45. Fraenkel, ibid.; cf. also Radkau (note 26), p. 278ss.

46. Greffrath (note 10), p. 16; Henry Pachter, *Weimar Etudes* (New York, 1982), p. 346.

47. Herbert Marcuse, *Vorwort*. In: Franz Neumann, *Demokratischer und autoritärer Staat* (Frankfurt and Wien, 1967), pp. 5-8, esp. p. 7.

48. Hughes (note 47), p. 446; Helge Pross, *Einleitung*. In: Neumann (note 47), pp. 9-27, esp. p. 23.

49. Radkau (note 26), p. 280.

50. Manfred Hennigsen, *Der Fall Amerika* (Muenchen, 1974), p. 10.

51. Cf. in detail Hans-Hermann Hartwich, *Sozialstaatspostulat und gesellschaftlicher Status quo* (Koeln and Opladen, 1970). Hennigsen (note 50) pays no more attention to such processes than to the export of American capital after 1924 and the interests of those groups in Germany that profited from it, however temporarily. This circumstance leads him to the bold, and mistaken, assertion that Radkau's statement quoted above in section II (cf. note 26) is a "sectarian left-wing variant" of a "conspiracy theory" (p. 205).

52. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, *Eine deutsche Art zu lieben*. (Reworked and extended version of the first chapter of *Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern*. (Muenchen, 1970), p. 78.

53. Ernst Fraenkel, *Der Pluralismus als Strukturelement der freiheitlich-rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie* (München and Bern, 1964), pp. B5, B9.

54. Ernst Fraenkel, Modified *Vorwort* in the 6th edition of his *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien* (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 7.

55. Hans-Joachim Arndt, *Die Besiegten von 1945* (Berlin, 1978), pp. 167, 259.

56. These and the following details are derived from the lecture lists of the universities named.

57. Blanke et al. (note 19), p. 94.

58. Cf. Lange-Quassowski (note 42), pp. 227, 301 n. 725.

59. Otto Suhr, *Die "neue" Hochschule für Politik*. In: *Das Otto Suhr-Institut . . .* (note 28), pp. 35-48, esp. p. 37.

60. Loewenstein's own words reminiscing in 1965, quoted from Blanke et al. (note 19), p. 55.

61. So too Heinrich Schneider, *Einleitung*. In: id., ed., *Aufgabe und Selbstverständnis der Politischen Wissenschaft* (Darmstadt, 1967), p. IX-XXXVI, esp. p. XII.

62. *Staatsminister* Erwin Stein, *Eröffnung*. In: Hessisches Ministerium für Erziehung und Volksbildung, ed., *Die politischen Wissenschaften an den deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen. Gesamtprotokoll der Konferenz von Waldleiningen vom 10./11. September 1949* (Wiesbaden, 1950), pp. 7-14, esp. pp. 10, 12.

63. On the Waldleiningen demands see op. cit., p. 155; on their treatment by the WRK (evident from its protocols) see note 15.

64. Cf. Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (Berlin), *Vorlesungsverzeichnis Sommersemester 1951*, p. 15.

65. Cf. ibid. In 1952 the Free University and the DHfP agreed on the creation of professorial chairs in political science in the Philosophical Faculty and the Faculty of Economics and Social Science. Graduates of the DHfP were able to study there for doctorates.

66. Blanke et al. (note 19), p. 70.

67. Deutsche Hochschule für Politik Berlin, *Vorlesungsverzeichnis Sommersemester 1952*, p. 22.

68. Cf. on this Hessisches Ministerium für Erziehung und Volksbildung, ed., *Über Lehre und Forschung der Wissenschaft von der Politik*. Gesamtprotokoll der Konferenz von Königstein im Taunus vom 15./16. Juni 1950 (Wiesbaden, 1951). The conference, which pursued the themes of the Waldleiningen conference, was also organized at the invitation of the Hessian *Landesregierung*. It led to the foundation of the *Deutsche Vereinigung für die Wissenschaft von der Politik*.

69. Quoted from Caspar Schrenck-Notzing, *Charakterwäsche. Die amerikanische Besatzung in Deutschland und ihre Folgen* (Stuttgart, 1965) (3rd edition), p. 149.

70. On the "loners" outside the "schools" cf. the summary of Klaus von Beyme, *Modern Schools of Politics: Western Germany*. In: *Government and Opposition*, 17 (1982), pp. 94-107, esp. p. 97.

71. Arndt (note 55), p. 265.

72. Cf. Arnold Bergstraesser, *Sinn und Grenzen der Verständigung zwischen Nationen* (Munich and Leipzig, 1930), p. 38s.

73. Ernst Fraenkel, *Arnold Bergstraesser*. In: *Jahrbuch für Amerika-Studien*, 10 (1965), pp. 8-14, esp. p. 13.

74. Thus the verdict of Michael Olaf Maxelon, *Stresemann und Frankreich 1914-1929* (Düsseldorf, 1972), p. 276.

75. Bergstraesser (note 72), p. 89.

76. So in summary Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920* (Tübingen, 1959), p. 394.

77. Bergstraesser (note 72), p. 39.

78. On October 19, 1933 in the final comment on the discussion of his lecture: "The Economic Policy of the German Government." Cf. the printed version of his lecture and the following discussion in: *International Affairs* (January, 1934), pp. 26-46, esp. p. 44.

79. Bergstraesser (note 78), esp. p. 26ss., 29, 31. Cf. already Bergstraesser's statements in id.: *Nation und Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, 1933), ch. IV (p. 31ss.), V (p. 40ss.).

80. Cf. Birgit Vezina, *Die 'Gleichschaltung' der Universität Heidelberg im Zuge der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung* (Heidelberg, 1982), pp. 43, 47; regarding the withdrawal of Bergstraesser's *venia legendi* in 1936, p. 113s.

81. Cf. the lecture lists of the Ruprecht Karl-University Heidelberg for the summer semester 1934 and the winter semester 1934-35.

82. Franz Alfred Six, *Die politische Propaganda der NSDAP im Kampf um die Macht* (Heidelberg, 1936), p. 20, 60.

83. Cf. Rolf Seeliger, ed., *Doktorarbeiten im Dritten Reich.* Braune Universität, vol. 5 (Munich, 1966), p. 10s.

84. On Gumbel and the circumstances of the withdrawal of his *venia legendi* cf. Wolfgang Benz, *Emil J. Gumbel. Die Karriere eines deutschen Pazifisten.* In: Ulrich Walberer, ed., *10. Mai 1933.* (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 160-198, esp. p. 185s.—It was Bergstraesser who, as a member of the Committee of Inquiry set up by the Faculty of Philosophy, reported to the faculty. His own later fate bars any petty-minded settling of accounts. However, one cannot consult the Gumbel papers in the archive of the University of Heidelberg (cf. III 5b No. 334, changed to B-3075/19, pp. 195-197, 223-225) and contrast Bergstraesser's degrading phrases with Gumbel's pertinent and sympathetic appraisal by his official counsel Gustav Radbruch without feeling ashamed of the impositions Gumbel had to suffer.

85. Cf. Waldemar Gurian, *The German Riddle.* In: *Review of Politics,* VI (1944), pp. 541-547, esp. p. 542s. In *Germany. A Short History* (New York, 1944), on which Bergstraesser collaborated with George N. Shuster, Bergstraesser was responsible for the first chapters (Germany to 1914). Cf. with his colorless description of the "new world power" after 1871 the study by Kurt Stechert, *Wie war das möglich?* (Stockholm, 1945), which was also produced in emigre circles. The controversies surrounding Bergstraesser during his exile have been analyzed by Claus-Dieter Krohn, *Der Fall Bergstraesser in Amerika.* In: *Jahrbuch Exilforschung,* 4 (Munich, 1986), pp. 254-275. On p. 270, Krohn quotes Golo Mann's 1942 judgment to the effect that he considered Bergstraesser "a morally culpable academic abetter of the catastrophe."

86. The contribution by Jürgen Schwarz, *Arnold Bergstraesser und die Studentenschaft der frühen zwanziger Jahre.* In: *ZfP,* 15 (1968), pp. 300-311, dispenses, even in the case of direct quotations, with references to sources. The accounts of the war time student generation, of the *Freie Studentenschaft* (to which Bergstraesser belonged) and lastly of the German Students' Union do not permit a precise definition of Bergstraesser's views. The academic value of this contribution is therefore rather limited.

87. Bergstraesser (note 78), p. 46.

88. Ernst Fraenkel, *Chronik.* In: *Die Justiz,* 8 (1932-33), pp. 281-284, quoted from the reprint in id.: *Reformismus und Pluralismus.* Falk Esche and Frank Grube, eds., (Hamburg, 1973), pp. 194-198, esp. p. 198.

89. Ernst Fraenkel, *Abschied von Weimar?* In: *Die Gesellschaft.* 2 (1932), pp. 109-124, quoted from the reprint in id.: *Zur Soziologie der Klassenjustiz und Aufsätze zur Verfassungskrise 1931-32* (Darmstadt, 1968), pp. 57-72, esp. p. 72.

90. Ernst Fraenkel, *Zur Soziologie der Klassenjustiz* (Berlin, 1927), esp. pp. 12s., 17ss., 28ss., quoted here from the reprint (note 89), pp. 8s., 13ss., 24ss.

91. Fraenkel, *Abschied von Weimar?* (note 89), p. 64.

92. Fraenkel, *Um die Verfassung.* In: *Die Gesellschaft,* 2 (1932), pp. 297-312, quoted from the reprint in: id. *Zur Soziologie* . . . (note 89), pp. 73-88, esp. p. 79ss.

93. Hans Kremendahl, *Pluralismustheorie in Deutschland* (Leverkusen, 1977), p. 190.

94. Ernst Fraenkel, *Die Staatskrise und der Kampf um den Staat*. In: *Sozialistische Bildung*, 14 (1932), pp. 236-239, quoted from the reprint in: id.: *Reformismus* . . . (note 88), pp. 180-184, esp. p. 184.

95. Fritz Dreher (Ernst Fraenkel), *Der Sinn illegaler Arbeit*. In: *Sozialistische Warte*, 10 (1935), pp. 241-247, quoted from the reprint in: id., *Reformismus* . . . (note 88), pp. 240-247, esp. p. 244.

96. Ernst Frankel *Aussichten einer deutschen Revolution*. In: *Neue Volkszeitung*, September 19, 1943, quoted from reprint in: id.: *Reformismus* . . . (note 88), pp. 275-282, esp. p. 280.

97. ibid., p. 279.

98. ibid., p. 281 (1943); ibid. (introduction 1973), p. 26.

99. Cf. on this also Ernst Robert Curtius and Arnold Bergstraesser, *Frankreich*, vol 2: *Staat und Wirtschaft Frankreichs* by Arnold Bergstraesser. (Stuttgart, Berlin, and Leipzig, 1930).

100. Fraenkel (note 73), p. 12. Cf. on this also Bergstraesser's contributions in: Arnold Bergstraesser, *Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung* (Freiburg, 1961), pt. III: *Europa und Amerika*.

101. Kremendahl (note 93), pp. 221, 234.

102. Arnold Bergstraesser, *Führung in der modern Welt* (Freiburg, 1961), pp. 40, 43.

103. Cf. Blanke et al. (note 19), pp. 76, 79, 80.

104. Cf. on this von Beyme (note 70), p. 95; Blanke et al. (note 19), p. 104ss., 107ss.

105. Kogon (note 2), ibid.

106. He had in mind that of the "Berlin model" at the Free University, which, in contrast to Western German universities, provided for a certain amount of student and non-professorial representation on academic committees.

107. Ernst Fraenkel, *Universität und Demokratie* (Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 31, 68, 37; do., *Brief an die Schriftleitung des FU-Spiegels*, printed in the *FU-Spiegel* 57 (May, 1967), p. 13. quoted from its reproduction in Ludwig von Friedeburg et al., *Freie Universität und politisches Potential der Studenten* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1968), p. 363s.

108. Ernst Fraenkel, *Politologie ist keine Obstruktionswissenschaft*. In: *Die Zeit*, (March 20, 1970), p. 21, quoted from Blanke et al. (note 19), p. 122.

109. Cf. on this also Fraenkel (note 107), p. 53ss.

110. On the contrasting positions cf., e.g., Winfried Steffani, *Pluralistische Demokratie*, (Opladen, 1980), and this author's *Pluralism as a Critical Political Theory*. In: *Praxis International*, 6 (1986), pp. 277-293.

George H. Whipple, George Eastman, Abraham Flexner, and Rush Rhees. Photo courtesy of Karl Kabelac, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester.

Abraham Flexner and the Politics of Educational Reform

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ONE OF ABRAHAM FLEXNER'S COLLEAGUES in the New York foundation world of the 1920s confided to another associate that "I am very fond of Flexner but I never know how much salt is needed to digest his statements."[1] Flexner, one of the most influential managers in the history of American philanthropy, presents historians with the same problem. He almost always suggested that the policies he promoted were the logical task of the present moment. His ability to cast his programs as historical imperatives gave him rhetorical and administrative power, but presents historians with a challenge. The difficulties of interpreting a career that promiscuously mixed success and failure, bureaucratic power and polemical persuasion, acuity and naivete are compounded in Flexner's case by a public use of history for private managerial purposes. Such a challenge is worth undertaking, however, since Flexner's career informs turbulent historiographical questions.[2]

I will address that challenge in three steps. First, I will describe the important stages of Flexner's career. Second, I will consider the historiography that has grown up around that career. Much of the writing on Flexner has been prompted by an interest in the objects of his activity: medical education, educational theory, and philanthropic practice. Accordingly, scholars have emphasized the primary role of such impersonal forces as the bureaucratization of education and philanthropy or the political machinations of monopoly capital. When so viewed Flexner is perhaps justifiably seen as either epiphenomenal, quixotic, or cynical. I wish to suggest a more useful view of Flexner and his millieu: he and his colleagues were the first managers of national policies for education in U.S. history. From this perspective he becomes an able and nimble, but withal, tragic figure. More important, Flexner's career is best interpreted not so much through the distinctive events of his time—the growth of bureaucracy and monopoly capitalism—but in the persistent power of democratic values and symbols in the face of that growth.

First, to outline Flexner's career. The Civil War had just ended when Abraham Flexner was born in 1866 on the hinge between North and South at Louisville, Kentucky. Flexner's father, a Moravian Jewish immigrant, had built up a successful business as an itinerant merchant only to be wiped out by the Panic of 1873. Despite family penury, his sons built substantial careers. Abraham was

one of the first graduates of the new Johns Hopkins University, where he took advantage of President Daniel C. Gilman's programmatic flexibility to finish the undergraduate requirements in two years. Ironically, at the dawn of the age of educational specialization and science, Flexner majored in classics. After graduation he returned to Louisville to teach and help support his struggling family. He soon became impatient with his work at the local high school and instead began his own school that prepared the sons of aspiring families for admission to desirable Eastern colleges.[3]

But Flexner was not satisfied with the success of his school and his work as a provincial correspondent to *The Nation,* that cosmopolitan mugwump organ. Once his younger brothers had been safely launched on their careers, he entered Harvard to study psychology with Hugo Musterberg. But the limitations of being a forty-year old graduate student also chafed. After a brief period of European study, he decided to address a broader audience by publishing a short, polemic, *The American College.* That book forcefully criticized contemporary colleges with neglecting the training of the mind while being preoccupied with the extra-curricular and residential aspects of student life.[4]

That work attracted the attention of Henry Smith Pritchett, the first president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Pritchett endeavored to use the corporate power of the Foundation to reshape American education. Pritchett had already begun discussion with the American Medical Association about a survey of the nation's medical schools, and in 1908 he asked Flexner to undertake it. The resulting publication, *Medical Education in the United States and Canada,* the so-called "Flexner Report," combined the assurance of authoritative expertise with the muckraker's intriguing whiff of scandal. The wide publicity given Flexner's suggestion that 80 percent of the existing medical schools should be closed only catalyzed an ongoing process. But the report secured Flexner permanent employment on the Rockefeller-endowed General Education Board.[5]

Between 1913 and 1928 Flexner became one of the most powerful figures in American education. No longer merely a publicist, he could now enact his ideals. Flexner spent upwards of $120 million to establish, fund, and manage a network of reformed medical schools that he hoped would incubate a new university discipline of clinical science. Through his direct intervention, the medical schools of Johns Hopkins, Yale, Columbia, Vanderbilt, and Washington University were thoroughly reformed, and new schools were created at the Universities of Chicago and Rochester. His influence expanded beyond the Rockefeller boards to touch such prominent philanthropists as Julius Rosenwald, Robert S. Brookings, George Eastman, and Edward S. Harkness.[6]

All told, during his tenure at the General Education Board, Flexner

commanded more than 60 percent of the foundation funds available for medical education during this period.[7] But medical education did not absorb his whole attention. Through the Rockefeller boards, Flexner left his mark on primary education (through such projects as the establishment of the Lincoln School at Teachers College and the Gary School survey) and university efforts to improve social scientific and humanistic research and teaching. By 1928, he had become an established influential, receiving honorary doctorates and expounding from such forums as the Ingalls lectureship at Harvard and the Taylorian lectureship at Oxford.[8]

But in 1928, Flexner was abruptly fired from the Rockefeller boards. The boards were reorganized to avoid the sort of direct management his philanthropic program entailed. His dismissal was discreetly handled and carried a generous severance settlement. Flexner himself never spoke publicly of it, but it stunned and sorely rankled him. In private, he bitterly complained to his brother, Simon, of his anguish at the "sudden guillotining of a life's work." But after a brief interlude, he recouped and began the third act of his career.[9]

This third stage recapitulated the second. In *Universities: American, English, and German* (1932) he excoriated his enemies and announced his readiness to undertake organizational experimentation, much as had his college volume twenty-five years earlier. Again, Flexner gained the confidence of a group of philanthropists, in this case the Fuld and Bamberger families, owners of New Jersey department stores. With their backing, he designed and founded the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. But once more, an effort which he began with great energy and promise, turned out to be a frustration and a vexation to him and he was eventually relieved of his responsibilities by the Institute's board. Thereafter, until his death in 1961 he published, corresponded actively, and delivered acerbic comments on the many trends he found distressing.[10]

Flexner's career touches on many vexing issues in the historiography of American education, society, and politics. One such question is the relation of internal intellectual and external social and political influences on the shaping of the modern American university. In many ways, Flexner's career and activities bear all the hallmarks of the Progressive era, a period which is interpreted variously as one of elite reaction, popular empowerment, and/or the birth of the new, more bureaucratized, American state. Finally, overarching all these questions is the more abstract issue of the role of expertise and professionalism in a democracy, a question which is both an analytical as well as a political issue. It is not surprising therefore that Flexner and the reforms that engaged him have received increasing scholarly attention. But this growing body of literature lacks any interpretive consistency.

The first historian to assay Flexner's career was Flexner himself. Prompted by Columbia historian Allan Nevins, Flexner published two different versions of his autobiography.[11] These volumes submerge many salient facts and present no narrative sequence, but they do reveal a good deal about Flexner's self-conception. The author presents himself as a self-assured man of affairs who, when confronted with a problem of which lesser minds have made a botch, sets the situation aright with a few deft maneuvers. Years after being fired from the Rockefeller boards, Flexner kept his original pledge of silence and gave no hint of the administrative struggles that had characterized and ruptured his career. He portrays reform as effortless, or at least as inevitable once he brought together the proper combination of like-minded men of action. What is, surprisingly, missing from his autobiographies is an exposition of the ideological underpinnings of his policies, views Flexner was explicit about when developing them.

After Flexner came other, professional, historians. Ironically, most subsequent authors have minimized his importance, especially in connection with his famous report on medical education. These scholars have pointed out that, unlike Athena from Zeus, the reform of medical education did not spring full-grown from the head of Abraham Flexner. Rather, he publicized a movement that had already made significant progress.[12] This conclusion is less profound than the historians believe it to be. It confirms a fact that contemporary observers, including Flexner himself, asserted.[13] Similarly, the discovery of close cooperation between the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the American Medical Association reveals a connection that the participants took no pains to hide. But the meaning of these undisputed facts has been sharply disputed.

Most scholars who have addressed this aspect of Flexner's career have written from a left perspective. One prominent Marxian analysis is contained in E. Richard Brown's *Rockefeller Medicine Men*.[14] Brown's view may be briefly outlined: The leading capitalists of the early twentieth century devised the philanthropic foundation to extend their economic hegemony into the social sphere. Medical reform was ideologically attractive because scientific medicine in general and the germ theory of disease in particular suggested that individual and not collective solutions to social problems needed to be found. This macrosocial and macrohistorical focus allows Flexner to be reduced to an able, but secondary, functionary; a "scholarly technician" in Brown's words, who was mildly surprised to be asked to write his famous report. Brown gives some attention to the "full-time plan," but he treats it as the work of Frederick Taylor Gates, John D. Rockefeller, Sr.'s close adviser and an outspoken champion of classical economics.[15]

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Paul Starr has succinctly summarized the analytical difficulties of this viewpoint. The notion that capitalism mandates particular therapeutic regimes is conceptually faulty. The assertion that the philanthropic foundations downplayed collective public health measures will not stand empirical scrutiny.[16] Brown's treatment of Flexner is equally unreliable. While there was an undeniable Rockefeller family influence on foundation policies, the foundation bureaucrats, not the plutocrats, did the decisive managing. After his report was issued, Flexner actively campaigned for a post with one of the great foundations. Once he had secured permanent employment with the Rockefeller-funded General Education Board, he exploited its strategic position far beyond the limits set by the earlier, relatively timid, programs adopted by Rockefeller's first group of advisers.[17]

Flexner himself suggested what he was about when he responded to one university president who impugned his report as the work of a medical layman: "As a matter of fact the question is not a medical question, but an educational question. It is a question of relations."[18] If we understand "relations" as the process by which institutions are organized to work for a larger social purpose, that is, as the development of public policies, then we see the real importance of Flexner's career. In promoting a particular vision of the organization of medical education (a vision by no means uniquely his), Flexner was also developing something more general: a structure which could allow decisions to be made, on a national basis, about the appropriate organization of medical education. What he was helping to create is what we now, awkwardly, call a "policy process." At the center of that process was the new institution of the general purpose foundation. Thus, the most important aspect of Flexner's career is not his famous report, but the ensuing effort to implement the ideas implicit in it, in particular his efforts to academicize clinical teaching through the full-time plan.

What, precisely, was the full-time plan? Simply put, it was the policy that the clinical faculty of university medical schools should receive no income other than their university salary. Previously, clinical professors had customarily received a nominal salary, at most, from their school. They derived their living from a private practice that benefited from their university prestige. Clinical appointments under this older system tended to reflect local professional or social eminence rather than a national frame of reference. Flexner's plan aimed to supplant these local cliques with a new national network of academic clinical scientists.

The plan itself was straightforward, but it implied the bureaucratization of medical education, in two senses. First, the reform produced new formal structures at individual schools. The plan assumed that universalistic and abstract principles of appointment, i.e., demonstrated scientific ability, would

replace personalistic, localist standards. Flexner emphasized the "science" of clinical research, not the "art" of clinical practice.[19] Schools heretofore organized collegially became more strictly hierarchical since the plan allowed for only one clinical professor in each field. Second, because the plan was both novel and expensive, schools were collectively arranged in a definable network. Leading schools would train the faculty for schools of lesser rank and all schools would depend on alert and involved philanthropies for support and advice. At the center of the network, managing and defending it, was Flexner.

Historian Daniel Fox emphasizes the bureaucratic dimension of Flexner's philanthropic career. Fox treats the endowed foundations as complex bureaucracies looking toward "the uniform application of policies and procedures," not as personalized incorporations of the great capitalists. He points to the "dominance of salaried managers" as distinguishing the Rockefeller philanthropies after 1910 and describes Flexner as an adroit, if somewhat irascible, manager. Fox treats Flexner as "ambivalent" about bureaucracy and contemptuous of some of his colleagues, but nonetheless satisfied with the achievements of his tenure at the Rockefeller boards. He finds that Flexner was an articulate partisan and a somewhat flexible administrator of the full-time plan, although he frequently clashed with philanthropic colleagues over the proper degree of flexibility.[20]

Fox accurately isolates the crucial elements of Flexner's philanthropic career: the bureaucratic nature of the philanthropic foundations, Flexner's conflicts with colleagues and recipients, and his zeal for the full-time plan. But Fox does not provide any schema for organizing these elements. (He, like the left writers, ignores Flexner's dismissal from the Rockefeller philanthropies, a turn of events as revealing of the dynamics of foundation practice as it was important to the history of Flexner's career.) Moreover, the characterization of philanthropic reform as part of the bureaucratization of modern American life and education raises further questions. Flexner and his fellow philanthropic reformers were more than ambivalent about bureaucracy. They despised the idea of it and used the term only as one of opprobrium. How do we understand this gap between their practice and their values?

This semantic disjunction is illustrative of both the strength and the limits of American bureaucratic reform. Flexner's work with the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations suggests that functional efficiencies that propelled bureaucratic initiatives coexisted with democratic political realities that frustrated their full application. Philanthropic management did not consist of the "closed politics of bureaucracies," to use Fox's terms, but rather exemplified the open political tension between democracy and bureaucracy. This tension has oscillated through American reform history since the Progressive era.[21] Flexner,

himself, internalized this tension and developed a vocabulary for its open discussion, but he could not manage the tension indefinitely, and it worked his ruin.

Flexner's philanthropic career displays the rising and falling action of a Shakespearean drama. He became disillusioned at Harvard when he realized that he was too old to start a career as a credentialized professional. He wrote to his brother, Simon: "I am not trained & that stares me in the face constantly . . . I am sure that in philosophy or psychology I can never be on equal footing with men of my age who have been trained systematically . . . It is . . . a warning to me not to make a one-subject specialist of myself, no matter how fascinating the chase may become."[22]

A career as an educational reformer, as a professionalizer rather than as a professional, was quite another matter. Flexner felt that the rambunctious democracy of the 19th century had left gaps in America's social infrastructure that could not long remain unfilled. He wrote in 1911:

> The fact is that we have discovered that democracy needs—more so than any other social form—to be both intensively educated albeit extensive and intensive organization is not itself native to the genius of democratic society . . . Democracy lacks . . . driving force; it is deficient in initiative, in the ability to conceive and to execute comprehensive designs.[23]

Like Jefferson, Flexner was a meritocrat. However, unlike Jefferson, he had no confidence that democratic government was a sufficient condition for the growth of a meritocracy. Democracy's inability to initiate grand plans attracted Flexner to philanthropic foundations that could, "do what in Germany the government does, —develop a policy & offer inducement enough to force its acceptance."[24] Once he was installed in the General Education Board, Flexner felt that he could offer initiatives, that he had the opportunity to "win approval for any policy I can hammer out."[25] He proceeded to do precisely that, even if he had to cross swords with former patrons like Pritchett and Gates.

Throughout his philanthropic stewardship, Flexner insisted that the Rockefeller boards take a systematic view of American education and act accordingly. Philanthropists could be effective, he reasoned, only if they considered the bureaucratic structure of education. "Education broadly conceived necessarily involves organizations, systems, institutions, as well as individuals," he maintained. "Hence, if you are going to deal broadly with education, you must have contacts with, knowledge of, and influence over, institutions and systems."[26]

But even as he stressed the necessity of the "systematic interrelation" of educational problems and institutions, Flexner remained very American in his disdain for formal bureaucracy.[27] He bemoaned the over-organization of American higher education, and he feared that "hodge-podge of feverish and indiscriminate activity" subsumed under "the alluring title of executive work" distracted foundation officers from creative reflection.[28]

Flexner reconciled this simultaneous exaltation of systems and institutions and distrust of bureaucracy by positing the fundamental importance of the individual and his ideals. By "ideals" he meant an internalization of the processes and standards of rigorous intellectual, scientific inquiry. Organizations existed to institutionalize the rationalism of scientific inquiry, to routinize its charisma so that it might be transmitted to students. Ideals could permeate both individual institutions and a national system of institutions. Flexner wrote,

> First, ideals are valuable because by contrast they make administrators and teachers conscious of defects and stimulate them to remedy their shortcomings. Second, ideals are valuable because they can be approximately attained by the most highly favored institutions and from these institutions can go forth teachers and practitioners of medicine who can improve and still further stimulate institutions with which they may be connected and communities in which they reside.[29]

The importance Flexner attached to the full-time plan now becomes clear. The plan encompassed both the reorganization of existing medical schools and the national systematization of such schools. But the resulting organizations would be simple ones: one clinical professor for each field and a national hierarchy of elite full-time schools that produced teachers for less developed schools. The organizations that Flexner put together would permit clinical teachers to pursue their scientific ideals undistracted by the siren call of lucrative private practice.

But the full-time plan had to be enforced. His concept of institutionally grounded idealism and his control of Rockefeller funds convinced local philanthropists, university presidents, and clinical teachers to reorganize their schools. He cast his reform proposals in the Progressive idiom: the avarice of the few stalled the beneficent forward movement of history. Just as the emergence of scientific medicine had transformed basic medical studies, he argued, so too must the clinical branches be modernized, and they could be if only the moneychangers could be driven from the scientific temple. While Flexner's

reforms split the organized profession, the opposition was politically manageable. The public press portrayed the plan as an overdue attack on medical avarice and some newspapers hailed it as the harbinger of socialized medicine, a reform expected imminently. But as Flexner's national system developed, more enduring political values caught up with his program.[30]

Flexner saw his policies and the philanthropic role as a substitute for government action, as a corrective for democracy's drift in organizational matters. He failed to understand that democratic values would determine both the division of activity between public and private bodies, *and* the degree to which private agencies that functioned in the government's stead would be held responsible to those values.

The weak political legitimacy of the large foundations had made medical education—as opposed to social and political reform—an attractive activity for them. But Flexner had assumed an intensely political role: he was the sole distributor of basic resources for careers in academic medicine. He discovered that administering his network of schools was riskier than establishing it. Even with the vast resources at his disposal, the volume of requests for addtional support left him "stunned and helpless." During the 1920s he became a more rigid manager, insisting that local university presidents "hew the line" in enforcing the full-time plan.[31]

Opposition soon arose within the community of the reformed. These opponents did not challenge Flexner's lack of medical credentials nor dispute his premise of the scientific basis of for medical education. Rather, they complained about an "invisible government" that dominated the nation's medical schools. Opponents criticized Flexner's management as pettifoggingly rigid, a system that sapped the energy of academic medicine.[32]

These criticisms soon echoed within the Rockefeller boards where the chief legal officer warned that "some day the power of the dead hand [of philanthropy] will again be the subject of political, if not popular discussion," and that browbeating the universities was not a good idea. In 1926, the boards began a functional and administrative reorganization. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. worried that the boards were caught on a bureaucratic treadmill: "Any institution tends to get into a rut, to confuse motion with progress, and to exalt machinery and organization above work and objectives." The officers were concerned that Flexner's zeal for the full-time plan could ultimately damage the foundations.[33]

Flexner eloquently defended the premises and achievements of his policies, but he could not support his own managerial function. He noted that philanthropic managers necessarily made crucial choices among institutions—choices which could determine the future of those institutions—but admitted

that this reality could not be "trumpeted from the housetops." The new generation of philanthropic managers wanted to avoid exactly that sort of rhetorically untenable entanglement. The Rockefeller philanthropies adopted new policies that seemingly begged questions of institutional management: policies looking toward the retail support of particular research projects as opposed to the wholesale support of institutions. Flexner was reorganized out of power and asked to resign from the General Education Board.[34]

Flexner's anger at his dismissal was not only directed at his quondam colleagues but also at the national ambivalence toward institutions and managerial leadership. He noted ruefully that "contemporary America . . . does unwittingly two things—gives such opportunity as no other country does, and then denies opportunity, as perhaps no other country would."[35] His flash of anger was a moment of perspicacity not repeated in his later writing, least of all in his autobiographies. The absence of any significant organs of social and educational management had presented Flexner and his foundation colleagues with an enormous opportunity for organization building. Flexner recognized that opportunity, publicly discussed it, and pursued it with a vengeance. But the same political values that created that opportunity—a suspicion of elite, hierarchical institutions which was rooted in Jacksonianism and even before—also limited it. When organization-building was complete and the managerial dimension of reform became explicit, Flexner had exhausted his political vocabulary. A good mugwump, he had no problem with elite leadership. He publicly maintained that organizations must be devised to produce leaders. But he failed to express his understanding that in a modern society leadership was manifested through organizations. Indeed, he held to the American disregard for bureaucracy, and insisted that "ideals" and not organizational structures ultimately determined educational outcomes. As his political failure suggests, he was correct, but not in the way he expected.

In the end, history betrayed Flexner. The pattern of American institutional development provided him with a unique opportunity for a spectacularly powerful career. However, that power had a very short half-life and Flexner did not have the prudence to plan accordingly. He had assumed that his creation of a privately managed policy process was an escape from the leveling tendencies of democratic politics. It turned out, however, that escape was not that simple. The very same democratic distrust of power and centralization existed, however attenuated and distorted, within the new sphere of organizational life developed by Flexner and his colleagues. The political uncertainties of the newly bureaucratized America eventually snared Flexner, but he was not their last victim.

NOTES

1. Frederick P. Keppel to James R. Angell, February 15, 1924, Carnegie Corporation of New York files.

2. This paper is drawn from a larger work analyzing Flexner's career with the Rockefeller philanthropies: Steven C. Wheatley, *The Politics of Philanthropic Management: Abraham Flexner and Medical Education* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

3. Abraham Flexner, *An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 50-55.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64; *The American College: A Criticism* (New York: Century, 1908).

5. Abraham Flexner, *Medical Education in the United States and Canada*, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bulletin no. 4 (New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1910); for an admiring review of the report and its effect see Carleton Chapman, "The Flexner Report by Abraham Flexner," *Daedalus* 103 (Winter 1974): 105-117; see also, Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, *Private Power for the Public Good: A History of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1983).

6. *General Education Board, Review and Final Report, 1902-1964* (New York: General Education Board, 1965). Flexner was Assistant Secretary of the General Education Board from 1912 to 1928. The GEB and the Rockefeller Foundation cooperated closely, were housed in the same building (61 Broadway), and had interlocking boards of trustees. In this paper "Rockefeller boards" refers to the two organizations.

7. *American Foundations and Their Fields* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1931).

8. Flexner, *Autobiography*; Flexner, *Do Americans Really Value Education?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927); Flexner, *The Burden of Humanism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928).

9. Abraham to Simon Flexner, July 24, 1928, Simon Flexner Papers, microfilm, Rockefeller Archive Center, Pocantico Hills, New York; the reorganization of the Rockefeller philanthropic boards is discussed in chapter 5 of the *The Politics of Philanthropy*.

10. Laurie Smith Porter, "From Intellectual Sanctuary to Social Responsibility: The Founding of the Institute for Advanced Study, 1930-1933" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1988); for an example of Flexner's waspish correspondence see the series of exchanges between him and Warren Weaver in Box 15, Abraham Flexner Papers, Library of Congress.

11. Before he published his *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, Flexner published *I Remember* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940).

12. Kenneth M. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal: The Development of American Medical Education* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 5-7; H. David Banta, "Abraham Flexner: A Reappraisal," *Social Science and Medicine* 5 (1971): 655-661; Robert P. Hudson, "Abraham Flexner in Perspective: American Medical Education, 1865-1910," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 46 (1972): 545-561; John Field, "Medical Education in the United States: Late Nineteenth and

Twentieth Centuries," in C. D. O'Malley, ed., *The History of Medical Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Saul Jarcho, "Medical Education in the United States, 1910-1956," 26 (1959): 339-385: more matter of fact discussions of Flexner's role is to be found in Paul Starr, *The Social Transformation of American Medicine* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), pp. 118-126; and Michael Schudson, "The Flexner Report and the Reed Report: Notes of the History of Professional Education in the United States," *Social Science Quarterly* 55 (1974): 347-361.

13. Flexner, *Medical Education in the United States and Canada*, pp. 19, 143, 153.

14. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); see also Howard S. Berliner, "Philanthropic Foundations and Scientific Medicine" (Sc.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, School of Public Health, 1977); Stephen Kunitz, "Professionalism and Social Control in the Progressive Era: The Case of the Flexner Report," *Social Problems Journal* 22 (1974-75): 16-27; Gerald E. Markowitz and David K. Rosner, "Doctors in Crisis: A Study of the Use of Medical Education Reform to Establish Modern Professional Elitism in Medicine," *American Quarterly* 24 (1973): 83-107.

15. Brown pp. 145, 157.

16. Starr, 227-230.

17. Wheatley, pp. 52-82.

18. Flexner to Frederick W. Hamilton, March 15, 1910, box 21, Abraham Flexner Papers.

19. Judy Sadler, "Ideologies of 'Art' and 'Science' in Medicine: The Transition from Medical Care to Application of Technique in the British Medical Profession," in Wolfgang Krohn et al., eds., *The Dynamics of Science and Technology* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reider, 1978), pp. 177-215.

20. Daniel M. Fox, "Abraham Flexner's Unpublished Report: Foundations and Medical Education, 1909-1928," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 54(1980): 476, 477, *passim*.

21. See Barry D. Karl, *Executive Reorganization in the New Deal* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

22. Abraham to Simon Flexner, June 12, 1906, Simon Flexner Papers.

23. Abraham Flexner, "Aristocratic and Democratic Education," *Atlantic Monthly* 108(1811): 391.

24. Abraham to Simon Flexner, May 18, 1912, Simon Flexner Papers.

25. Abraham to Simon Flexner, October 28, 1912, Simon Flexner Papers.

26. Abraham Flexner to Charles Howland, April 13, 1927, Record Group 3, Series 900, subseries 17, box 123, Rockefeller Foundation Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center.

27. Flexner, "Memorandum regarding the General Education Board," January 4, 1927, Record Group 3, Series 318, subseries 1, box 3, Rockefeller Foundation Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center.

28. Flexner, "Foundations: Ours and Others," 1925, Record Group 3, Series 900, subseries 22, box 165, Rockefeller Foundation Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center.

29. Flexner, "Memorandum for Dr. Vincent re Medical Education," December 30, 1919, Record Group 1, Series 5, subseries 702, box 7225, General Education Board Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center.

30. Wheatley, pp. 57-139.

31. Flexner to Winford Smith, March 17, 1921, Record Group One, Series 4, Box 589, folder 6267; Flexner to Max Mason, November 3, 1925, University of Chicago Presidents' Papers, ca. 1920-1965, box 70, folder 3, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago.

32. Hans Zinsser, "The Perils of Magnanimity: A Problem in American Education," ***Atlantic Monthly*** 159(1927): 247 Francis W. Peabody, ***Doctor and Patient*** (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 95.

33. Thomas M. Debevoise to Frederick T. Gates, October 7, 1925, Rockefeller Family Archives, Rockefeller Center, New York, New York; John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to Raymond B. Fosdick, October 6, 1927, Record Group 3, Series 900, Box 17, folder 120, Rockefeller Foundation Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center.

34. Abraham Flexner to Simon Flexner, January 5, 1928, Simon Flexner Papers; Wheatley, pp. 152-163.

35. Abraham to Simon Flexner, June 1, 1928, Simon Flexner Papers.

Arthur Morgan—This photo probably dates from the 1917-25 period.

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"Forcing Them to be Free": Antioch College and Progressive Education in the 1920s

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THE FIRST THREE DECADES of the twentieth century were an important time in the history of American education. The late nineteenth century institutionalization of mass public schooling had spawned a host of theories and debates about proper methods of education. Born in this atmosphere, progressive education inspired hot controversies among contemporaries. Was it a wonderful attempt to make teaching more socially relevant, tailored to the needs of each individual? Or was this movement that touted the centrality of connections between school and society a kind of business conspiracy: training future workers in particular skills to enable them to take their places in the new industrial order?[1]

Decades later, these central questions about progressive education have yet to be resolved. Interestingly, the majority of scholars continue to follow ground rules established by contemporary critics; most still focus, as did analysts in the teens and twenties, on primary education.

But the first several decades of the twentieth century also witnessed tremendous changes in higher education in America. Especially during the years between 1915 and 1930 the transformations that re-defined the role of the college in American society also involved debates about issues central to an understanding of the impact of progressive education.

John Dewey, progressive education's most important theorist, rarely wrote about higher education specifically. Nevertheless, his emphasis on the development of each individual's potential through systems of education that connected school with society influenced many college faculty members and administrators.

Progressive education's focus on practical skills certainly centered the curriculums of the junior colleges that sprang up all around the country. As late as 1918, junior colleges were not even listed in the federal *Education Directory*. But by the end of the 1930s 456 such institutions dotted the country, with, each year, an average of 150,000 students studying the kinds of vocationally-oriented curriculum progressive educators promoted.[2]

The 1920s, witnessed not only the dramatic growth of these "people's" colleges, but also an enormous expansion of other "practical" courses of instruction. Business education boomed at four-year as well as junior colleges.[3] The number of degrees four year colleges awarded in business mushroomed: 16 in the entire nation in 1915, 5,474 in 1928.[4] Other utilitarian subjects, including engineering and agriculture, experienced similar dramatic gains.[5]

But while some progressive educators emphasized the dictum that schooling and life must be integrated, others defended a disinterested pursuit of knowledge. Thorstein Veblen, for instance, decried the new vocational emphasis, and blamed excessive business influence for the change.[6] His was not a solitary voice. Administrators at several elite colleges urged a renewed commitment to the study of such subjects as religion or Greek. In fact, while some colleges adopted a vocational emphasis and accepted a broader demographic spectrum of students, others became more elitists. The children of the rich and the upper middle class fled to liberal arts colleges that became more expensive and more selective. As late as World War I, most American colleges accepted any student able to pay the fees, who could either pass the entrance examinations or gain certification from a high school. In 1920 Dartmouth and Swarthmore Colleges developed admission restrictions and established quotas for minorities and Jews.[7] These schools buttressed their rhetoric about selectivity and limitation by establishing honors programs.

Efforts to encourage carefully selected students to study the humanities and the tradition they represented symbolized another, very different, educational philosophy.[8]

So, during decades of growth and fierce controversy colleges utilized progressive education, either as a key or foil to their curriculum.[9] It was a kind of touchstone to decry or defend during decades, as Freeman Butts argued, of debate over "ivory tower versus the watchtower," "aristocratic ideal versus democratic ideal," and "culture versus cash."[10] But, while scholars have thoroughly investigated the emergence of modern liberal education, they have paid insufficient attention to the importance of progressive higher education during this period.

The history of the educational revolution that occurred at Antioch College in Yellow Springs, Ohio during the 1920s helps remedy that neglect. Moreover, it illustrates an attempt to reconcile the conflicts raging in higher education during the teens and twenties. Antioch, a self-proclaimed "progressive" college, sought to provide students with an education that integrated vocational training with a solid background in the liberal arts. As such, Antioch's efforts to transpose progressive education's central tenets to the college level deserve scholarly attention.

Arthur Morgan and Charles Kettering, the chief engineers of the new Antioch curriculum were, indeed, engineers, not professional educators. In 1919 Arthur Morgan accepted the presidency of Antioch College. By 1921, he was president of the new Progressive Education Association (founded in 1919). But Morgan was a prominent hydraulics engineer who would later become one of the first directors of the T.V.A. Between 1918 and 1920, Morgan masterminded the Miami Conservancy District, a massive flood control project in southern Ohio that was the hemisphere's biggest engineering feat since the building of the Panama Canal. But even while fully involved in engineering work, he expressed interest in education. In 1916-17, he was a founder of a Dewey-style progressive laboratory school in Dayton for primary and secondary students. The Moraine Park School emphasized student involvement with "real" life activities. Children in secondary grades, for instance, had to run their own small businesses, borrowing start-up cash from their parents or the school bank.

In fact, Moraine Park was a small-scale model of Morgan's ambitious educational plans for Antioch. Morgan enlisted the patronage of Charles Kettering for both projects. Kettering, another engineer, invented leaded gasoline, high-compression engines, and dozens of other machines or processes crucial to the American automobile industry. Such inventive genius had made him a millionaire while still in his forties.[11] Morgan and Kettering seized the chance to create a "college for proprietors" at Antioch that would connect school and society even more directly than had been possible with younger students. Antioch students prepared for life by participating in life. A study of Antioch's experimentation in the 1920s thus offers useful insights into the nature, achievements, and failures of progressive education.

Antioch College was in 1919 a school with an illustrious past and a gloomy future. Founded in 1853 with prominent educator, Horace Mann, as president, the college had a tradition of experimentation. It was one of only a handful of nineteenth century colleges that admitted both blacks and women.

It's nineteenth century history was more troubled than idyllic, however. During Mann's presidency, battles over religious issues divided the faculty. The Christian Church, a Protestant sect that provided funds for the college, denounced some of Mann's Unitarian views. Financial problems and disputes about curriculum and goals plagued the college for decades. It even closed its doors in 1881 and 1882 for lack of money. By the late nineteenth century, the college had degenerated. Down from a peak student body of 500 during the Mann years, Antioch by the end of the century graduated ragged classes of a dozen to twenty, most of whom spent their time studying Greek, Latin, elocution, and theology. In fact among the presidents who led the collapsing college, only one roused himself to any real enthusiasm, and that not for curriculum, but

for programs of planting ivy and woodbine thickly around campus.[12] By 1913, the college seemed doomed. The graduating class that year numbered only ten students. Faculty members were paid irregularly. In 1917, its president, Simeon Fess, resigned. Fess worked without salary for several years and was away most of the time anyway as a United States congressman from Ohio.

The trustees, a dispirited group of elderly men, many of them ministers, tried and failed to sell the college to the Y.M.C.A. In 1919, Arthur Morgan accepted their invitiation to join the Board. Within months he had agreed to become president of the floundering college. Morgan's wife Lucy remembered him telling her that Antioch "looks dead enough to do anything I want with it."[13] He was right. The Board's offer of the presidency illustrated its desperation. Morgan demanded and received wide latitude to remake the college. This latitude included not only the right to demand the resignations of the Antioch faculty, but the resignations of the trustees who had just appointed him head of the college.

With that kind of power, and with Antioch's tradition of experimentation, Morgan could implement some ambitious plans. All of his adult life, Morgan sustained a keen interest in Utopian experiments. He would even author a biography of Edward Bellamy. Morgan concluded that the way to build a new society was to start on a small scale. At the center would be education, but his schools would "see education whole."[14]

Implementing this vision required radical transformation of the Antioch curriculum. For too long, Morgan argued, the leaders of liberal arts colleges had been like "the natives of Tierra Del Fuego . . . short and squatty with large protruding stomachs, who . . . think of short, potbellied persons as the ultimate expression of physical beauty." American educational institutions, said Morgan, like the Tierra Del Fuegans, needed new ideals, new standards for comparison, but they "could not expect strange ships to appear on the horizon, bringing new revelations of perfection."[15]

Indeed they would have no need to wait for prophets or strange ships if they would only use the scientific method to determine educational policy. The scientific attitude, Morgan concluded, "with its rigorous methods, its iconoclastic analysis . . . will do for ordinary intelligent men what only the brilliant originality of genius would otherwise accomplish. If we can, through the atmosphere of the college, transmit this spirit to our students, our work will not have been lost."[16]

For Morgan, the scientific method applied to education embodied the progressive ideal: development of the whole person by means of a curriculum in which independent study, vocational education, and an emphasis on health and proper physical development played large roles. But unlike some contemporary

experimental schools for younger children, Antioch also emphasized a traditional required curriculum. Students had to acquire a background in literature, math, history, and science. Only then could they begin to connect "school and society" with projects that provided vocational skills and links to the outside world.

All told, Morgan outlined a dramatic curricular change from the requirements of the "old" Antioch.[17] His educational vision embraced what are usually seen as conflicting views of progressive education. He certainly agreed with John Dewey that education had to be sensitive to individual needs and to society's needs. It needed to nourish the whole person, including ethical, physical, intellectual, and vocational-skills development, all in an atmosphere of freedom and individual initiative. Morgan admired the founder of the Chicago Lab School. He even, unsuccessfully, tried to persuade him to come to Antioch to teach.[18]

But, Morgan was not interested in unstructured education. He reiterated often the need to inculcate young people with skills and attitudes that would prepare them for their social, political, and vocational obligations. As the head of a prominent engineering firm that specialized in building huge dams, he had employed thousands of workers. Just as he did not give those workers complete latitude to do their jobs as they saw fit, he did not allow Antioch students full control over their educational program. Independent study and individual initiative were important elements of education that existed within a highly structured framework of required course work. Students, like laborers building dams, needed a clear plan to follow in order to do their best. Indeed, they needed to be "compelled . . . into freedom."[19] That freedom to live socially responsible lives—to have well-developed job skills, inquiring minds, and strong ethical principles—had its roots in carefully directed study. The scientific method allowed its practitioner to progress from the known to the unknown. The student at Antioch progressed from structure to independence.

All students completed a series of interdisciplinary survey courses including a substantial introduction to English composition and to literature. The mandatory four-year survey of "social science" integrated the study of world history, economics, and law in society. All students spent two years studying the history of philosophy, and one year each on physics, chemistry, biology, and "earth sciences," defined to include introductions to geology and astronomy. In addition, students took courses in "college aims" and ethics.[20] Beyond this common curriculum, students chose areas of concentration. By their junior or senior years, they were engaged in "autonomous courses," projects in which consultations with professors took place only when students asked for further guidance.

With a background of requirements taken in the freshmen and sophomore years, the Antioch upper-class student was to "dig out for himself as much as he is able." Morgan expected that students would discover "unsuspected powers" and learn to "think creatively."[21]

But Antioch students developed not just through required courses and independent study. They balanced classes at Antioch with work at outside paid jobs. Antioch's "Cooperative Plan," allowed students to study at Antioch for five weeks, then work full time at an outside job for the next five weeks. The jobs were to be an "apprenticeship with real life.[22] Since paid employment involved a substantial commitment of time, an undergraduate education at Antioch would generally take six years to finish.

The college sought not only to prepare the student intellectually and vocationally but also physically and ethically to begin adult life as a responsible and productive citizen. Since efficient performance presupposed good health, the college required that each student to participate in regular physical activity. Students also had to know how to sleep, eat, and maintain correct posture.[23]

The college encouraged the development of character in its students. Morgan warned prospective students that the new Antioch would not "be a place to teach clever men and women to make better livings than their neighbors, or simply to have intellectual tastes.[24] The Antioch dream would fail unless graduates were noted for their integrity, social purpose, and commitment to betterment of the group. Antioch graduates could then use their experiences within the Antioch community to then create their own socially responsible communities in independent adult life. In these communities the efforts of individual members would merge into a greater whole.

Morgan's dream combined what critics often saw as conflicting elements of progressive education. The new Antioch encouraged creativity and independence. Each student studied and worked independently before graduation. But at the same time he or she learned useful business skills through actual participation in the work force. Moreover, he or she participated in mandatory ethics training, finished required courses, even had to exercise. Antioch's "freedom" had limits.

Arthur Morgan needed money to implement this vision, and turned to the business community. Most important, once again, he approached Charles Kettering, who accepted a seat on the Antioch board and showered the college with more than $500,000 in gifts and loans. Kettering, like Morgan, was obsessed with education as the key to social reform. The famous inventor began his career as a schoolteacher in a small Ohio town. Throughout his lifetime, Kettering would continue to aid various educational projects.

Assured of Kettering's financial support, Morgan created a dramatically

new board of trustees. Until 1919, quarreling ministers from several local Protestant denominations dominated the Antioch board. By 1921 the new board had become a national showcase for progressive business. A majority of board members were prominent businessmen sympathetic to Morgan's ideas about social and educational reform. It's membership included several corporate leaders: Gordon Rentschler, the Hamilton, Ohio owner of ship engine-production factories, John Haswell, owner of a group of steel plants and president of Dayton Malleable Iron Company, Will Mayo, Henry Ford's Chief Engineer, George Verity, president of the American Rolling Mills, and Henry Dennison, president of Dennison Manufacturing. Also on the board were several bank presidents, three Wall Street lawyers, two influential publishers, Edwin Gay of the *New York Evening Post* and Ellery Sedgwick of the *Atlantic Monthly*, and Frank Slutz, the former headmaster of the Moraine Park School. Most trustees served throughout the 1920s. The few replacements necessitated by resignation or death did not significantly change the board's character. The trustees who oversaw the Antioch revolution were powerful businessmen, but Morgan took pains to characterize them as "idealists and dreamers, somewhat after the Edison type, and moneymaking is secondary with them."[25]

The money they and their associates brought to the Antioch experiment, however, was certainly not secondary. Between 1921 and 1933 Charles Kettering alone contributed more than $500,000 to Antioch. Samuel Fels, president of the Philadelphia-based Fels Company and an heir to the Fels-Naptha Soap fortune, donated over $177,000. Allen Balch, president of the Southern California Gas Company gave stock and cash contributions to the college worth in excess of $160,000. Major donations totalled more than $2,000,000 for the decade.[26] These men and their organizations gave such sums in an era when significant tax advantages for individual and corporate giving to educational institutions did not yet exist. A search for tax advantage played no significant role in the trustee's financial support.[27]

Rather, excitement about a college that would "train proprietors" fueled such generosity. William Mayo of Ford said that while his company had "no trouble" find machine-shop hands, it had a "such a hard time" hiring good foremen and superintendents.[28] Charles Kettering argued, "Our colleges have only been dealing with the theory of life and the theories of the professions they teach." Such a practice was a "glaring weakness." Too many college graduates had no exposure to the realities of the business world and were unsuited to enter it.[29] They lacked the initiative, coordination, and management necessary to a business career. Many in the business community had high hopes that the Antioch experiment could produce the managers they needed. George Roberts, Vice President of New York's National City Bank, felt executives had to be

"all-round men." Antioch, with its motto of "seeing education whole," could train such men, for "the process of seeing things in all their relationships is the peculiar function of the executive."[30]

Kettering and other major patrons hoped that Antioch would graduate several hundred such potential administrators a year. But they had a larger aim as well. They wanted to produce a national model for advanced higher education. Kettering was certainly willing to "spend time, money, and sleepless nights . . . to make a model of a machine" but only if that machine "were duplicated in the millions or thousands."[31]

To create a better machine for American higher education, the college recruited widely both for its new student body and for its faculty. The powerful new board of directors helped the college generate enormous national publicity. Dozens of articles in specialized and mass-market magazines extolled the Antioch experiment. The Board funded sophisticated and innovative recruitment programs aimed at prospective students and their parents. The names of recipients were often chosen from corporation records. And, whereas nineteenth century Antioch students were overwhelmingly local Ohioans, the new Antioch freshman class had members from over 29 states and seven foreign countries. More students came from the East Coast than from Ohio. As the board had become national in its representation, so had the student body.

The first year 203 students arrived. By 1924, the total college enrollment reached Morgan's target of about 600. The college subsequently used that number as a benchmark in recruitment and admission. The student population was coeducational, in keeping with a long Antioch custom. However, the new board of trustees broke with the school's tradition of admitting blacks. Without making it a formal policy, the new Antioch became a whites-only college. During the 1927-1928 school year, student enrollment rose to a high point of 706. But the college, thoughout the decade, remained intentionally small. Male students outnumbered women by about two to one. Women students could take any Antioch course along with males. However, outside employment discrimination restricted their co-op experiences. Although a majority of women married, rather than work outside the home, their alma mater never described their training as appropriate for housewives or mothers.[32]

Since the cooperative program partially supported Antioch students, the cost of their education was substantially lower than were costs at other small, private liberal arts colleges. The college estimated that students during the first two years of their course would probably need about $300 a year. They could earn the remainder of their room, board, and tuition costs. Upper class students could expect to support themselves entirely with better-paying part time jobs.[33]

But Morgan and other college officials constantly downplayed the

chance for self-support the college offered for students of modest means. The most important object of the cooperative work-study regime at Antioch was not self-support, but "training for proprietorship." And such training provided opportunities for students to test their occupational interests in the real world, to develop self-discipline, a sense of responsibility, and initiative.[34]

In fact, the well-known Unitarian minister, Charles Francis Potter, who quit his pulpit at New York's West Side Unitarian Church in 1925 to become Executive Secretary of the college, asserted, "Far from being a university for the poor, many children of the rich are already matriculated; and it is urged that the Antioch experience of self-help in the real world is for them especially useful.[35] Ida Clarke followed a day in the life of several students for a magazine story on Antioch. One student was a "high-bred" young woman named Wilma Compton, who worked as a department store clerk during her first year at Antioch. Although initially bored with her job, Compton saw it in a different light after she went to the post office at Christmas to find that for her present her mother mailed her a fur coat. "Suddenly the thought popped into my mind that I would have to work three years at my present job to save up enough money to buy that coat!"[36]

Not all students had families wealthy enough to send an extravagant Christmas present. But Wilma Compton was more typical of the Antioch students of the 1920s than would have been a younger Arthur Morgan, struggling to find ways to educate himself without family funds or backing. Morgan saw education as a key to society's progress. At Antioch he introduced sliding tuition scales based on income and cooperative work-study to ensure that the college would be open to all applicants, at least all white applicants. Instead, Morgan created a college for the middle and upper classes, led by a new board of prominent corporation leaders. Only six percent of Antioch's students were the children of unskilled workers. The vast majority had fathers who were business executives or professional men. These enrollment patterns linked Antioch with elite colleges like Harvard or Dartmouth rather than the growing state universities and junior colleges. At the public colleges, far higher percentages of students came from families where the father was a farmer, factory worker, or laborer. Morover, through the early 1930s, more Antioch graduates chose a business career than any other. But most of those new business executives were men. Unlike their nineteenth century counterparts, who often remained single and had careers, the vast majority of women who graduated from Antioch in the 1920s married. In keeping with social mores firmly in place among the American middle class until the 1940s, most women graduates left work when they married.[37] If evaluated by its admissions policies or career choices made by its graduates, the "new" Antioch was less radical, by far, than the "old." Its privi-

leged students utilized progressive education to prepare for adult membership in the middle and upper classes to which they already belonged.

In 1932 Antioch Dean Algo Henderson studied 332 of the 520 men and women who graduated from the college since its reorganization in 1921. Henderson excluded from his report Antioch graduates who were still graduate or law students at some other institution as well as women graduates who married and did not seek employment. He and his assistants contacted most of the others. They interviewed the former students at length, asking them to judge the value of their Antioch education, to chart job choices, and to assess the worth of the Antioch revolution.

The first graduates from the years 1926 and 1927 had worked at co-op jobs near Yellow Springs. During the first year of the program, all but one of the 113 cooperative employers were located in Ohio. Most students traveled the fifteen-mile distance to Dayton by trolley line to work in the city's factories and stores. But by the end of the decade, almost a thousand companies throughout the nation employed Antioch students. By 1930 a majority of the school's students left the state to take jobs in places as far-flung as Chicago, Boston, and New York.[38]

A small minority of responding graduates were disappointed with their Antioch educations. Glenn Argetsinger, for instance, "got an overdose of factory experience at the possible sacrifice of experience needed in meeting people . . . above that general plane."[39] But most students who answered Henderson's questionnaire felt that they benefited from their direct exposure to real-world jobs. Generally they reported that the co-op work made vocational adjustment after graduation easier. Many eliminated or chose possible careers through a process of trial and error. Mildred Hawhurst, for instance, decided, after jobs at several elementary schools, that "I would never succeed as a teacher." She eventually became a librarian. The coop work did not directly prepare her for her future career, but it had forced her to make "a realistic estimate of my abilities."[40]

Although some job providers offered only the kinds of work that left Glenn Argetsinger unhappy, a majority treated their pairs of Antioch employees as junior executive trainees. As of 1930, fully half of Antioch graduates found employment with companies for which they had worked. An average 40 percent of its first five graduating classes entered business careers. Engineering careers ran second, and teaching third.[41]

Within a decade, Antioch College had not only returned from the brink of death, but had produced graduates eager to enter the business world. Its national network of corporate patrons provided those graduates jobs and the college money. That network existed in part because of the publicity Antioch

received. Charles Kettering had said that he was interested in making Antioch a model. A bonanza of good press treatment spread the word far beyond Ohio. Throughout the decade, dozens of journalists from business and general interest publications followed Ida Clarke's example and descended on the sleepy village of Yellow Springs. Most left impressed. Arthur Morgan was the "lean, keen worker whom some of us . . . consider the flower of American culture."[42] He was a man whose life "should be written and placed in the hands of every young American."[43] In 1926, the editor of the *Los Angeles Times* bubbled that he "could have been knocked over with a feather," when Morgan appeared in his office. The editor recounted, "As soon as we could get our breath, we spoke up and said if only Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and John D. Rockefeller were to walk into his little room we would have the unique thrill of sitting in the presence of the four greatest living Americans."[44]

Most readers of the popular magazines of the period heard of Antioch and of its bright future. The truth was much less simple. The 1929 Crash greatly reduced the number of work-study jobs employers could offer and considerably dimmed the prospects for Antioch graduates.

Even before the crash, the college faced an intellectual and financial crisis. The crisis involved a bitter debate between Antioch professors and their president over goals, directions, and achievements. It also arose from the growing disenchantment of the college's most important individual benefactor, Charles Kettering.

Arthur Morgan had interviewed and hand-picked almost all of the Antioch faculty. Indeed, the faculty was, like the college plan itself, Morgan's personal creation. Morgan offered better-than-average pay and the chance to participate in a novel experiment.[45] Moreover, the new Antioch president placed far more emphasis on actual work experience, character, and "sound judgment" than on academic degrees.[46] A majority of the faculty, had only bachelor's degrees, during a decade when normal schools became teachers' colleges, when teachers' colleges became state universities, and when institutions of all types increasingly demanded graduate degrees from their faculties.[47] Instead of Ph.D.s, the faculty offered knowledge gained in established careers as architects, engineers, chemists, advertising executives, and government bureaucrats.[48]

Despite his involvement in their hiring, the faculty and Morgan were often at odds. In early 1931, while traveling in Europe, Morgan mailed his faculty a critique of over eighty typed pages, outlining in passionate detail where and how the great Antioch adventure of the 1920s had failed. This attack, quickly copied and widely distributed, became known as the "Letter from Portugal."[49] The letter and the equally lengthy faculty responses it inspired, provide a

detailed evaluation, from differing perspectives, of the Antioch dream. Morgan's letter in fact, is a passionate contemporary critique of progressive education.

Morgan did not fault Antioch's ability to prepare students adequately for vocations or to offer a broad exposure to the sciences and the liberal arts. Rather his letter was the pain-filled lament of a dreamer who had begun to doubt that perfect communities could exist on earth. Antioch had not succeeded "in achieving a great pattern of life."[50] Its students put on risque commencement plays. Its faculty spent too many evenings playing bridge. Frequently, Morgan lamented, Antioch upperclassmen "leave us with cold, deliberate, selfishness, with no warmth of social hope, with no high plan . . . for their lives."[51]

Antioch College's first decade after reorganization, then, ended not with jubilation, but with soul-searching and bitter public accusations of failure. Anguished student and faculty responses to Morgan's charges revealed that troubled reflection was not limited to the college's absent president.

Some professors accused Arthur Morgan of acting too much like a "dictator." He expected the faculty, they charged, to be "puppets dancing as the president pulls the strings."[52] One even wrote, "Is Mr. Morgan a sick man, who is not responsible for what he says?"[53]

Others, less angry, thoughtfully assessed their participation in the Antioch experiment. Some argued that it had, in fact, achieved much. But to become the ideal community Morgan wanted, Antioch students and faculty would have had to be driven idealists, exactly in the Morgan mold. And all were not. A 1928 faculty report on the autonomous course plan had already acknowledged that most Antioch students were ordinary human beings who often procrastinated. Many students, on their own to choose subject matter and course direction, delayed serious work and made only "last minute attempts to cover the subjects."[54] Others bit off more than they could chew. They selected demanding projects, and ended up burdened with "too much pressure and a feeling that the faculty was unjust in its demands."[55] Economist William Leisersen said he was not the only Antioch professor who found his upperclass students "not advanced enough" to do much independent work. Leisersen freely admitted that he lectured to and set up formal meetings with students who chose him as an autonomous course adviser.[56]

Lucy Morgan, Arthur Morgan's wife, was a chemist with a Master's degree from the University of Pennsylvania. A member of the Antioch faculty, she defended her husband's version. A member of the Antioch faculty, she defended her husband's vision at an open forum. Nonetheless, she admitted that many students lacked the self-direction necessary to succeed. Rather than "climbing stairs on their own," some students ". . . wanted to sit in the shade and have petting parties." Then, Lucy Morgan argued, ". . . faculty members get concerned

and hunt up various ropes and try to haul the laggards part way up—and they find that to do so it is easier to have the ones to be pulled go in compact groups."[57]

That was unacceptable. Arthur Morgan's stern dream had no room for petting parties, for student laggards, or for faculty wives who objected that the demands of the Antioch plan disrupted family life.[58] But a faculty and student body of crusaders did not exist. Too many students, Dean Henderson sadly acknowledged, "laid greater stress on monetary return" than on social reform.[59]

Ironically, by decade's end, Kettering and other prominent business patrons worried that the college faculty and students were too radical, not too mercenary. The path from structure to independence seemed to lead to too much of the latter. Morgan had argued that the Antioch plan would "spoil any a radical, because he comes to have respect for those long, hard processes, that long, hard road that the human race has traveled to find its present status."[60]

But Kettering and others were not so sure. By 1930, Antioch's honeymoon with business patronage began to sour. During the 1930s and 1940s many business leaders charged that the college tolerated communism and other radical doctrines, and resigned from the board. Trustee Russell Steward angrily charged that "Antioch has been supported mainly by employers and money . . . from business and as such owes them an obligation . . . but the college has not evidenced good faith with the people from whom they accepted money in large amounts."[61]

Free spirits did populate Antioch during the 1920s; some probably considered themselves radicals. Professor William Leiserson, frequently lectured to socialist groups.[62] Student Mather Eliot denounced Antioch as just another "finishing school for American businessmen."[63] Nevertheless such "radicals" while often dramatic presences on campus, were a minority. Algo Henderson's Antioch—where most students eagerly joined the system to get ahead was the reality. Still. Antioch's encouragement of creativity and independent thought provided forums for the views of all. Some trustees questioned whether the college was a "finishing school" for business. They turned board meetings from love-fests for the college that sought to train proprietors into inquisitions about teachers and courses.[64] In the 1930s Kettering closed his purse, resigned from the board, and sent angry letters to Morgan and others damning the college as a nest of radicals and communists.

Morgan himself soon left Antioch. In 1933, he began a highly controversial term as a director of the new Tennessee Valley Authority. With Morgan and Kettering gone, Antioch College lost its place in the national spotlight. In the thirties it maintained much of Morgan's plan including the work-study requirements, but struggled with mounting debts and falling levels of outside financial support and student enrollment. It survived the Depression to emerge as a

college whose faculty and students embraced the liberals arts *and* political activism. Ironically, its image became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Antioch's national reputation rested on the *Antioch Review*, not on an alliance with the practical business world. The conflict with business patrons never really healed. And Antioch never reasserted its goal of creating "proprietors."

That conflict might have been prophesied. Even when college officials and business patrons agreed on the importance of educating proprietors, their definitions sometimes differed. In 1921, for instance, Arthur Morgan and Charles Kettering shared keynote speaking honors at a fund-raising dinner for Antioch. Were they listening closely to each other? Morgan argued that "I would prefer not to have our young men trained at Antioch become part of great organizations like the Pennsylvania Railroad or the United States Steel Corporation."[65] Rather, he wanted them to take the intellectual and practical skills gained at Antioch to go out to start hundreds of new small businesses and be their own bosses. Morgan envisioned proprietors as socially responsible; they produced necessary goods and services in a climate of fairness to their workers. In fact, the new Antioch president worried that big business might produce conditions "which menace our entire social structure. . . . Let the village blacksmith mistreat his apprentice boys if he will, and it has no effect on the world in general, but take a great corporation employing half a million men, and let them put economic pressure on their men, and the situation is a direct attack on our entire country."[66]

Morgan sat down, and Charles Kettering rose. Kettering also praised "proprietorship" and the college that would train proprietors. But then Kettering continued, "For the large number of foremen in our various industries play a big part in the relations existing between capital and labor. In fact I believe they control the situation, because they represent the management, and the policies of the management to the men at the machines. So I believe that one of our jobs at Antioch will be to fit these type of men for their jobs, for it is a real job of proprietorship."[67] Indeed the time had passed ". . . when men are to be handled with the molder's hammer, by having the policies of the company . . . pounded into them." The Antioch experiment would be proven "worth-while" if it instilled its graduates "a better method" of passing the policies of the organization "down the line."[68] The audience politely applauded two strikingly different versions of Antioch's mission.

This exchange, indeed, the entire history of Antioch's experiment, suggests that scholarly interpretations of progressive education have been too narrowly conceived and too heavily focused on primary education. One of the two general interpretations of progressive education views the progressive classroom as an attempt at an ideal community, opposed to business conformity

and dedicated to the individual development of each student. The second sees the classroom as a factory that aped business standards and values and produced willing human cogs for the industrial machine. But such a dichotomy does a disservice to the history of a complex and interesting movement.

Although John Dewey based his progressive education philosophy on the democratization of education, Arthur Morgan did not wish to make the Antioch experiment democratic. He deserved the epithets hurled at him in one faculty memorandum. He was "arbitrary, impatient, and dogmatic."[69]

He did not create an ideal community of self-directed and cooperative teachers and students. His Antioch was not the perfect "lab school," but neither was it focused solely on utilitarian training. A concern for ethics and morality was pervasive. Morgan, for instance, argued that "the critical issue in civilization was not 'technical progress' . . . but the ennobling of human purposes, and the arousing of aspirations to that end."[70]

In fact, Morgan, far from seeking only to train students for jobs, sought "a better economic order and a new religion."[71] That new religion took as its most important creed the raising of human society to a higher plane. Morgan's failure to brook dissent and his impatience with any alternative vision epitomized a dilemma that faced many progressive educators and political reformers.

The history of Antioch College during the 1920s demonstrates the difficulty of forcing people to be free. But it illustrates more than that. Like Arthur Morgan himself, progressive education at Antioch was a complicated phenomenon. Its history certainly suggests that the decades-old debate that views progressive educators as either noble humanitarians or dupes of business needs a fresh re-evaluation.

NOTES

1. The standard work tracing the development of the progressive education movement is: Lawrence Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education* (New York: Random House, 1961). See also Ronald Cohen and Raymond Mohl, *The Paradox of Progressive Education: The Gary Plan and Urban Schooling* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1979); David Hogan, *Class and Reform: School and Society in Chicago, 1880-1930* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985); Joel Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); Michael Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and the Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); Paul Peterson, *The Politics of School Reform, 1870-1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Paul Violas, *The Training of the Urban Working Class: A History of Twentieth Century American Education* (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing, 1978).

2. For an examination of the junior college movement in America see: David Levine, *The American College and the Culture of Aspiration, 1915-1940* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 162-185.

3. David Levine, *The American College*, 45-59; See also: David Noble, *America by Design, Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York: Knopf, 1977); Kenneth Lynn, ed., *The Professions in America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963).

4. David Levine *The American College*, 59.

5. *Ibid*, 49-53; See also: Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

6. Thorstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1918), 6-25.

7. For a discussion of the history of the development of admission standards and discrimination at colleges see: Harold Wechsler, *The Qualified Student: A History of Selective College Admission in America* (New York: Wiley, 1977); Harold Wechsler, "The Rationale for Restriction: Ethnicity and College Admissions in America, 1910-1980," *American Quarterly* 36 (1984): 643-67.

8. For a discussion of the development of honors programs at colleges such as Dartmouth see: David Levine, *The American College*, 108-112.

9. The best book on the history of higher education in America during this period is the already cited David Levine, *The American College*. Other perceptive monographs include: Gerald Grant and David Riesman, *The Perpetual Dream: Reform and Experiment in the American College* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Paula Fass, *The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Helen Horowitz, *Alma Mater: Design and Experience in the Women's Colleges from the Nineteenth Century Beginnings to the 1930s* (New York: Knopf, 1984).

10. Freeman Butts, "A Retrospective Review of *The College Charts its Course*," *American Journal of Education* 90 (1981): 91.

11. The best source for Morgan's life remains the Morgan papers themselves, especially Series I, Diaries, The Papers of Arthur E. Morgan, Antioch College Library, Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, [Hereafter AEM]; See also: Roy Talbert, *FDR's Utopian; Arthur Morgan and the TVA* (Jackson, Ms.: University of Mississippi Press, 1987); Walter Kahoe, *Arthur Morgan: A Biography and Memoir* (Moyland, Pa.: Whimsie Press, 1977); For information on Kettering see: Stuart Leslie, *Boss Kettering* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

12. Scholars have not paid a great deal of attention to Antioch College, despite its role as a pioneer in several educational movements over the decades. The most important work is Burton Clark, *The Distinctive College: Antioch, Reed, and Swarthmore* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1970). Also useful for information about Antioch's nineteenth century origins is Jonathan Messerli, *Horace Mann: A Biography* (New York: Knopf, 1972). Two unpublished dissertations should be mentioned: Roy Talbert, "Beyond Pragmatism: The Story of Arthur E. Morgan" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1973); George Newman, "The Morgan Years: Politics of Innovative Change: Antioch College in the 1920s" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978). Talbert focuses on Morgan's life, not on Antioch College, per se. The two other works direct their attention narrowly, to narratives of curricular change, personalities, and campus atmosphere. None of these works seeks to place changes at Antioch in the 1920s within the larger contexts of the developments of progressive education and business-progressivism.

Talbert has used a portion of his dissertation as the basis for his book, *FDR's Utopian*. As the title indicates, however, the book focuses on Morgan's work for Roosevelt's New Deal and mentions the Antioch years only briefly.

13. Lucy Morgan, *Pioneering Days at Antioch* (Yellow Springs, Oh.: Antioch Press, 1947), 1.

14. Arthur Morgan, speech transcript, Meeting of the Association of College and Preparatory Schools, November 30, 1923, Drown Hall, Lehigh University, Antiochiana Manuscripts Collection, Antioch Library, Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio. [College records and publications, as well as a wide variety of manuscript materials relating to Antioch College form a special, totally uncatalogued archive, known as Antiochiana, within the Antioch College Library. Hereafter, these materials will be cited: A.A.; the transcript of this meeting will be cited as: Lehigh Meeting, A.C.P.S.]

15. Arthur Morgan, "The Antioch Plan: Education for Symmetry," typescript, 4, marked by handwritten note, "1921 or 1922," Series V-A, AEM.

16. Lehigh Meeting, A.C.P.S.

17. Burton Clark, *The Distinctive College*, 16-19.

18. Morgan wrote his friend Charles Eliot several times asking for his help in recruiting Dewey. See, for instance, Morgan to Eliot, July 12, 1920, Series V, AEM. In 1921 Morgan was president of the Progressive Education Association, an organization formed in 1919 of which John Dewey was a vice president. Dewey did not take a really active role in this association, despite Morgan's attempts to involve him both with it and with Antioch. See: "Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the Progressive Education Association," typescript, Series VIII, AEM.

19. Arthur Morgan to Morris Keeton, February 6, 1965, Series III, AEM.

20. Minutes of Antioch College Faculty Meetings, December 8, 1926, typed transcript, individual speakers not identified: those participating in discussion noted as: Professors Nash, Swinnerton, Kennedy, and Mathewson, A.A.

21. *Ibid.*

22. George Roberts, "An Experiment in Education," *National City Bank Bulletin* (February, 1923): 28.

23. For a summary of Antioch's health program as it developed see: George Paul, "Health Provisions of Antioch College," *The Nation's Health* 5 (February, 1923): 63.

24. Letter to parents and teachers of prospective students, signed "A.E.M., 1921," Series V-A, AEM.

25. The Minutes of Meetings of the Board of Trustees 1921-1929, list names and occupations of trustees for each year, A.A; Arthur Morgan to Angelo Patri, July 14, 1920, Series V-A, AEM.

26. The exact figure was $2,222,141.32. For a complete list of major patrons of Antioch College during the period here studied see: "People Who Have Contributed to Antioch College in the Amount of $5,000. or More Since 1921," May 1, 1933, A.A.

27. Daniel Wren, "American Business Philanthropy and Higher Education in the Nineteenth Century," *Business History Review* 57 (Autumn, 1983): 342-346. Federal tax law allowed certain kinds of individual charitable deductions after 1917, but deductions to schools were rarely accepted. Corporations had to wait until 1935 to receive permission to deduct charitable contributions. States generally taxed inheritance bequests to organizations much more heavily than they taxed bequests to blood relatives.

28. Mayo quoted by Arthur Morgan in "Question and Answer Session: Morning Session, April 9, 1921," 1921 Proceedings.

29. Typed transcript, unpaginated, Fund-Raising Dinner at the Engineers Club, Dayton, Ohio, January 19, 1921, Series V-A, AEM, [Hereafter, Engineers Club Dinner].

30. George Roberts, "An Experiment in Education": 28.

31. Engineers Club Dinner.

32. The total yearly enrollment by men and women at Antioch between 1921 and 1929 was as follows:

Year	*Men*	*Women*	*Total*
1921-22	164	39	203
1922-23	311	82	393
1923-24	377	140	517
1924-25	444	154	598
1925-26	468	172	640
1926-27	532	187	719
1927-28	509	197	706
1928-29	459	205	664
1929-30	467	213	680

Statistics from: J. D. Dawson File, AA.

33. See student budgets detailed in: Angelo Patri, "The Strangest College in the U.S.," *Liberty Magazine* (October, 1924): 57-58.

34. Charles Eliot, "Address Given at a Meeting in the Interest of Antioch College, Hotel Somerset, Boston," reprinted in: *School and Society* 18 (July, 1923): 35-37.

35. Charles Francis Potter, notes for article to be titled, "The New American Education," typescript, handwritten date on document marked "1925?", AA.

36. Ida Clyde Clark, "Antioch, An Adventure in Education," *Pictorial Review* (January, 1924): 20.

37. "Enrollment Summaries," *Antioch Notes* 5 (December 1, 1927): 1, AA; A very interesting contemporary demographic profile of the college student population in the 1920s can be found in: O. E. Reynolds, *The Social and Economic Status of College Students* (New York, 1927).

38. Algo Henderson, "The Extramural School," October 26, 1933, typescript: 1-9, AA.

39. Algo Henderson, typed notes labeled, "Quotations Concerning the Antioch Experience from Mrs. Sontag" (no date, probably late 1932, early 1933): 5-6, A.A.

40. *Ibid.*: 5.

42. Angelo Patri, "The Strangest College in the U.S.": 57.

43. Ida Clarke, "Antioch, An Adventure in Education": 20.

44. *The Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles, California), April 11, 1926, clipping in: A.A.

45. In 1923, for instance, salaries ranged from $1,000 for part-time teaching to $5,000 for heads of departments. See: R. M. Hughes, "Conditions at Antioch College," March, 1923, typed report, A.A.

46. Arthur Morgan to Homer Corry, February 4, 1921, Series V-A, AEM.

47. For a review of the educational climate in American colleges during the decade see: William Learned, "The Quality of the Educational Process in the United States and Europe," *Bulletin #20* (The Carnegie Foundation for the Assessment of Teaching, New York, 1927), 1-75.

48. For a representative list of faculty members, containing brief biographies and summaries of credentials see: "The Officers of Instruction," *General Catalogue of Antioch College*, 5 (1925-1926): 11-20.

49. Arthur Morgan, "Memorandum to the Faculty: An Inventory and Appraisal," November 1, 1931, A.A. [Hereafter this document will be cited as: Letter from Portugal].

50. *Ibid.*: 3.

51. *Ibid.*: 9.

52. O. F. Mathiasen, typed memo, untitled, January 4, 1932, A.A.

53. *Ibid.*

54. "Report of the Autonomous Course Plan Committee, 1927-1928," typescript, 1928: B. (Professors P. S. Dwyer, R. E. Hiller, and O. F. Mathiasen comprised the faculty committee during the year 1927-1928), A.A.

55. *Ibid.*

56. William Leiserson to Arthur Morgan, typed memo, undated, (probably 1928?), A.A.

57. Lucy Morgan, speech, printed transcript of speeches given at an "Open Forum" held during November 1931, Antioch College, A.A. [Hereafter this transcript will be cited as: Open Forum].

58. The charges about the faculty wives appeared in a length memo defending his father written from Europe by Ernest Morgan. See Ernest Morgan to Dr. Henderson, Mr. Chatterjee, Mr. Horton, and Bishop Jones, dated December, 1931, A.A. (Another shorter copy of this memo is in: Series V-A, AEM).

59. Open Forum.

60. Lehigh Meeting, A.C.P.S.

61. "Proposed Statement of Russell Steward," typed memo, November 20, 1947, Series V-B, AEM.

62. The speech quoted in: *Springfield News*, (Springfield, Ohio), February 7, 1928.

63. Open Forum.

64. See: Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of Antioch College, 1926-1929, A.A.

65. Engineers Club Dinner.

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*

69. O. F. Mathiasen, typed memo, January 4, 1932.

70. Letter from Portugal, 14.

71. Arthur Morgan to Algo Henderson, typed memo, January 9, 1932, A.A.

"Putting a *Woman* in Sole Power": The Presidential Succession at Bryn Mawr College, 1892-1894

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WHEN DR. JAMES RHOADS, first president of Bryn Mawr College, resigned in 1893, he precipitated a power struggle over the presidency. The conflict, which pitted the school's brilliant Dean, Martha Carey Thomas, against a number of the college's trustees, revolved around two issues: the school's mission, and Thomas's challenge to traditional ideas about gender. Thomas, Rhoads, and several trustees believed that Bryn Mawr had to emphasize academic excellence, and that the dean should succeed to the presidency. Other trustees perceived a falling away from the primarily religious emphasis of the school. They did not believe a woman could handle the presidency. This struggle epitomized the contest between the seminary and liberal arts ideals of women's education. It also raised questions about the place of women in higher education. Would Carey Thomas be appointed president of the college she had helped establish? Or would the fear of "putting a *woman* in sole power" keep her out of that office, and by extension relegate women to a secondary role in shaping their own education?[1]

Carey Thomas played a critical role in opening the gates of educational administration to women. A majority of the trustees probably remained unconvinced that women should lead their own colleges. Yet Thomas confronted their objections and claimed a decisive role at Bryn Mawr, despite her sex. She relied upon personal relationships with several trustees, monetary inducement, and, if necessary, her threatened resignation.

The destinies of Carey Thomas and Bryn Mawr had been intertwined for more than a decade. Founder Joseph Taylor, physician, Friend, and manager (trustee) of Quaker Haverford College, first discussed endowing a school for the daughters of Orthodox Quakers in 1876. Quaker tenets of sexual equality prompted discussion of women's education. So did denominational developments in the 1860s and 1870s. While Orthodox Friends on the east coast had only all-male Haverford, the rival Hicksite sect had opened coeducational Swarthmore in 1864. The Hicksites split from the Orthodox Friends in 1827

because they championed greater freedom of religious conscience. They subsequently advocated radical social views, including coeducation.[2]

In the 1870s some liberal Orthodox Friends contemplated the higher education of their own daughters. Some young Quaker women hoped to enter newly opened colleges, such as Vassar, Wellesley, and Smith, that lay outside the close-knit Quaker world. Male Friends took up the issue of women's higher education from the perspective of exceptionalism, the desire of a young woman they knew to go to college. From there, the young women converted their fathers, including for example, James Thomas, father of Carey, and Francis King, two of Taylor's closest advisors.[3] They invoked the concept of a "religiously guarded education," which prepared Quaker children to take part in their faith's separate, distinct community. Orthodox Friends had not hitherto applied this principle to the new enterprise of women's higher education.[4]

A group of thirteen friends and relatives helped Taylor to set up the new school. All were Orthodox Friends; one, James Rhoads, was identified with the sect's liberal wing. Most had attended Haverford, and several served as its managers. Only one, Albert Smiley, was a professional educator: he headed a Rhode Island Friends' school. Several were bankers or lawyers. Four were directly related: cousins James Thomas, Francis King, and David Scull, Jr.; and Thomas's brother-in-law James Whitall. The two Baltimore trustees, Thomas and King, were also trustees of newly-opened Johns Hopkins University, and helped establish Hopkins as the United States leader in modern graduate training. Though several trustees championed Indian rights and other causes, none had previous experience in women's education. There is no evidence that women assisted their efforts; thus Bryn Mawr initially remained firmly within the patriarchal mold of Taylor's world.[5]

Taylor first thought he would establish his college as a woman's branch of Hopkins. Francis King and Carey Thomas, then a junior at Cornell, dissuaded him by arguing that "a separate college of women could do more for women's education than the annex to Johns Hopkins." He then chose the Bryn Mawr site near Haverford. Taylor focused on the religious mission of the institution, and directed that the college incorporate the tenets of Orthodox Quakerism "as taught by Fox, Penn, and Barclay." He wanted the school to "impose the cultivation of a very high degree of refinement of heart, mind and manners," suitable to Christians. He hoped graduates who sought employment would concentrate on teaching. Nothing in this plan distinguished Bryn Mawr from any other sectarian-sponsored seminary or college of the period.[6]

After Taylor's death in 1880, the thirteen trustees took over. The first curriculum, drafted in 1883, included such seminary staples as drawing, "physical culture," and required Bible studies. Bryn Mawr would nurture "intellectual

culture," "develop womanly character," and be "a Christian college." The trustees noted that the school could not "give the profound teaching of a university," and emphasized teacher training. Their emphasis on piety and guarded education over educational attainment eventually led many of them to later demand curriculum and staffing concessions.[7]

At this juncture Carey Thomas, daughter, niece, or cousin of several trustees, entered the history of Bryn Mawr. Thomas grew up in the small Quaker community of Baltimore, whose Orthodox meeting (church organization) was separate from the major United States Quaker meeting, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. Family connections to Philadelphia meant frequent contact with the wider Quaker community, but until she was a teenager Carey seldom met anyone other than Friends. Baltimore Friends lived in close proximity, patronized one another's professional services, and avoided contact with non-Friends.[8]

The eldest and favorite of ten children of James and Mary Thomas, Carey was an intelligent, energetic manipulator of her parents and other relatives. She developed this skill over years of negotiating to attend various schools and to avoid the "family claim" as eldest daughter to assist in the family's domestic life. She found strong role models among her female relatives. Her mother's sister Hannah Smith, the dominant member of her generation, stepped out of convention into public life, experimented with various religious beliefs, backed temperance and women's suffrage, and became a best-selling author of religious books. Hannah Smith retained a healthy appreciation of the worldly as well as the spiritual. She adroitly juggled "doctrine and ice-creams," an ability her favorite niece would emulate though in altered form. Her ideas about women's equality persuaded her niece to become a feminist as a teenager.[9]

Carey won permission to attend Howland Academy, and then Cornell. Johns Hopkins then admitted her to graduate studies on a restricted basis. At Howland she had been part of a female world of friendships, "smashes," and solidarity. At both Cornell and Hopkins she was isolated, cut off by propriety from most male contact, and without female teachers as mentors. She formed a clique with a few other students at Cornell; in graduate school this option was unavailable. Rebuffed in her attempts to earn a Hopkins doctorate despite backing from her father and other liberal trustees, Carey explicitly linked her struggles to "the cause" of women's equality. She could not advance, she realized, without fundamental change in societal ideas about women.[10]

Her close friendships with two daughters of Hopkins trustees strengthened this realization. Mary Garrett (whose father John was president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad), and Mamie Gwinn, (whose father Charles was a former attorney general of Maryland) were privately educated and belonged to Baltimore's upperclass, Episcopalian establishment. They opened new worlds of

culture and society to Carey. Together with mutual friends Julia Rogers and Elizabeth King, daughter of Francis, they met on Fridays to talk, write, and plan. The Friday Evening Group was a source of support and inquiry, exploring topics ranging from free love to literary conventions. All its members eventually contributed to women's education; four, to women's suffrage.[11]

At college, Carey's adherence to Quakerism faded before the "divine primal inspiration" of Romanticism. She molded the ideas of William Godwin, Percy Shelley, and others into a semi-religious scheme. "All religions are . . . only notes within the chorus" of beauty and belief, she wrote. Carey tried to connect religion and Romanticism: "Quakerism is a philosophy, its expansive faith need not hamper a wise and liberal culture." The effort failed. For her all religions including Quakerism represented the most intellectually deadened aspects of life.[12] Though she never became an atheist, she drifted from the Society of Friends and rejected the Quaker culture that had suffused her childhood and guided the Bryn Mawr trustees.

Thomas drew on the experiences of her mother as well as of her aunt Hannah for her liberal religious ideas. Mary Thomas was self-sacrificing to her family but also absorbed in her faith. She held administrative positions in Baltimore Quaker Meeting, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the YWCA. She also organized religious revivals. Like her sister, though less adamantly, Mary Thomas was critical of social restraints on women and favored religious freedom. Carey once admonished her mother, "Thee must not think that because I am not a missionary in your sense that I have no missionary spirit. . ." In Carey the family mysticism became intellectual ardor. She substituted science for Christ, academic work and ritual for religious study and worship. At Bryn Mawr she resolved the conflict of family and professional life by melding intellectual and female worlds.[13]

In 1878, realizing Hopkins would never give her a degree, Carey withdrew from the university. She pursued her Ph.D. at the University of Leipzig, Germany, persuading her parents to give her the necessary permission and resources. Again socially isolated, except for the company of friend and fellow student Mamie Gwinn, Carey experienced the same estrangement she had felt at Cornell. When the German university system denied her a degree, she traveled to Zurich. There she achieved the unprecedented triumph of the Ph.D. in English and German philology, *summa cum laude*, in 1882.[14]

She wrote of her doctorate, "I am only glad because I hope it shows that I can be useful . . . and then I am glad for 'the cause's' sake." Her yearning for "real earnest intellectual companionship," and her fervent feminism fueled a desire "to protest against the misery and oppression of a girl's life[,]" especially the social conventions that prevented women from obtaining an education. It was

probably inevitable that Carey would interest herself in Bryn Mawr.[15]

In the flush of academic triumph, and with the help of her family, she hoped to be appointed president. Despite her youth and inexperience, this was not an idle desire. Alice Freeman, with no doctorate and limited teaching experience, became a successful president of Wellesley at age twenty-seven; Carey was twenty-six and held the Ph.D. when she applied for Bryn Mawr's presidency in 1883. She cleared her application with her relatives on the board, stated her "old desire to see an excellent women's college in America" and presented her credentials. She assured the trustees that she would promote Quakerism and maintain a high academic standard. She suggested that Bryn Mawr fund graduate fellowships for women, to "assist in giving the new college the requisite scholarly atmosphere" and to attract students and research-oriented faculty. She conceived of the new college as the culmination of women's dreams of higher education, "a power which shall extend to every place where women are interested in educating or being educated," and in furthering the equality of women. "I care as much for 'the cause' as for myself," she wrote to her mother. The twin ideas of excellence and equity were now fixed in her conception of Bryn Mawr.[16]

Carey soon learned that she would not be the first president, but that she would receive some high position at the new college. Aunt Hannah confidently predicted that the "dear old fogies" of the board would give Carey a position where she could "prove thy capabilities . . . they would [eventually] have no alternative finally but to make thee president." She advised using women's "usual weapons" of "management and influence" to "save this college to our sex" until Carey could ascend to the presidency. Aunt Hannah thus invoked the typically Victorian, bourgeois ideal of women's greater moral virtue to persuade nominally dominant males to do the right thing. Carey combined this appeal with her own skills at manipulation to "manage" those trustees who were family members, and through them to challenge the opposition of other trustees. This tactic yielded mixed results.[17]

Wellesley College offered a model for combining scholarship with feminism. Boasting an all-woman faculty, Wellesley began as an ideal community for demonstrating women's abilities in 1875. At first subject to the paternalistic evangelicism of its founder, Henry Durant, Alice Freeman reoriented the college toward the achievement of "a genuine female intellectual community" when she became president in 1881.[18] Carey visited Wellesley in 1884 and exclaimed:

> When, as now, out of the rush of passionate . . . interest in what is being done for girls I wonder why I have gone into it, whether I can accomplish what I wish with this distress of the

> stopping halfway of the so far and no further of these girls' colleges—oh and men's too! but they do not concern us. To sit, as I sat today, in chapel and look down upon a woman president read prayers to an audience of 500 women and 70 professors and teachers—all women, not a man's influence seen or felt; or to watch the girls in trousers swing on rings . . . ushers in a new day.[19]

Wellesley offered emotional sustenance Thomas had not previously known. Female friendships and nascent feminism dominated, indeed determined, the social world of Wellesley. Many faculty members lived with one another in "Wellesley marriages," that supported the intellectual life of the school. This woman-centered atmosphere did not preclude high academic standards that led to "girls being dropped without mercy." Those left were both able and willing to hew to rigorous intellectual demands. Carey stated in block letters in her notebook: "THE SECRET OF WELLESLEY'S SUCCESS IS HER INEXORABLENESS". She resolved to transfer that inexorableness to Bryn Mawr.[20]

Carey was appointed dean of Bryn Mawr in April, 1884, reporting to President Rhoads. She used the information gathered from an 1884 tour of various schools to back up her effort to strengthen Bryn Mawr's academic standard and introduce the Wellesley influences she admired. Thomas proposed changing, not merely the curriculum, but the central purpose of the college. She wanted Bryn Mawr to become "an epitome of women's education . . . a model . . . for the future." She advised refusing to accept certificates in lieu of admissions examinations, a stringency that only Radcliffe shared with the new school. She and Rhoads recommended the Hopkins group system, an early form of the major, and supported a Greek requirement, and oral examinations in French and German. Thomas proposed that only scholars holding Ph.D.s receive teaching appointments and that lectures and laboratory demonstrations replace recitations: "The dispensers of spiritual food in colleges are so unspirited minded that in the midel [sic] of it all I grow very anxious that we may be able to change things a little."[21]

Thomas's ideas evolved in part from the 1883 curriculum, in part from recommendations from President L. Clark Seelye of Smith, who in 1878 advocated higher standards to Joseph Taylor, and from President Gilman of Hopkins. Seelye and Gilman urged her to raise the work standard, introduce new methods, and strengthen requirements for faculty to establish the college as a serious, modern institution of higher learning.[22]

The trustees adopted nearly all of Carey Thomas's proposals, thereby

giving the college a unique role in women's higher education. Carey renewed her proposal for graduate fellowships and for one travelling fellowship for a senior. The original college plan included an unspecified number of fellowships worth two-thirds of college tuition for "graduates of Bryn Mawr or other colleges," but made no mention of graduate work. The trustees approved fellowships in English, history, mathematics, biology, Greek, and the travelling fellowship. They thus committed the college to graduate work, laying the foundation for a women's university that offered scholarship, academic careers, and tangible rewards for intellectual achievement.[23]

Dean Thomas's belief in a place for women scholars subverted most common ideas about women's abilities and career potential. The fellowships also represented a large financial commitment. Why did the educationally conservative, frugal trustees enact this proposal? Carey's educational experience, her relationship to several trustees, and her persuasive arguments no doubt contributed to the decision. The allure of graduate work would bolster the college's image and attract quality faculty. Thomas also appealed to the Quaker idea of equality. By offering the opportunity for graduate study, the trustees demonstrated their confidence in women's intellectual ability. Casting Bryn Mawr's founding in an idealized light, Carey later declared, "A college without graduate studies . . . never occurred to us." She considered graduate work synonymous with the meaning of Bryn Mawr.[24]

The board probably failed to understand the extent of her support of scholarship over religion. Thomas did not directly challenge the school's religious emphasis, and she accepted a requirement in Christian ethics. The second college circular, which she probably drafted, discussed the influence of Quakerism on the college. The trustees knew and accepted her as pious if somewhat liberal. They paid close attention to her interpretation of a proper academic standard. They did not know, because she kept private, the extent of her drift from the Society.[25]

The trustees and Thomas agreed that students would come from "families of influence," "desiring," as Carey put it, "to fill their lives with the interests and pleasures a cultivated mind affords its possessors." They agreed that education would further the position of women. Thomas expressed ideas within traditional limits, even if the educational goals of the college went beyond those limits. Though the trustees knew her views as a "women's righter," the ideas did not yet conflict with the religious mission of the college. She consciously muted these ideas through her deanship and her presidency, as she did other ideas and behaviors.[26]

Finally, both the board and Carey desired excellence in curriculum, faculty, and students. This common purpose stood her in good stead through the

crises of the next decade. By appealing to excellence, and her ability to achieve it, Thomas bargained successfully for more resources, expanded programs, and a broader interpretation of the college's mission. She also consolidated her own leadership. Her vision, for better or worse, became that of Bryn Mawr. With remarkable consistency, she guided much of the college's development in its light.

Once the college opened, Carey Thomas and James Rhoads divided the responsibilities. Rhoads oversaw buildings, finances, and relations with the trustees, while Thomas guided educational policy, kept college records, advised students, and evaluated most potential faculty. Thomas soon expanded her authority, reporting on such matters as buildings and grounds directly to the trustees. Her wide discretion reflected a productive, affectionate relationship with the President, probably the most liberal of the trustees and the most skillful in harmonizing various views.[27]

Thomas influenced her students through advising and the daily literature and composition courses she taught to all freshmen and sophomores. "[M]y class [first year English] . . . will increase every year—and it is this course which gives me my hold over the students. . . ." She encouraged students and professors to wear their academic robes to class. The robes emphasized their scholarly identity and masked class differences. She supported traditions such as Lantern Night, when upperclassmen awarded lanterns of learning to freshmen who passed a quiz. The ceremony grew to include a procession and the singing of Greek and Latin hymns to Athena and other deities. The traditions drew together female ritual, neo-medieval English culture, and mysticism. They consecrated scholarship and created a collegiate culture absent from her own education. The dean set a highly idealized tone for academic life, and cultivated her speech, demeanor, and dress. Even a detractor noted that she was "a majestic woman whose spirit and manner had a dignity and classical style that reminded me of a passage in Sophocles."[28]

As dean, Thomas recapitulated her role as eldest child: head of the junior branch of the family still subject, however reluctantly, to the paternal authority of President Rhoads and the trustees. The youth of both students and faculty reinforced the generational theme: almost all were under 40. Some, including Thomas in 1885, were under 30. The Trustees, all of whom were over 40, represented to her the educational methods and paternal authority of another era. Indeed, the trustees often gave avuncular advice to Dean Thomas as well as to the students. Elevating her to the presidency would thus present difficult psychological as well as ideological issues.[29]

Thomas successfully transferred the family "missionary spirit" into the college. As a minister of rationalism she shaped student beliefs, and preached the

new faith of scholarship. She replaced a religion-centered college culture with an amalgam of women's friendships and scholarship by becoming the conduit between the administration and the students. She sympathized with the faculty's scientifically-based, German-influenced scholarship. Exploiting and expanding this strategic position, she exerted greater influence over the college than the holder of official power.[30]

The college was an immediate and lasting success. By 1889 freshman enrollment averaged 80 to 85 students, and the college confidently targeted 500 undergraduates as optimal. By the time of the presidential controversy two new dormitories, holding 110 students, stood on the college grounds, while construction on a double-winged hall to house 120 students moved ahead. The classroom facilities were cramped almost from the first year. The first major addition was the science building, Dalton Hall, completed in 1893. The graduate program, targeted for 100 students, attracted four or five applicants for each fellowship, many of whom attended Bryn Mawr. The building program came out of the college's endowments, but operating expenses came from tuition and room fees, a lesson learned from the experiences of other women's colleges which had initially subsidized reduced fees to the detriment of their endowments.[31]

Joined to Thomas's efforts in building Bryn Mawr, and complementing them, was her role in founding the Bryn Mawr School in Baltimore, which also opened in 1885. The Friday Evening participants conceived of the school and Mary Garrett funded it in large part. The school prepared Baltimore girls to enter Bryn Mawr—graduates had to pass the Bryn Mawr or Harvard entrance examinations. It also filled the need for a non-denominational preparatory school for the city's young women. Lacking such a school, Carey Thomas and Elizabeth King journeyed to New York for secondary education, while Mary Garrett, Mamie Gwinn, and Julia Rogers, had no formal secondary education. The school's young, feminist, all-female board, whose composition clearly contrasted with that of the college, dominated the first decade of development.[32]

In 1892, with Bryn Mawr successfully launched, President Rhoads, in declining health, talked of resigning. He believed Thomas could carry on the work of the college, and expected she would receive automatic appointment as the next president. Yet a majority of the trustees was convinced that Joseph Taylor's vision of guarded education for female Friends was in danger. Brothers Philip and John Garrett (not related to Mary Garrett); Francis R. Cope; and Edward Bettle believed that putting the liberal, outspoken Dean in the presidency would irrevocably end Taylor's conception of the college.[33]

Most ominous were signs of increasing ecumenicism. The first class was about half Quaker; subsequent classes contained no more than a handful, usually

six to ten, of student Friends. Thomas made no special efforts to attract Friends to the faculty. Further, despite the founder's admonitions regarding the college's Quaker atmosphere, there were no required religious exercises. President Rhoads preached optional chapel exercises six days a week, Thomas one, and Rhoads taught the single required course in Christian principles. These arrangements satisfied Thomas and Rhoads, and reinforced the primacy of scholarship. The secondary position of religion seemed to many trustees the reason for the decline in Quaker enrollments. The entire idea of a college for Orthodox Quaker women was, in their minds, rapidly slipping away. They believed they had "an obligation to make the College more Friendly."[34]

The trustees also perceived a liberal tendency in the curriculum. When Francis Cope complained, Carey omitted Shakespeare's *Othello* and censored other works from her courses, but she retained the plays of Beaumont and Fletcher. She promised to remove the offending playwrights from the library, though she never did so. When the board resolved to remove them in 1894, she placed them in the "locked closet" of the library. Cope eventually resigned in protest over the Elizabethan dramas that remained in her courses. The conservative board members, who clung to old ideas of propriety and parentalism in education, made Beaumont and Fletcher a symbolic issue.[35]

Carey's father, James Thomas, her uncle, James Whitall, and James Rhoads staunchly supported her. So did her second cousin Francis King, the first president of the Board. Prior to his death in 1891 King told Carey that the Board planned to appoint her the second president. Carey's other cousin, David Scull, personally opposed many of the liberalizing changes, but he believed in the ability of his young relative. He often played the role of go-between.[36]

The five remaining trustees were the swing votes. Lacking a dominant personality, they served out their terms without providing much leadership. None was related to the Thomas family, and none was the focus of any of the debates over ecumenicism. Their names seldom figure in the critical correspondence of 1893-94. They presumably shifted allegiance from time to time. Personal persuasion and compromise would be necessary to win three votes from this group to form a majority for Carey.[37]

When she learned of Rhoads' intentions, Thomas resolved to remain only if elected president and life trustee, as he had been. "The whole success of the college is of course due to me," she asserted. While this was not strictly true, she was the heart of Bryn Mawr's educational structure and the soul of its community. The opposing trustees tried to persuade Rhoads to stay. They equated Thomas's elevation with "committing themselves to ultra . . . liberalism". They were, Thomas thought, "terrified" of making her president. When Rhoads could not be swayed, the trustees tried to persuade Thomas to remain as dean under a

male president, lecturing her on her "duty to sacrifice myself" for the sake of the college. She threatened to resign.[38]

A period of sparring and circling began. Carey took on most of the duties of the exhausted Rhoads, further alarming the opposing trustees. She exhorted her relatives on the board to smooth the way for her nomination. When Rhoads finally resigned, in February, 1893, to take effect the following academic year, the trustees formed a nominating committee and forced the issue of guarded education. A subcommittee would decide whether the college conformed to Joseph Taylor's instructions regarding the place of Quakerism. Several trustees favored strengthening the religious commitment of the college, scaling down academic goals, perhaps even re-organizing it as a seminary or abandoning graduate work.[39]

Carey's allies counseled patience. Rhoads believed the committee would "probably soon exhaust all other alternatives" and appoint her. Her uncle, knowing her short temper, advised her, "Be swift to hear, slow to speak."[40] She followed this advice, but poured out her frustrations, anger, doubts, and hopes in almost daily letters to Mary Garrett. She explained to Garrett,

> . . . you do not yet understand why I often think this is not perhaps the best use of my time here at Bryn Mawr—it is not that I am not delighted at the revolution—for it is almost that—we have been able to begin in women's education—it is not that it is not very much worthwhile for it is, it is that with the same effort much more lasting and permanent things could be accomplished. . . . I am tormented by the thought that in some other way I might help on more that poor der [sic] Woman with a capital letter.[41]

Carey later declared she did not want to "waste more years of my life" under the collective thumb of the Board, "building up this house of cards that 13 irresponsible men can in a moment destroy . . . I shall be free again." These bitter words came from momentary despair. She fought for the presidency tenaciously.[42]

Thomas perceived the college as the best platform for women's advancement, through education and emancipation. Under her leadership, the Bryn Mawr "experiment" would create a "a great university of women scholars where publication and investigation etc. by women shall prove[their] original thinking power." She had once said, "if I give up . . . personal ambition it ought to be for *something*." Looking back, she would say that in leading Bryn Mawr, "I had found what I most cared to do." The presidency allowed her "to help

women to get free materially and intellectually." The discovery that she needed the college to accomplish her goals steeled her for the struggle.[43]

Help soon arrived from an unexpected quarter. Mary Garrett took a direct interest in the college in order to help her friend. She donated marble busts, paid off some overdue property taxes for the college, and offered to purchase an important classical library. On March 28, she pledged a $10,000 yearly donation for the term of a Thomas presidency.[44]

James Thomas, apprised of Garrett's intentions, wrote a letter in favor of her election. He cited her successes as administator, fundraiser, and representative of the college. As an original Board member, he counseled Taylor and knew Taylor's thinking. He concluded, "If she were a man you would appoint her without hesitation."[45]

These letters influenced the trustees. They had watched the Taylor million dollar endowment dwindle to under $400,000 as building progressed. Garrett's gift would help establish stability in operating expenses. James Thomas was a respected member of the board. Yet the trustees continued to stall. They voted to consider the gift and recorded their newest idea: having Rhoads remain as president and appointing a (male) vice-president to assist him. They sounded out candidates for this position through the spring. Meanwhile the committee charged with examining the question of religion finally reported.[46]

The report led to several measures designed to increase religious influence. Friends would receive preference for faculty appointment even if less qualified than other candidates. Students had to register their religious affiliation, and the president had to record Sabbath worship. The trustees stated that Taylor intended Bryn Mawr to have neither a lower *nor a higher* standard than Haverford. The majority was clearly uneasy, if not opposed to the college's direction and to Carey's promotion.[47]

Unease notwithstanding, the trustees could not pass over her for the presidency. They could not find a male president, nor could the most conservative members effect radical change, as in requiring, for example, that all faculty be Friends. Nor could they pass up the inducement of Mary Garrett. They negotiated an understanding that Garrett's gift only be used for temporary, not capital, expenses of the college. Thomas could not then operate as a free agent with an independent income.[48]

The four liberal trustees finally found a majority, and Carey Thomas was elected president on November 17, 1893, by one vote. The terms of election inevitably included compromise. Thomas was not made a trustee, as she had ardently argued she should be, and Rhoads agreed to stay on for a year while Carey proved herself. One trustee, alienated beyond repair, resigned. Thus power, money, and compromise triumphed. Carey Thomas worked through her

relatives to secure her elevation to the presidency, aided unexpectedly by Mary Garrett.[49]

Lingering acrimony led the President-elect to forego an inauguration. She maintained the transition did not warrant a ceremony. Yet she was never one to pass up an occasion, let alone one lauding her own achievements, and her appointment had been well-received by faculty, students, and the public. The circumstances of her elevation must have made festivity with the trustees a painful prospect. With uncharacterstic lack of fanfare, Carey Thomas became President of Bryn Mawr, a position she would hold for the next 28 years.[50]

Bryn Mawr had reached a turning point. Thomas now set it on the path of excellence and ecumenicism. While she insisted upon, perhaps for too long, specific curricular ideas such as the group system, the ideal of excellence proved a durable, unifying element in the college's development. Thomas also tightened the links between feminism and the college, conveying to students the necessity of changing women's lives. She valued her role in bolstering student feminism and idealism more than inspiring their academic achievements. She disentangled the conventions of piety from the college experience, but replaced them with other conventions, inculcating students as surely as Friends might have. During Bryn Mawr's fiftieth anniversary, she quoted as the alumnae letter she prized most: "I have forgotten everything I learned at Bryn Mawr but I still see you standing in chapel and telling us to believe in women."[51]

Thomas's emphasis on feminism signifies the importance of her presidency. She replaced the evangelical, hortatory, regularized system of religious belief with an equally evangelical, hortatory, and regularized belief system focused on feminism. This was a revolution, a shift in the locus of power from a male to a female center. The conservative trustees were correct: religion at Bryn Mawr became ecumenical and privatized, and "ultra liberalism" dominated its intellectual, if not curricular, core.

Thomas's ascension to the Bryn Mawr presidency marked the emergence of women in college administration. She differed from presidents such as Alice Freeman, who publicly deferred to men while manipulating them behind the scenes. Carey Thomas sought power and exercised it openly. Her clashes with the Trustees continued, even after her own election in 1902. The issues remained the same: ecumenicism, liberalism, and her assertion of control. Yet Thomas had the last word. She supplanted the trustees with a non-Quaker board of Directors, which became the actual decision-making body of the college by 1906. The Trustees remained as symbols of another era, but the influence of Orthodox Quakerism fell away.[52] Carey Thomas demonstrated that women could reject traditional, pietistic education in favor of academic excellence and feminism. The Bryn Mawr precedent claimed for women the power to deter-

mine the direction of their own educational experience, a power central to the development of a generation of college-educated women.

NOTES

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1. The relationship of women's colleges to the development of higher education in America is largely unexamined. Among the few works that attempt this task are Barbara Miller Solomon, *In the Company of Educated Women: A History of Women and Higher Education in America* (New Haven: Yale, 1985), and Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, *Alma Mater: Design and Experience in the Women's Colleges from Their Nineteenth Century Beginnings to the 1930s* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1984). Quotations from M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, March 10, 1893, M. Carey Thomas Papers, Bryn Mawr College Archives, Bryn Mawr, PA (hereinafter referred to as Thomas Papers).

2. Information on Taylor comes from Cornelia Meigs, *What Makes a College? A History of Bryn Mawr* (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 1-22. The Orthodox-Hicksite division is described in Edwin Bronner, "An Historical Summary," in *American Quakers Today* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1966); and in Margaret Bacon, *The Quiet Rebels: The Story of the Quakers in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

3. The conversion of Thomas and King appears in Meigs, *What Makes a College?* p. 24. An excellent insight into exceptionalism can be seen in a letter from Mary Thomas to daughter Carey about the issue of admitting women to Johns Hopkins. Though a majority of the Quaker-dominated board supported coeducation, the final policy was to let President Daniel Coit Gilman use his "discretion" in making "arrangements for special cases. . . ," precisely the situation Carey would face. Quoted in Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist: Early Journals and Letters of M. Carey Thomas* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State Press, 1979), p. 10 (letter undated but probably 1876-77).

4. Cornell was founded by Quaker Elias Hicks but did not offer guarded education. Its women's section opened in 1872. Carey Thomas attended Cornell instead of Vassar in part because of its superior academic reputation and in part because of its Quaker connection. See Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*; and Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, p. 16. On the opening of colleges for women, see Solomon, *In the Company of Educated Women*, pp. 43-61. The generational difference is clear from Carey Thomas's early journals and letters, in Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*; see also Helen Thomas Flexner, *A Quaker Childhood* (New Haven: Yale, 1940), p. 81, 88-89, and 185-87. On religiously guarded education see Bacon, *The Quiet Rebels*, p. 154 ff.

5. Information on the Trustees appears in Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, pp. 23-26; see also *An English View of American Quakerism: The Journal of Walter Robson*, ed. Edwin Bronner (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1970) for biographical information. On Johns

Hopkins see Hugh Hawkins, *Pioneer: A History of Johns Hopkins University 1874-1884* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960); and Abraham Flexner, *Daniel Coit Gilman* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946).

6. The advice of Carey Thomas appears as part of her autobiographical fragments, Thomas Papers. The wishes of Joseph Taylor are contained in his will, made in February, 1877, and quoted in Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, pp. 28-29. They reflect in part the advice of the then president of Haverford, Thomas Chase, who was educationally as well as doctrinally conservative. See Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, p. 28. On the general quality and composition of education for women at this time, see Solomon, *In the Company of Educated Women*.

7. The first curriculum is contained in *Circular No. 1, Bryn Mawr College* (Bryn Mawr, 1883), Bryn Mawr College Archives. Cornelia Meigs implies that the trustees were always willing to change their minds on the issue of "'guarded' instruction." In fact the debate of Carey's ascension to the presidency was a referendum on this issue. See Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, p. 29 ff.

8. There is no comprehensive study of the Quaker community of Baltimore. Some information appears in Bronner, ed., *An English view*; in Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*; and in Hawkins, *Pioneer*.

9. On the Thomas family see Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*; Edith Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr* (New York: Harper, 1947); and Flexner, *A Quaker Childhood*. The conflict over the family claim may be traced in Dobkin, *ibid.*, pp. 49, 55, 57-58, 61, 63. See also Jane Addams, "The College Woman and the Family Claim," *The Commons* IV (September, 1898), and Joyce Antler, "'After College, What?': New Graduates and the Family Claim," *American Quarterly* 32 (1980), pp. 409-434. On Hannah Smith see *Notable America Women*, ed. Edward T. James and Janet Wilson James (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1971), and Barbara Strachey Halperin, *Remarkable Relations: The Story of the Pearsall Smith Women* (New York: Universe Books, 1980). "Doctrines and ice-creams" appears in Bronner, ed., *An English View*; p. 142. Carey's first reference to herself as a feminist are in her early journals of 1871-72 (see Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*).

10. On female friendships see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations Between Women in Nineteenth-Century America," in Rosenberg, *Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian America* (New York: Oxford, 1985); Blanche Wiesen Cook, *Women and Support Networks* (New York: Out & Out Books, 1981); Nancy Sahli, "Smashing: Women's Relationships Before the Fall," *Chrisalis* 8 (1979), pp. 17-22; and Leila Rupp, "'Imagine My Surprise': Women's Relationships in Historical Perspective," *Frontiers* 5 (1981), pp. 61-79. On Cornell see Charlotte W. Conable, *Women at Cornell: The Myth of Equal Education* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), and Carey's letters to her parents, 1875, in Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*, pp. 106-107, 112.

11. On the Friday Evening group see Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*, pp. 125-28 and ff.

12. M. Carey Thomas, Journal entry, August 25, 1878, in Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*, p. 147-48; M[artha] C[arey] T[homas], "Education in the Society of Friends: A Plea for its Continuance," *The Quaker Alumnus*, 1 (First Month, 1879). Her objections and her resentment of the narrowness of the Quaker world are stated in her autobiographical fragments; see

especially the edited version in Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*, pp. 307-313.

13. On Mary Thomas, see Flexner, *A Quaker Childhood*. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Thomas, October 2, 1883, Thomas Papers.

14. M. Carey Thomas to the Trustees of Johns Hopkins, October 17, 1878, Thomas Papers. On her German sojourn see Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*, pp. 159-287; also Thomas's "A Letter from Leipzig" and "The Study of Comparative Literature" in *The Alumnus* 2 (Sixth Month, 1880), pp. 35-36, 39-40.

15. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, July 2, 1884, Journal, Sept. 23, 1877; to Mary Garrett, July 12, 1879, Thomas Papers.

16. On Alice Freeman see *Notable American Women*; and Patricia A. Palmieri, "'In Adamless Eden': A Social Portrait of the Academic Community at Wellesley College, 1875-1920," (Ed.D. Dissertation: Harvard University School of Education, 1981), n. 97 For encouragement to apply, see Mary Thomas to M. Carey Thomas, January 30, 1880; Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, pp. 35-37. The letter is given in full in Dobkin, *The Making of a Feminist*, pp. 277-81. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Thomas, January 30, 1883; to Mary Thomas, November 30, 1882, Thomas Papers.

17. M. Carey Thomas Mary Thomas, January 30, 1883, and November 30, 1882, Thomas Papers. On Hannah Smith's advice, see her letter to Thomas, January 15, 1884, Thomas Papers.

18. On Wellesley's early history and the goals of the Durants and Freeman, see Palmieri, "'In Adamless Eden;" and Patricia A. Palmieri, "Here Was Fellowship: A Social Portrait of Academic Women at Wellesley College, 1895-1920," *History of Education Quarterly* (Summer 1983), pp. 195-214. See also Solomon, *In the Company of Educated Women*; and Horowitz, *Alma Mater*.

19. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, May 3, 1884, Thomas Papers.

20. On Wellesley see Palmieri, "'In Adamless Eden'". On Thomas's impressions, see M. Carey Thomas, "Notebook," n.d., and M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, April 26, 1884, Thomas Papers.

21. Her idea of the school as a model, and her recommendations, are in M. Carey Thomas, "Report to the Board of Trustees," June 7, 1884, Thomas Papers. "The dispensers" is in M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, May 28, 1884, Thomas Papers.

22. Carey describes her interviews with Seelye and Gilman in her "Notebook" of 1884, Thomas Papers; see also L. Clark Seelye to Joseph W. Taylor, November 27, 1878 (draft), Seelye Correspondence S-T, Taylor File, Smith College Archives; and Hawkins, *Pioneer*.

23. The original scholarship plan appears in *Circular No. 1*, p. 10, the graduate fellowships in *Circular No. 2, Bryn Mawr College* (Bryn Mawr, 1884). Details of the vote from the Minutes of the Trustees, June 19, 1884, Bryn Mawr College Archives. This level of support remained the most extensive for women for many years.

24. Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, p. 29.

25. See Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, and the *Second Circular*.

26. Thomas's views on prospective students are in her "Report" of 1884. The conscious muting of ideas and behavior, ranging from overt feminism to her decision to forego smoking until her retirement, appears in her letters and is discussed in Cynthia Farr Brown, "Letting In New Light: M. Carey Thomas, Feminism, and Higher Education" (M.A. Thesis: Bryn Mawr College, 1984), pp. 84-90.

27. Rhoads' and Thomas's official papers from this period are lost. This description of early administration is taken from Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, and the Minutes of the Trustees for 1884-1892, Bryn Mawr College Archives, as well as from Carey Thomas's personal correspondence, Thomas Papers.

28. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, May 24, 1891, and December 21, 1891, Thomas Papers. On academic robes, see Lida Rose McCabe, *The American Girl at College* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1893), and Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*. The traditions of Bryn Mawr are described in Virginia Wolf Briscoe, "Bryn Mawr College Traditions: Women's Ritual as Expressive Behavior" (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Pennsylvania, 1981). On her duties and relations to students, see M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, December 12 to 13, 1891, and December 20, 1891, Thomas Papers; see also notes dated October 17, 1907, in "Self Government Association" file, Office Files of M. Carey Thomas, Thomas Papers. The quotation is from ex-faculty member Alvin Johnson, *Pioneer's Progress* (New York: Viking, 1952), p. 145 ff.

29. The generational theme appears in Thomas's correspondence, and in that of several of the trustees to her, especially her cousin David Scull. Even during the presidential debate the board's proposals were often couched in terms of advice or as guidance.

30. Direct religious imagery appears in her letter to Mary Garrett, May 28, 1884, Thomas Papers; the concept of the teacher as minister is clear from Thomas's own teaching style and especially from her approach to speaking in daily chapel, which brought her hortatory skills to bear on worldly issues to the near exclusion of religious topics; see her notes for chapel talks in the Thomas Papers. The pivotal role of Thomas as dean, which appears in a close study of college records, is confirmed by Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, p. 161.

31. The enrollment history of the college is difficult to trace. The college opened with 36 undergraduates and five graduate students. The freshman enrollment in 1889 is drawn from Carey Thomas's statement of enrollment in her mandatory English class, in a letter to Mary Garrett, May 24, 1891, Thomas Papers. The building history of the school is discussed by Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, pp. 58-60, and in an address by M. Carey Thomas, "In memory of Walter Cope, Architect of Bryn Mawr College," Bryn Mawr College, 1905 (Bryn Mawr College Archives).

32. The early history of the school may be traced in the correspondence of M. Carey Thomas; see especially the commentary by Lucy Fisher West, *The Papers of M. Carey Thomas*, Bryn Mawr College (1982). See also Doblin, *The Making of a Feminist*, pp. 126-28. There is also useful information in Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, pp. 161-215.

33. The composition of this conservative core has been reconstructed from the correspondence of Carey and her relatives and from the tenor of subsequent events, which often found Carey and

these four in opposition and in which she sometimes mentioned their original opposition to her appointment as president. Cornelia Meigs has suggested that many of Taylor's ideas were suggestive rather than definitive, including his advocacy of guarded education. Whether this is true or not, many of the trustees believed he saw guarded education as a central principle of the college, and acted accordingly. (Meigs, *What Makes a College?*)

34. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, March 8, 1891, Thomas Papers. On her continuing animosity toward denominational identification, see her letters to Mary Garrett of October 17, 1898, and February 20, 1900, as well as her letter to Joseph Swain, May 10, 1904, Thomas Papers. The concerns of the Trustees are phrased by James Rhoads in a letter written during the Presidential controversy and quoted by Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, pp. 210-11.

35. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, March 14, 1892, Thomas Papers. The outcome of the debate is in Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, pp. 168-69.

36. With these relatives and Rhoads Thomas carried on extensive correspondence during this period. The representations of Francis King are described by James Whitall in a letter to the Trustees in March, 1893, quoted in Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, p. 208.

37. This evaluation of the swing vote trustees depends upon a reading of the "Trustees' Minutes" through 1916, in the Bryn Mawr College Archives; analysis of the Thomas family correspondence; and information provided in Meigs, *What Makes a College?*, pp. 23 ff. It should be noted that the board apparently operated by majority vote, rather than by Quaker consensus, though it appears that for major decisions a *de facto* consensus was reached.

38. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, March 14, 1892; March 1, 1893; and March 23, 1892, Thomas Papers.

39. The votes appear in the Trustee's Minutes for March, 1893, Bryn Mawr College Archives. See also Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, p. 211, and Meigs, *What Makes a College?*

40. Rhoads and James Whitall are quoted in Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, pp. 207-8.

41. The correspondence with Garrett extends from February, 1892 to early 1894, in the Thomas Papers. Quotation from M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, January 17, 1892, Thomas Papers.

42. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, April 4, 1893, Thomas Papers.

43. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, January 17, 1892; to Mary Garrett, October 31, 1885; to Helen Taft Manning, August 18, 1920, and April 17, 1920, Thomas Papers.

44. The records of Garrett's donations appear in the Trustee Minutes for March, Bryn Mawr College Archives, and in Edith Finch, *ibid.*, p. 208. The monetary inducement replicated the tactic Mary Garrett used to help gain admittance for women into Johns Hopkins Medical school. See Beatrice S. Levin, *Women and Medicine* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1980), and Mary Roth Walsh, *"Doctors Wanted, No Women Need Apply:" Sexual Barriers in the Medical Profession, 1835-1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

45. James Thomas, circular letter, April 13, 1893, recorded in the "Trustees' Minutes" for April 14, 1893, Bryn Mawr College Archives.

46. "Trustees' Minutes," April 14 and July 7, 1893, Bryn Mawr College Archives.

47. M. Carey Thomas to Mary Garrett, March 1, 1893, March 10, 1893, March 22, 1893, Thomas Papers. The resolutions appear in the Trustees' Minutes for July 7, 1893.

48. The concern over Thomas's use of the Garrett pledge is in Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, pp. 211-12.

49. See the Trustees' Minutes for November 17, 1893, and Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, p. 214.

50. The suggestion is contained in the Trustee's Minutes. Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, p. 214, gives an account of how her election was received. She eventually became a trustee in 1902, after petitioning for the post each year.

51. The role of chapel is made clear by Meigs, *What Makes a College?* Notes and outlines for a number of chapel talks survive which underscore their consistent themes, including that of feminism; see them collected under the heading "Chapel Talks" in the Thomas Papers. Anonymous alumna quoted by her in *Address at the Fiftieth Anniversary of Bryn Mawr College* (Bryn Mawr College, 1935), p. 54.

52. The various trustee's debates after Thomas's appointment are underplayed in Finch, *Carey Thomas of Bryn Mawr*, and Meigs, *What Makes a College?* See however her correspondence with Mary Garrett, November 4 and November 11, 1896; and March 24, and April 11, 1897; and David Scull to M. Carey Thomas, January 12, 1897, Thomas Papers. The evolution of the Board of Directors appears in Meigs, *ibid.*, pp. 77-80, and 97 ff. It should be noted that Haverford took a different path; the school has remained infused with Quaker beliefs, in clear contrast with Bryn Mawr. The style of Alice Freeman, and her later role behind the scenes after her marriage and resignation as president, are discussed in Palmieri, "'In Adamless Eden.'"

University of Rochester Medical Center, 1936. Photo courtesy of Chris Hoolihan, Librarian of History of Medicine.

Mixed Blessings: Science and Specialization in American Medical Education

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Kenneth M. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal: The Development of American Medical Education*, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985, 346 pp., cloth and paper.

Regina Markell Morantz-Sanchez, *Sympathy and Science: Women Physicians and American Medicine*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 464 pp., cloth and paper.

William G. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools and the Practice of Medicine*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 408 pp., cloth.

THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES (AAMC) reports that the number of medical school graduates is declining. In 1984 American medical colleges graduated 16,343 new physicians; if present trends continue, that number will be 15,600 by 1990, a decline of 4.5%.[1] Some observers attribute this decline to the greater attractions of Wall Street. But, the spate of "survivor" accounts by recent medical graduates points us to a deeper problem.[2] Today's physicians-in-training, undergraduates and residents, seem demoralized and disaffected. They claim that the combination of numbing pre-clinical science, over-specialization, and a dearth of clinician role models results in a dehumanizing course of study. Alas, dehumanized medical care is the corollary to such an educational process. The AAMC's 1984 report, *Physicians for the Twentieth-First Century*, notes, "despite frequent assertions that the general professional education of medical students is the basic mission of medical schools, it often occupies the last place in the competition for faculty time and attention." An intern in *The House of God* sums it up, "How can we care for patients [if] nobody cares for us?"[3]

In all fairness, medical educators try to address the dehumanization of medical education. Harvard's new "Pathway" program eliminates lecture courses and redirects students to a case-study, problem-based, curriculum. Johns Hopkins no longer requires the MCATS for admission. The University of

Pennsylvania no longer designates *any* pre-medical course requirements.[4] In addition, many schools have added medical ethics or medical humanities courses to their curricula.

These innovations all have the same objective: to create a better fit between our health care needs and the way we train our doctors. They reflect a consensus that training in good medical science does not translate easily into good clinical practice. Ironically, many of today's failures of medical care and medical education may be traceable to the very reforms in medical education chronicled by Kenneth Ludmerer, Regina Morantz-Sanchez, and William Rothstein. All three works substantially contribute to the history of medical education and address the current concerns of medical educators. Although they overlap, each book offers something distinctive. Ludmerer describes the 19th century movement for the reform of medical education. Morantz-Sanchez's analysis of those reforms focuses on women in medicine. Her analysis is applicable to all practitioners after the turn of the century. Rothstein, like Ludmerer, describes the eighteenth and nineteenth century origins of medical education, but emphasizes the effects of the early reforms on the course of medical education in the twentieth century. Taken together, these works provide ample perspective for an assessment of two centuries of medical education. Moreover, the books successfully place the evolution of medical education in the context of the general history of higher education.

For most of this century, few medical faculty questioned the close relationship of medical education to clinical and biomedical science. This was not always so. Although the art and science of medicine have always been linked (albeit in the context of changing conceptions of "science"), prior to the late nineteenth century few clinicians would have accorded them equal importance. Ludmerer's subject, in fact, is not so much "learning to heal" as it is "learning to think" and, particularly, to think in the language of experimental science.[5] Ludmerer, an internist and medical historian at Washington University School of Medicine, chronicles the introduction of "active," rather than passive or merely observant, biomedical experimentation into the medical curriculum. Like the great pathologist William Henry Welch at Johns Hopkins, Ludmerer believes that "critical thinking" is at the heart of both clinical science and clinical practice. A solid foundation in basic science ingrains the habits of mind needed for both.[6]

The traditional, now discredited, account of the professionalization of American medical education, runs something like this: In the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when anatomical studies first developed in Edinburgh, Paris, and London, a handful of European-trained American doctors hoped to found European-style medical schools and hospitals here.[7] They made

a credible start in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. Until 1830 all but three states placed medical licensure in the hands of professional medical societies. Unfortunately the anti-elitism of "Jacksonian democracy," popular health reform, and revulsion from the harsh therapeutics of mainstream medicine overwhelmed their efforts. An array of popular medical sects challenged the so-called "regulars." These sects included—among others—hydropathists, the cayenne-dosing Thompsonians, and the (actually quite respectable) homeopaths. Each group produced its own supply of proprietary medical schools. Between 1830 and 1850, licensure laws were repealed or amended to allow anyone with a medical degree from virtually any medical school to practice medicine. Dependent on student fees for survival, *all* medical schools lowered their entrance requirements and the rigor of their curricula to stay competitive.[8]

This account credits the American Medical Association, founded in the late 1840s, with countering the influence of the sectarians, and improving the common standard of medical education. After decades of effort, in the early twentieth century the AMA (assisted by the Carnegie Foundation's muckraking Flexner Report) persuaded the profession and the public to accept the need for "fewer and better" physicians.[9]

Ludmerer's account builds on the recent work of other historians and on extensive, careful archival research. It carefully delineates the motives and intentions that separated the practitioner-based American Medical Association from researchers like Welch or Franklin Mall in the campaign to upgrade medical education. Ludmerer shows that the AMA tried to eliminate sectarian competitors and reinstitute professionally administered state licensing laws for physicians. For the AMA, the fundamental issue was the uneven quality, oversupply, low income, and general lack of prestige of the American medical profession. Although researchers like Welch and the famed clinician William Osler (and, Morantz-Sanchez demonstrates, Mary Putnam Jacobi at the Woman's Medical College of the New York Infirmary) also deplored these conditions, they believed that medicine's poor "image" was the symptom, not the cause, of its precarious professional standing. Getting at the root condition, the unscientific character of most nineteenth century medical practice, required reformation of medical thought and education.

Ludmerer explores the social and educational context for reform during the 1870s and 1880s. Advances in German biomedical science, a general increase in America's wealth, improvement of transportation and commercial development, and the strengthening of secondary education were elements of an "infrastructure" that supported reform. Somewhat Whiggishly he writes, "Medical knowledge was rapidly increasing, and mastery thereof was becoming more and more important to the practice of good medicine. A cadre of teachers

was arising, intent on transmitting scientific medicine to their students."[10]

Ludmerer contends—and all recent accounts agree—that this experimentalist "cadre," at Hopkins, Michigan, Harvard, and Pennsylvania, and not the AMA, led the early campaign to link biomedical science to medical education. Ludmerer convincingly shows that what set most of these researcher-instructors apart from the mass of part-time medical faculty was their unusual training in the laboratories, rather than the clinics, of late nineteenth century Germany. The older elites of the larger medical schools were steeped in what Ludmerer characterizes as the passively empirical, morbid anatomy of the French school. The younger generation of Americans, however, came under the sway of the actively experimental bacteriology flourishing in German scientific institutes by the 1870s.[11]

Ludmerer realizes that these men did not act alone. The unflinching support of the presidents of the universities with which their medical colleges affiliated, allowed them to realize their hopes for a scientific medicine. Before the 1870s all medical schools were run as proprietary schools, although a few were affiliated with large universities. Every medical college depended on student fees for survival. Closer affiliation with parent universities (including financial support) allowed medical schools to undertake reforms that risked lowering their enrollments. As historians of higher education have known all along, reform of medical education was only one facet of a more general process: the transformation of the undergraduate college, the articulation of the research university, and the gradual divergence of graduate and professional education from the undergraduate, collegiate curriculum.[12] Ludmerer believes, too, that the reform of medical education depended on the new, progressive educational philosophy that proclaimed the gospel of "learning by doing."[13] Finally, an increasingly discriminating public supported state examining boards to license practitioners.

The resulting reform of medical education was largely begun between 1890 and 1910. The opening of the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine in 1893 symbolized the reform of medical education that took place in the 1890s and 1900s. The Flexner Report, published in 1910, hastened a process already well under way. Increasingly, after 1890, universities brought nearby medical schools into their orbits. Medical schools required applicants to have one or two years of collegiate, and preferably scientific, education or to pass an entrance examination. The schools lengthened the course of study to four years and accepted instruction in laboratory research techniques as the natural partner to clinical and didactic teaching. Teaching hospitals were incorporated into what was meant to be the heart of medical education: clinical clerkships on the wards.

Only 80 of the 133 medical schools in operation in the 1890s still existed in 1925. Philanthropic foundations helped to create a few new ones, such as the University of Rochester. Medical schools, once the structural and educational equivalent of undergraduate colleges, now functioned as graduate institutions. Many of their students arrived with a college degree in hand.

Ludmerer attempts to exonerate Flexner from charges of bias against women and the poor. (He admits, however, Flexner's prejudice against blacks.)[14] Nevertheless, Flexner's report made it unlikely that philanthropists would aid the less wealthy schools. Flexner aimed to eliminate all but the best, and to create a few new schools. Furthermore, as more medical students arrived with two to four years of collegiate education, they set a standard of increased expense as well as higher achievement. Ludmerer acknowledges that the triumph of science-based, specialized, medical teaching was not an unqualified gain. Indeed, Flexner himself bemoaned the rigidly scientific tenor of the modern medical curriculum and its deficiencies of "cultural and philosophic background."[15]

Sympathy and Science, Regina Morantz-Sanchez's fine book on the history of women physicians in America, sheds important light on what was lost through the professionalization of medicine—and not by women alone. As midwives, women long ministered to their own kind. A few women called themselves "doctor" by the 1830s. They usually apprenticed with a supportive sectarian practitioner. Few challenged the right of women to adopt the title since regulation was lax for everyone. In the late 1840s, women sought admission to regular medical colleges to earn an official medical degree. Harvard refused the application of Dr. Harriet Hunt, a well established Boston physician. Indeed, Harvard refused all women applicants until World War II. Elizabeth Blackwell was the first woman admitted to a coeducational medical school. She graduated from the Geneva Medical College in 1849.

These early efforts to integrate the medical profession required the support of the contemporary popular health and woman suffrage movements. Idealogues of Victorian womanhood believed that woman's nature was equal in value to, but distinctive from, man's. They commonly equated feminity with the gentle characteristics of maternal nurturance. The privatized, urban family that emerged as the modern middle class unit of socialization, accorded women increased responsibilities for its physical, intellectual, and emotional viability. Those who revolted against the harshly disagreeable heroics of traditionally trained physicians, advised women to take responsibility for the health of their households. Physiological societies, specifically founded to educate the public in the workings and physical needs of the human body, sprang up in many cities. These societies were often run by and for women alone. Popular lecturers such

as Mary Gove Nichols demonstrated basic principles of anatomy (sometimes using model skeletons and other visual aids) and the "laws of health."[16]

Next came the claim that women were natural healers and, as such, perfectly suited to the practice of medicine. In fact, many claimed that women would make better physicians than their male colleagues—at least for women and children—because of their gentle, finer natures. Critics frequently described male medical students as a coarse lot; they thought it seemlier to call in a woman physician for the modest and delicate sensibilities of women patients.[17]

It only remained for leaders of the early women's movement (Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton), and educators such as M. Carey Thomas, to argue for the right of women to higher education. (Susan B. Anthony's last physician, by the way, was the female homeopath, Dr. Marcena Sherman Ricker, of Rochester, New York.)[18] As Mary Roth Walsh notes, women like Dr. Harriet Hunt and Dr. Maria Zakrzewska, the German-born founder of the New England Hospital for Women and Children, received significant assistance from women's committees organized to sponsor female medical students.[19]

Few advocates of women's right to higher education based their arguments on male-female equality. Instead, they argued that women needed more scientific education to fulfill their feminine charge to minister to their homes and communities. Likewise, the female physician would not imitate the male, but provide a unique and much needed alternative.

The creation of women's medical colleges, like the reform of all-male medical schools, was an integral part of the general history of higher education. Many male physicians feared the competition women represented or the destabilizing social effects of educating women beyond their "sphere." But most opponents of higher education for women focused on the unsettling specter of coeducation. Dr. Edward Clarke, in *Sex in Education: A Fair Chance for Girls* (1873), feared that coeducation would jeopardize the mental and physical health of the feminine sex. Opponents of coeducation predicted (with some justice, as it turned out) that college educated women would postpone marriage and childbearing or even fail to marry at all. These arguments applied to all higher education for women, not just to medical schools. They provoked a strong response.[20]

A few women published immediate replies to Clarke. Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi's remarkable prizewinning essay, *The Question of Rest for Women during Menstruation*, described her survey of the health of college women. They were healthier and more energetic than the norm and need not fear for their health or femininity. The five regular and twelve sectarian medical schools for women founded between 1849 and 1900 provided another retort. The graduates of these schools practiced medicine successfully and competently.[21]

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Perhaps the best proof of success resulted from the admission of women (usually required by charter) to the many land-grant colleges. The medical school at the University of Michigan, established in 1870, possessed the best researcher-clinicians in the country prior to the opening of Johns Hopkins in 1893 (half of Hopkins' first medical faculty came from the University of Michigan). Thus, the many women who graduated from Ann Arbor were among the best trained medical graduates in the country. When Johns Hopkins opened as a coeducational school, many predicted a permanent place for women in medicine. All together, the number of female medical graduates increased from less than one percent in 1850 to approximately six percent by 1910.[22]

Without minimizing the importance of the coeducational schools, however, Morantz-Sanchez emphasizes the contribution of the all-women's medical colleges prior to the twentieth century. In 1890, for example, they accounted for sixty percent of all women enrolled in medical schools. Yet all but one, the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania, closed their doors during the age of reform (1890-1910). The question thus arises, how good were they? Morantz-Sanchez carefully examines the question of what—and how well—the women's medical colleges taught their students. The title she chose for this chapter, "Separate but Equal," points to her conclusions. Four of the five regular women's medical colleges, those located in Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, and Baltimore, made every effort to keep up or even surpass the educational reforms suggested by the AAMC in the 1890s. The Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania and the Blackwells's Woman's Medical College of the New York Infirmary, for example, were two of only six schools in the country prior to the opening of Johns Hopkins to institute a four-year curriculum (the others included Harvard, Michigan, and Chicago Medical College).[23]

Why, then, did all but the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania fail to survive? Their failure to thrive between 1890 and 1910 was largely due to their lack of money. Flexner cited the all-women's *regular* medical schools for their poverty, not for their unintelligence or unwillingness to conform with every AMA guideline. Without the endowment to support expensive, but essential, laboratories and teaching hospitals, they could neither compete for students nor attract the philanthropic contributions that made modernization possible. Moreover, the majority of women students opted for coeducation when they had a chance. Between 1890 and 1899 the percentage enrolled in women's medical colleges fell from 60 to 30 percent.[24]

The women's medical colleges faced the same quandaries confronted by present day women's colleges, Vassar, for example, when embracing coeducation. Take, for example, the question of gender separatism. Many nineteenth century women physicians supported all-female schools as halfway houses on

the road to equality of the sexes. They fervently hoped to outlive the usefulness of such expediencies. By the 1890s, many fine women physicians, including Alice Hamilton, had no patience for the "parochialism" of the all-women's colleges and hospitals. These physicians were eager to test their mettle at the growing number of coeducational institutions. But as Morantz-Sanchez points out (and as the deans of the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania maintained until the 1960s), women's medical colleges provided many invaluable, if intangible, advantages available nowhere else. Women students felt the security of being in the majority, learned from the example of female faculty members, and received a thorough training in obstetrics and gynecology, the mainstay of the "woman's sphere" in medicine.[25]

By 1910, the proportion of women admitted to medical school declined to three percent from a high of five percent in 1899. Only in the 1930s did the figures revert to the five percent level; it took another 30 years to go beyond it. Women were caught in an educational squeeze play. The standards and values of medicine were in flux between 1890 and 1920. Most of the women's medical colleges, along with many others, closed. Reformers reduced the total number of *all* medical students at the remaining colleges to lower class size and improve medical teaching. Further, from the 1930s to the recent past, women had no access to a new avenue for physicians, as researcher-clinicians in academic medical centers (a status Ludmerer treats at some length). At the same time, other avenues became more attractive to women, such as academia, public school teaching, and social work. Morantz-Sanchez does not tell the whole story, for example, the effect on access of the restructuring or disappearance of Victorian health care institutions, such as settlement houses, dispensaries, and women's hospitals. But *Sympathy and Science* is a major contribution to the growing literature on gender and professionalization.

William Rothstein's *American Medical Schools and the Practice of Medicine: a History,* chronicles the history of medical education from colonial times to the present. Although this makes it more inclusive than *Learning to Heal,* Ludmerer's archival research and conceptual sophistication make it the superior book. Rothstein relies on extensive culling from old and new printed records and books, rather than on archival material. He cites only representative sources or those leading the reader to other works. In this age of exorbitant book prices, this is a legitimate decision. What will cause the historian of medicine some concern, however, is Rothstein's penchant for choosing an older source rather than a newer monograph in which the older source would be cited anyway.[26] And, he seems not to have read the secondary literature on women's medical colleges.[27]

Nevertheless, Rothstein's work has real importance as a critique of

medical education since 1950. Ludmerer and Morantz-Sanchez describe the intentions behind Flexnerian reform; Rothstein suggests the fate of those noble dreams.

These books offer correctiveness to each other. Whereas Ludmerer looks foward from the 1870s, teleologically, to advances of medical science in our own era, Rothstein looks back from the deficiencies of today's over-specialized medical education to flaws in the original conception. Ludmerer celebrates the influence of the German biomedical institutes on the American medical school and the American scientists who brought the laboratory into medical education. Rothstein, on the other hand, implies that the "cleavage between medical science and medical practice in Germany" was never successfully overcome in the American adaptation.[28] He lists three themes that dominate twentieth century medical education: "a preoccupation with specialization; a lack of concern with thorough training in the [clinical] fundamentals; and the disjuncture of the basic sciences from clinical medicine."[29] Rothstein also correctly relates the changing practices of medical schools to the effects of "external factors," particularly shifting government policies concerning funding for research.

Let's consider each point.

Specialization has played a major role in the evolution of medical education. Rothstein notes that introduction of the graded curriculum freed up time in the last two years for specialty electives. By the 1920s the idea of a residency in a specialty following a year of general internship gained support. Rothstein defines a full-time specialist as "a physician who limits his practice to a recognized field within medicine." Until then, most physicians were more interested in their clinical practices than in research. Part-time medical school teaching gave them referrals and an affiliation with a major hospital.[30] World War II and the subsequent availability of G.I. benefits for residency training led to the real proliferation of specialists. Hospitals, insurers, and the public all accepted specialty board certification as the standard measure of competency. As a result, while general practitioners alone accounted for 67 percent of all practitioners in 1949, all forms of primary care (including g.p.'s, general internists, family medicine, and pediatricians) accounted for only 38 percent of physicians in 1983. This has led to the inappropriate use of specialists for some primary care.[31]

Rothstein maintains that the increase of specialization has produced a fragmented, technology-dependent faculty with little interest in teaching the basic clinical skills. Rothstein accepts the AAMC's charge that, "'Highly specialized medical faculty members all too often do not clearly specify the knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes that students should acquire.'" An AMA report in 1982, also quoted by Rothstein, concluded, "Faculty specialization has led to

'aggregates of semiautonomous units . . . Technological skills may be emphasized at the expense of the broad education needed by graduates.'"[32]

Ironically, medical research, too, has had an unexpectedly negative impact on medical school teaching. From the 1950s until about 1970, government funding to medical schools for sponsored research accounted for more than a third of their budgets.[33] Faculty were—and still are—expected to raise money from grants for their laboratories, research staff, and portions of their own salaries. Federal money earmarked for other uses was often spent on research facilities and research training.[34] Ninety percent of the money appropriated under the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1963, which was intended largely to help disadvantaged students, went for research.

After 1970, concern over a shortage of primary care physicians helped reverse the trend of heavy government funding. Instead, medical centers were reimbursed for medical care, not research, through Medicare and Medicaid. These centers also received financial incentives to produce a higher proportion of primary care physicians. Rothstein claims, although with little evidence, that increased dependence on patient-generated income detracts from the time and energy faculty expend on clinical teaching for third- and fourth-year students. In addition, since few full-time clinical faculty today have had any experience outside the teaching hospital, the skills they teach may have little bearing on the typical, primary care practice. Recent medical school memoirs back him up.[35]

Rothstein does not develop his last theme: the disjuncture of basic science and clinical medicine. Lacking a working definition of "clinical science" and disclaiming any intention to analyze it anyway, his meaning is unclear. (Nor does he describe the efforts of clinicians early in the century to hammer out the protocols and methodology of such research.) However, the complaints of medical students support his allusions to the curricular divide between preclinical basic science and the last two clinical years. Despite the high hopes of Abraham Flexner and William Welch, basic science is still often taught as a numbing mass of material to be memorized. That material makes little reference to the human organism, much less the human patient.[36] Medical schools such as Harvard take this problem seriously, but it may well be the intractable result of trying to "fit it all in." Oddly, molecular biology, particularly the astounding accomplishments of DNA research, is starting to play a major role in clinical decision-making, although Rothstein seems not to have considered this connection.

Rothstein concludes that it is misguided to conflate clinical teaching with training for specialized, postgraduate, biomedical research. He rightly concludes that the result of crossed educational purposes has been the neglect of student-centered clinical teaching. Moreover, like Woodward and Bernstein,

Rothstein "follows the money"; that is, he identifies a relationship between the sources of medical schools' income and their educational practices.

But we ought not to blame Flexner and his predecessors for today's under-supervised, prematurely specialized medical education. The preclinical years were intended to prepare students better for their educationally crucial, clinical encounters on the wards, not to abstract medical education from the world of the patient. They never doubted that science and art would naturally reinforce one another in the daily practice of medicine. Ironically, all three works challenge this very assumption. Medical students and interns amply demonstrate that "sympathy and science" are not natural allies. If they are to be united in clinical medicine, medical students must be taught how to unite them. That is only possible when they are given teachers who make worthy models.

NOTES

1. "Decline in U.S. Medical School Graduates Continues," *AAMC Weekly Report*, 1:45 (Oct. 29, 1987).

2. See, for example, Melvin Konner, *Becoming a Doctor: A Journey of Initiation in Medical School* (New York: Viking, 1987); Perri Klass, *A Not Entirely Benign Procedure: Four Years as a Medical Student* (New York: Putnam, 1987); Charles LeBaron, *Gentle Vengeance: An Account of the First Year at Harvard Medical School* (New York: Penguin Books, 1981); and the scathingly satirical novel about interning at Boston's Beth Israel Hospital by Samuel Shem, pseud., *The House of God* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1978).

3. Quoted in Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, p. 313; Shem, *The House of God*, p. 400.

4. "Curing-Plus Caring," *U.S. News and World Report* (Nov. 2, 1987), 78.

5. Actually, the only "healing" he alludes to is that performed by the eminent Dr. Osler of Johns Hopkins on wounds incurred by the profession as a result of the clash between "academic" and "clinical part time" faculty for control of medical education. See p. 135.

6. Cf. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal*, p. 278.

7. For a brief, but very good account of the opening of these early schools, see Martin Kaufman, *American Medical Education: The Formative Years, 1765-1910* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp. 1-30.

8. Kaufman, pp. 39-41, shows that a decline in the admission standards of the earliest "elite" medical schools preceded the proliferation of the sectarian medical schools. It is best explained, he believes, by the realization that few Americans could afford to obtain both an undergraduate and a graduate degree. As a result, medical schools were restructured to serve as undergraduate colleges, but bestowing the M.D. as the terminal degree. Academic prerequi-

sites were lowered to attract students with little or no secondary education and the course length was shortened to allow attendance by the less well-to-do.

9. Also see Gerald E. Markowitz and David Rosner, "Doctors in Crisis: Medical Education and Medical Reform During the Progressive Era, 1885-1915," in Susan Reverby and David Rosner, eds., *Health Care in America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), pp. 185-205.

10. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal*, p. 46.

11. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal*, pp. 41-51.

12. Not surprisingly, the university presidents singled out for praise by Ludmerer are precisely those profiled in Burton Bledstein's *The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America* (New York: Norton, 1976). Cf. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal*, p. 297, n. 37 and n. 38.

13. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal*, pp. 64, 65, 102-5.

14. Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal*, p. 316 n. 76. For a good account of black medical education prior to 1910, see Gloria Modlow, *Women Doctors in Gilded-Age Washington: Race, Gender, and Professionalization* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), esp. chapters III and IV.

15. Quoted in Ludmerer, *Learning to Heal*, p. 182. Ludmerer, however, with somewhat exaggerated optimism, believes that the essential, "progressive education" doctrine underlying medical education reforms, i.e., learning-by-doing in the laboratories and on the wards, is still alive and well today. See pp. 189-90.

16. Morantz-Sanchez, *Sympathy and Science*, pp. 29-46. Also see Martha H. Verbrugge, "The Social Meaning of Personal Health: The Ladies' Physiological Institute of Boston and Vicinity in the 1850s," in Reverby and Rosner, eds. *Health Care in America*, pp. 45-66.

17. Morantz-Sanchez, *Sympathy and Science*, pp. 50-54.

18. Ellen More, "The Blackwell Medical Society and the Professionalization of Women Physicians," *Bull. Hist. Med.*, 62:4 (Winter, 1987), 603-28.

19. Medical women themselves, once they had begun to practice, also raised money to help women medical students and even foreign born women intending to return home as medical missionaries. Cf. Letter from Li Bi Cu to the Women Physicians of Rochester, New York, September 5, 1902, Rochester, New York, Edward G. Miner Library, Marion Craig Potter papers, Box 2, Personal Correspondence folder; Mary Roth Walsh, *Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply* (New Haven, Conn., 1976), pp. 79-81. Virginia Drachman, *Hospital With a Heart: Women Doctors and the Paradox of Separatism at the New England Hospital, 1862-1969* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 46-49.

20. However, women physicians married at greater than twice the rate for all other female professionals. Morantz-Sanchez, pp. 54, 55, 137; and More, p. 610.

21. Morantz-Sanchez, p. 65; *Sympathy and Science*, p. 65; Walsh, *Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply*, pp. 130-31.

22. Walsh, *Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply*, p. 186.

23. Walsh and Morantz-Sanchez have shown the New England Female Medical College, founded by the uneducated and apparently unstable health reformer, Samuel Gregory, for the purpose of training midwives, to be decidedly inferior to the other women's medical colleges and the only one to deserve the charge of inadequacy. See Walsh, *Doctors Wanted: No Women Need Apply*, pp. 35-74, and Morantz-Sanchez, *Sympathy and Science*, pp. 77, 81, 82.

24. Morantz-Sanchez, *Sympathy and Science*, pp. 64-89, 245.

25. Morantz-Sanchez, *Sympathy and Science*, pp. 203-31; Judith Leavitt, *Brought to Bed: Childbearing in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 182-84. For Alice Hamilton, see Barbara Sicherman, *Alice Hamilton: A Life in Letters* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 63-78.

26. For example, he cites Dr. William Osler, rather than Ludmerer, in a discussion of the unsatisfactory "passive learning" of the older medical school curriculum (p. 108). Rothstein also relies heavily on published physician memoirs for evidence of medical school practices. These can be reliable, but only up to a point.

27. See, for example, Rothstein's unfounded claims that the faculties of women's medical colleges were mostly male and that coeducation was made possible only because of proprietary schools' needs for tuition (p. 115). A reading of Morantz-Sanchez, who is not cited by Rothstein but whose findings are incorporated by Ludmerer, would have prevented that problem. In addition, his discussion of the nineteenth century medical colleges of Baltimore (p. 95) makes no mention of the Woman's Medical College in that city; it is mentioned only on p. 115 as part of a brief comment on the difficulties faced by *women's* medical colleges.

28. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, pp. 105-7, 354, n. 51, 52. He also claims that as a result of the institutional division between basic science and clinical medicine, most of the early advances in basic biomedical science came from the French, e.g., Pasteur, or from German private practitioners such as Koch. What is odd about this claim, apparently based on some early work by the sociologist Joseph Ben-David, is that Pasteur, too, worked largely outside the clinical environment.

29. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, p. 116.

30. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, pp. 104, 135, 174, 187.

31. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, pp. 187, 88, 200-204.

32. Quoted by Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, p. 313, from the AAMC, *Physicians for the Twenty-First Century*, 1984, and "Future Directions for Medical Education," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 248 (1982), 3230.

33. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, p. 234, Table 11-5.

34. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, pp. 283, 84.

35. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, pp. 260-68, 300-306.

36. Rothstein, *American Medical Schools*, pp. vii, 9-10, 14, 251, 254. Cf. Russell C. Maulitz, "Physicians vs. Bacteriologist: The Ideology of Science in Clinical Medicine," in Morris J. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenberg, eds., *The Therapeutic Revolution* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), pp. 91-107; A. McGehee Harvey, *Science at the Bedside: Clinical Research in American Medicine, 1905-1945* (Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1981).

Lawrence Cremin on American Higher Education: A Review Essay

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Lawrence A. Cremin, *American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Lawrence A. Cremin, *American Education: The National Experience, 1783-1876*. New York: Harper & Row, 1980.

Lawrence A. Cremin, *American Education: The Metropolitan Experience*. New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

SOME NEW YORKERS, IT'S OFTEN SAID, think that they know everything. Lawrence Cremin, a quintessential New Yorker of a kind now almost extinct (a modestly optimistic urban progressive) really does know everything there is to know about the history of education in America. That knowledge was initially presented to the public in 1970 in the first volume of his massive trilogy, *American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783*, followed in 1980 by *American Education: The National Experience, 1783-1876*. Now, with the publication of *American Education: The Metropolitan Experience, 1876-1980* (1988), Cremin completes what is indisputably one of the most imposing and usable monuments of American historical scholarship to appear in the twentieth century. In the age of television and the computer he has created a testament to the efficacy of the printed word: with 1775 pages of text and 302 pages of ancillary prefaces, bibliographies, and indices (but no graphs, maps, or illustrations) Cremin's *American Education* is not a work for those with limited attention spans. (Nor, at a weight of almost eight pounds, is it a work for those weak of body.) It is a deceptively simple but demanding meditation on the nature of American education, supported by a command of the scholarly literature of both specialized and general American history shared by few other historians of Cremin's generation. It will please some, infuriate others, and will be used by all concerned with the American educational past and present for the next two generations or longer.

The readers of this journal will be most interested in Cremin's treatment of the history of higher education. They may be disappointed: of the 1775 pages

of text in the three volumes, only 163 pages, or about 9 percent of the total, are directly concerned with the history of higher education. In fact, if one were to estimate the importance Cremin attaches to higher education within the overall history of American education by the amount of space he allots to it in successive volumes one would have to conclude that he believes its significance has been declining steadily since the founding of Harvard College in 1636: 14 percent (80 pages) of *The Colonial Experience* is devoted to higher education, 9 percent (42 pages) of *The National Experience,* and 6 percent (41 pages) of *The Metropolitan Experience.* In other words, the nine colleges of the colonial period, attended by a few thousand students, receive more than twice as much coverage as the 3000-plus colleges and universities of recent times, attended by millions of students. But Cremin has not set out to make history run backwards: there are reasons for his allocation of space and significance. They grow out of the circumstances in which the work originated, the theoretical underpinnings of the volumes, and the existing literature of the history of American higher education. Cremin's treatment of higher education—indeed, his treatment of any subject he touches upon—is incomprehensible without some understanding of each.

The seed of the work was planted in 1964. The 1967 centenary of the founding of the United States Office of Education was approaching, and W. Stull Holt, the secretary of the American Historical Association, asked Cremin if he would be willing to write a comprehensive history of American education under the sponsorship of both the AHA and the Office of Education. Cremin agreed, and Francis Keppel, then United States Commissioner of Education, who had long been concerned about the split between professional educationists and the liberal arts, found funding for the project at the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Twenty-four years later, the three massive volumes in hand are the result.

Cremin's brief was to create a comprehensive and scholarly synthesis of American history and the history of American education and to bridge what some at the time saw as a gap between schools of education and liberal arts faculties. He has more than fulfilled his commitment. The supporting bibliographical apparatus for each volume is a marvel of scholarship. Anyone interested in any aspect of the history of American education should begin a bibliographical search here. The bibliographies include every important study, judiciously evaluated and placed within the context of its particular sub-field, that might be relevant to the subject at hand to the date the particular volume was published. As far as comprehensiveness is concerned, the work is encyclopedic in its coverage. But it is not an encyclopedia: it is a carefully constructed work designed to illustrate Cremin's ideas about the nature of education. As the volumes took shape he described the development of these ideas and the scope

of the work in a series of brief books, most originally given as lectures: *The Wonderful World of Elwood Patterson Cubberley: An Essay on the Historiography of American Education* (1965), *The Genius of American Education* (1965), *Public Education* (1976), and *Traditions of American Education* (1977). These works together make up an intellectual history of a work in progress.

The *Genius* and *Cubberley* volumes, taken together, constituted Cremin's prospectus for the larger series. In *Genius* Cremin announced the major theme that would inform the whole work. "The genius of American education," he wrote, "—its animating spirit, its most distinctive quality—lies in the commitment to popularization." (*Genius*, p. i.). This was one aspect of progressivism writ very large indeed. *Cubberley* summarized the historiography of American educational history within the broader framework of American history to that time. Cremin claimed that the history of American education, as it then stood, was essentially a narrowly-focused chronicle of the triumph of the American public school, divorced from the "mainstream" of American historical writing. Schools, he suggested, were hardly the only educative agencies; education, he insisted, could not be understood unless it was placed in a context far larger than schooling.

To that point, Cremin's argument was familiar enough. It was, after all, much the same one that John Dewey and his followers had been making since the turn of the century. And, to a degree, as the argument applied to the history of American education it had been anticipated by Harvard historian Bernard Bailyn in his *Education in the Forming of American Society* (1960). Bailyn's book was an early bridge between historians in arts faculties and historians in education faculties. (Bailyn, before moving to Harvard's history department, had taught in its Graduate School of Education during Francis Keppel's tenure as dean there.) Bailyn too had argued that the history of American education had been conceived of too narrowly, that other agencies, particularly the family in the colonial era, had been more significant as educational institutions than schools. Education, Bailyn asserted, should be reconceived as "not only . . . formal pedagogy but as the entire process by which a culture transmits itself across the generations." Bailyn, perhaps wisely, did not specify which of the approximately two-hundred definitions of the Protean term "culture" he had in mind, nor just what he meant by "process." But both Cremin and Bailyn drew from the same well—the social and behavioral sciences as they stood in the middle third of the twentieth century.

From the social sciences Cremin drew a new definition of education, deeper and broader than Bailyn's. "Throughout the work," he wrote in his first volume, "I shall view education as the deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort

to transmit or evoke knowledge, attitudes, values, skills, and sensibilities, a process that is more limited than what the anthropologist would term enculturation or the sociologist socialization, though obviously inclusive of some of the same elements." His definition, Cremin claimed (*Public Education*, p. 29), "projects us beyond the schools and colleges to the multiplicity of individuals and institutions that educate—parents, peers, siblings, and friends, as well as families, churches, synagogues, libraries, museums, summer camps, benevolent societies, agricultural fairs, settlement houses, factories, radio stations and television networks." He also promised to include some account of the "outcomes" of education so defined. Such a formulation might have seemed impossibly ambitious and unmanageable if Cremin had not had the wit to tie it firmly to reality through constructing what he termed an "ecology of education." While Bailyn had left the constitutive elements of his notion of culture (aside from the family) undefined, it was Cremin's special genius to specify the educative agencies that combined in what he called—in a notion probably derived from anthropology—a "configuration" to create the total educational process.[1] That process, he stated, was a "series of transactions between an individual with a particular life history and institutions of education that tend to relate to each other in configurations . . . the ideal study would be one that approaches the interactions between particular individuals and groups of individuals and specific configurations of education." (*Traditions*, p. 153). Here was a definition of education that clarified the progressive educators' vagueness about the connection between school and society. Cremin specified the origin of his educational theory in the social sciences as clearly and generously as possible in *Traditions of American Education*. "Apart from some intelligent conception of education itself," he wrote (*Traditions*, p. 162), "there can be no truly intelligent conception of the history of education." He then went on to specify the theoretical foundations of his conception of the history of education. His account is worth quoting at some length, for it decisively shapes his analysis of the history of American education, which is embedded in and determines the narrative structure and content of *American Education*:

> The theoretical position I have taken is fundamentally interactionist, and is derived from George Herbert Mead and John Dewey in philosophy, Ruth Benedict and Ralph Linton in anthropology, Gordon Allport and Gardner Murphy in psychology, Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton in sociology, and Arthur F. Bentley and David B. Truman in political science, among others. From this interactionist view stems the definition of education as purposeful, the conception of the config-

> uration as a patterning of institutions, the view of personality as a biosocial emergence, and the idea of the educative process as a continuum of contemporaneous and successive transactions.

This is a heady brew indeed. It is also something of a home brew. The direct successors to George Herbert Mead, the founder of interactionalism and the Chicago school of sociology, are generally accepted to be Robert E. Park and W. I. Thomas, not Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton, two of the central figures in the functionalist school of social analysis. Some of Parsons' and Merton's ideas—particularly those of Parsons—would seem to cancel out the reformist, progressive, bent that many have derived from Mead. In any case, Cremin's sketch of his intellectual debts is as interesting for what it omits as what it includes. The most obvious omission is any reference to economists or to the relation of economics to historical change. The second most obvious omission is any mention, positive or negative, of the structuralist school of social analysis in any of its varieties, an approach that, particularly in its quasi-Marxist manifestations, attracted some younger historians of education in the 1960s and 1970s. Since structuralism posits the emergence of pervasive and determinative historical trends beyond the conscious ken or control of individuals or groups it would obviously be incompatible with Cremin's adherence to Deweyan or Meadian purposefulness and intentionality. (And at least we were spared the simplicities of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of education as "social reproduction.")

Grand theory aside, Cremin appears to have done what good historians always do: he has picked and chosen, within certain obvious limits, among various systems of social analysis to find those he considers most personally, heuristically, and descriptively rewarding as applied to the particular historical phenomena at hand. Here is not the place to give a full explication of the rhetorical and narrative structure that emerges from Cremin's intellectual armamentum. Enough to indicate that the complex organization of the whole work proceeds from it. Each volume of *American Education* is organized, more or less, in a similar fashion. In good Parsonian fashion Cremin begins each volume with a broad sketch of the central, controlling, values and ideas he considers characteristic of America in the historical period under discussion. (A virtual reversal of Daniel Boorstin's equally lengthy and ambitious history of American culture, in which ideas are denied any role at all.) For volume II these values are derived mainly from Protestant evangelicalism, for volume III from the Protestant Social Gospel and its Progressive progeny. Cremin's theory takes account of conflict and accommodation among groups, which, in the fashion of the Chicago school, are largely conceived of in religious or ethnic terms (blacks,

Roman Catholics, Jews and so on), within the larger framework of controlling values, which Cremin sees emanating from the Protestant middle classes. Within a framework of freedoms and constraints derived from controlling values and changing historical circumstances, groups go on to generate educative institutions and agencies—settlement houses, churches, schools, museums, colleges, and so on. These institutions and agencies, ever more popularized, in turn form educational "configurations" among which individuals and groups interact to achieve their educations.

Where does this leave higher education? It leaves it, as we've seen, with 163 pages of text out of 1775. As more and more educative agencies are created over the centuries, Cremin, following his mandate to be comprehensive and the logical implications of his definition of education, must devote less and less space to any single agency or institution, be it the college or the family. And, in part too Cremin's relatively scanty treatment of higher education reflects scholarship in the field. A fairly sophisticated monographic literature exists for the nine colonial colleges, is relatively sparse for the 19th century, and can be counted on the fingers of two hands for the post-World War I period. A synthesizer can only synthesize the existing literature. His originality or novel insight must come from the juxtaposition of familiar elements in new and unfamiliar patterns. And here Cremin offers many unexpected rewards.

Higher education has been virtually a separate field in the historical study of American education. For obvious reasons it never fit well within the progressive historians' paradigm of the triumph of the public school or school systems, and few American historians have been able to integrate it successfully within general histories of education. (One prominent historian of the university has even suggested that the people who make up institutions of higher education somehow exist in splendid isolation from everyone else.[2]) Cremin handles the purely institutional history of higher education comprehensively and succintly, mainly in the chapters on "Institutions," that he includes in each book. But for all the virtuoso scholarship he displays in these sections, it is in placing what we thought we knew about American higher education in new contexts and thus revealing new meanings that Cremin particularly rewards. For example, the history of professional education has been notoriously difficult to integrate within the history of American education. In volume II Cremin discusses it in his chapter on apprenticeship and education in the crafts, where it fits logically and gathers new and appropriate resonance. In volume III Cremin gives for the first time in a general history of American education succinct, balanced and comprehensive histories of Roman Catholic and Jewish efforts in higher education, placed in the wider context of the educational configurations developed by these groups within the cultural diversity he sees as one of the major characteris-

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tics of America in this period. Perhaps his most notable achievement is his firm integration of the history of the massive expansion of American higher education after World War II, that culminated in and was made permanent by the Higher Education Act of 1965, within the popularizing aspect of the Progressive tradition in education. Here, in one of the few overtly critical moments he permits himself, he laments the less attractive and basically undemocratic effects of the parallel Progressive drive towards the development of expertise, and thus towards *de*popularization, as it affected the development of higher education (see esp. III, 242-255). Cremin did not manage to squeeze in a discussion of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988. This act seemed to indicate that subsidy of higher education by the national state would inevitably be followed by closer control of higher education by the national state, thus bringing higher education in the United States more in line with systems of higher education in other modern industrialized nations. One wishes in this respect that Cremin had dropped the perceptive but unnecessary educational biographies which lard volumes II and III, artfully designed to illustrate the operation of his theory of education in individual cases, in favor of more comparative material. One of the very few instances (volume II, p. 390) where he directly compares developments in American education to those in other countries is startingly illuminating.

Perhaps the most novel and provocative descriptive device Cremin has developed for his volumes is the image of the "configuration" of educational agencies. Each volume contains a chapter called "Configurations" in which Cremin sketches the range of educational agencies available to the inhabitants of a specific place over a particular period of time and attempts to suggest how each interacted with the other and with individuals. In the first volume he concentrates on the five educative agencies that form his configuration for the colonial period—household/family, church, school, college, and community. He describes in some detail how his configuration developed in the colonial era in five different places—the frontier, in the form of backcountry South Carolina and Connecticut, Elizabeth City county in tidewater Virginia, Philadelphia, New York City, and Dedham, a small farming village in Suffolk county, Massachusetts about nine miles west of Boston. These sketches hold particular interest, both for the unanswered (and even unasked) questions about the history of higher education that they suggest, and as indicators for further fruitful research. A close look at one of Cremin's configurations as it existed in relation to higher education in one of his exemplary communities, Dedham, suggests some of the strengths and limitations of his approach.

Dedham, planted in 1636, was one of the earliest Massachusetts towns. By 1689 it had 650 inhabitants, by 1700, 1200 inhabitants, and by 1765, 1919

people organized into 309 familes. The Massachusetts school law of 1692 required that the town keep a school, and the law of 1701 that a full-time certified Latinist be employed. Most interesting from our point of view, Cremin tell us (p. 525) that "the steady flow of Dedhamites through Harvard—there were thirty-six alumni from Dedham during the colonial period, of whom eighteen were graduated between 1760 and 1783—indicates that it was quite possible to obtain a competent Latin education as well, though there is evidence that some boys at least had to supplement the instruction obtained in school with tutoring from the parish minister." Cremin has accomplished something in this passage virtually unique in the writing of the history of American higher education. Most of it has been conceived of from the point of view of institutions or groups of institutions, not from the point of view of the people the institutions have served. Here Cremin has linked a specific community with an institution of higher education. To draw an analogy with the marketplace, he has linked supply—in this case Harvard—with demand, as represented by the Dedham college students.

Cremin does not have the space to develop a full description and analysis of any of his configurations. But let us push the image a bit further. Using a simple market model[3] as it might apply to Dedham and Dedham's interaction with higher education, along with some data not available to Cremin, we might indicate how the notion of a configuration might open new lines of inquiry and generate new questions about the history of American higher education.

Recall the purposes for which the first New England colleges had been founded: Harvard and later Yale were meant to supply the state with a steady stream of ministers and magistrates, educated in much the same way that Oxford and Cambridge had educated ministers and magistrates in the mother country. In New England as in old England the state (and other agencies) had created both the supply of higher education in the form of institutions and the market for it in the form of the incentives to buy an education in order to occupy a position in the established church or a position at some level of government. In England the traditional full university course had required seven years: four years' study for the bachelor's degree, followed by three years' study for the final and most important degree, the master's. The final degree was a necessary certification for those who wished to become clergy, slightly more than optional for others. This was what Harvard and Yale offered for sale, and Cremin tells us that during the colonial period 36 Dedham youths found it a commodity attractive enough to buy. Let us limit our inquiry to youths from Dedham who attended college through the class of 1770, following the perdurable dictum of Edward L. Thorndike, a distinguished predecessor of Cremin on the Columbia faculty: "Whatever exists at all exists in some amount. To know it thoroughly involves

knowing its quantity as well as its quality."[4] Our figures in this case are slightly different from Cremin's: in the years between the time a higher education was offered for sale in New England in 1639 and our cutoff year, 33 Dedham youths bought a liberal education, 32 from Harvard and one from Yale. The transaction was left uncompleted by two Dedham youths during the seventeenth century, who left college before they had secured the bachelor's degree. Of the 31 youths who secured their B.A.'s, all but one went on to purchase the final M.A. It represented "money in the bank" in a society that had no banks.

Most Dedham youths did not purchase their educations directly; their families bought it for them. Families regarded the sums spent on higher education for one or more of their sons much as they regarded any other investment: as part of the economy of the family, as part of a father's total capital, to be distributed among his offspring in much the same manner as property in the form of land or cash and with the goal of establishing the son as an independent adult. This economic conception of a college education, typical in American families throughout the course of American history, is clear in New England wills of the eighteenth century. The 1749 will of a farmer in Andover, Massachusetts, some miles north of Dedham, serves as an example of many. The farmer had seven sons to establish in life, and over the years succeeded in providing for all of them. The son who had looked after his father in his old age got the family farm. Another son had been set up as a carpenter, another as a shoemaker, and one son received 20 shillings in the final will, "with a Liberal Education which I have [already] given him at the University in Cambridge."[5] In the economy of the family a liberal education ranked on a par with a farm, land, or a craft. Like a craft, it had the advantage of being moveable capital. But it was a relatively expensive investment: a B.A. cost about £120 in mid-eighteenth century America, probably the annual salary of the average country clergyman.

Demand for a liberal education among Dedham families and youths varied from decade to decade. During the seventeenth century 9 bought one, during the 1700s, 4; during the 1710s, 3; in the 1720s, 6; and in the 1730s, 1. In the 1740s an A.B. found no buyers in Dedham, but demand picked up in the 1750s when 2 were purchased, and soared in the 1760s when 8 youths bought one. Placing the Dedham configuration as it related to higher education in a slightly larger context during the first seven decades of the 18th century sharpens our perception of what was happening there. The following table compares Dedham with Braintree, a community immediately to its east, with Boston, the provincial metropolis, and with Suffolk county, where all three were located, as a whole:

Decade	Dedham	Braintree	Boston	Suffolk Cty
1701-10	4	6	27	59
1711-20	3	5	34	60
1721-30	6	17	91	154
1731-40	1	9	76	115
1741-50	0	3	71	101
1751-60	2	8	46	78
1761-70	8	8	61	103

All told, in the college classes of 1701 through 1770, 670 individuals from nineteen different Suffolk county towns bought all or part of a liberal education from three different colleges—649 from Harvard, 11 from Yale, and 10 from the College of New Jersey. Was the demand for higher education among Dedhamites a fair representation of the demand for higher education in this period? (Cremin never claims that his configurations are representative—they are meant to be exemplary.) What we see here is almost violent contraction and expansion of higher education within the educational configurations represented by Dedham, Braintree, and Boston. In the case of Boston it appears as if college was actually being *de*popularized after 1730. One cannot help but suspect that the history of American higher education presents a much more complex development than is sometimes suggested. The table above actually indicates the beginning, after 1730, of segmentation in the market for higher education, a process that would continue to the present. Though the numbers of students from Braintree and Boston declined after 1730, demand apparently revived in the 1760s. In those years three Boston boys and three Braintree boys went far south to the College of New Jersey, which was keeping itself alive by offering "specials" on A.B.'s: it often awarded the A.B. after only two years' study—that is, at half-price. No one from Dedham took advantage of this bargain.

One of the major agencies in Cremin's configuration of educational agencies in Dedham is the family. The nature of the Dedham families that bought A.B.'s for their sons changed over time, just as the incentives to purchase an A.B. and the nature of the education that an A.B. represented changed. Space to analyze these changes is not available here, but any full description and analysis of Cremin's configurations, in Dedham in the eighteenth century or anyplace else during any period of time, would have to take account of them.

What was the "outcome"—one of Cremin's major areas of inquiry—of Dedham's interaction with higher education? Of the 33 Dedham youths who purchased all or part of a liberal education 20 became ministers (18 ordained Congregational ministers, one unordained preacher, and one clergyman of the Church of England), five became doctors, two became full-time magistrates,

two became businessmen, two farmers, and one a schoolmaster. We do not know how one got his bread. The most immediate outcome of the operation of colleges within Cremin's configuration of educational agencies in Dedham was in one sense negative: most Dedham youths who bought a liberal education did not go home again. The A.B. and the M.A. in fact represented moveable capital. Twenty-eight of these 33 Dedhamites lived twenty years after they received their first degrees. We know where all 28 resided at that point in their lives: full interaction with the configuration of educational agencies available to these Dedham boys had plucked them out of their hometown and scattered them to 21 different places in New England and New York. Only five ever returned permanently to Dedham. And variations on the same process would be repeated in places in every part of North America in the succeeding two centuries.

The outcome of Dedham's interaction with higher education was, of course, broader than simple occupational, social or geographical mobility. A market model, however useful, has its limits. College did not merely remove youths from Dedham. In the form of its alumni it produced products that Dedham as a community demanded. It supplied Dedham with its ministers, the central figures in the key educational agency of the church, though it was somewhat unusual in Dedham and most other towns for a native to occupy a pulpit there. College provided Dedham with schoolmasters for its Latin grammar school, another key educational agency. The state-mandated grammar school in fact did double educational duty: it supported the bachelors through payment for teaching while the bachelors simultaneously studied to become M.A.'s. And many of the non-clerical Dedham alumni acted as magistrates. Colleges in the eighteenth century and later changed or were created in response to changing demands, by no means all of them economic, as Cremin makes clear.

The Dedham collegians who left the town were not lost to education. The clergyman, doctors, businessmen, schoolmasters and others entered the educational configurations of other towns and cities and regions as teachers in the broad sense and as fathers in families. College, as it operated within any one of Cremin's configurations in a specific place, was a delocalizing, regionalizing, and eventually a nationalizing force, uniting town to city and city to country in a common culture as bachelors and masters circulated among places, using the special knowledge, skills, and perhaps even the values they had acquired in college—as well as in Dedham and other places.

"The ideal study," Cremin wrote, "would be one that approaches the interactions between particular individuals and groups of individuals and specific configurations of education." This prescription might indeed produce an ideal study of education. It would not produce an ideal *history* of education. Among

the major concerns of history are the identification of change and the analysis of change. Cremin's theory, as it is applied to Dedham and other places, does not identify and analyze points of historical change—at least insofar as colleges are concerned—within a configuration. His theory is a powerful descriptive tool; it is not a powerful historical tool. The little table above demonstrates extreme changes over a long period of time in the role of colleges in three different configurations—Dedham, Braintree, and Boston. There is nothing in Cremin's theory to account for such changes or to give us a way of analyzing and understanding them. And this, after all, should be a major concern not only of the history of higher education but also of the history of education.

"Depending on the particular theory of education that guides and informs the efforts of a particular historian," Cremin has written (*Traditions*, p. 163), "one history rather than another will result." To this one might add another proposition: "Depending on the particular theory of *history* that guides the efforts of a particular historian, one history rather than another will result." But a special virtue of Cremin's *American Education* is its suggestiveness, like the major synthesis it is, it opens up new vistas on the American educational past and thus on the present.

NOTES

1. The image of the "configuration" most likely derives from A. L. Kroeber's *Configurations of Culture Growth* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1944), though Cremin develops the notion in more imaginative ways than did Kroeber.

2. See Laurence Veysey, "The History of Education," *Reviews in American History*, 10 (1982), pp. 281-291.

3. Given the creation of a highly competitive permanent mass market for higher education by the Higher Education Act of 1965, market models for the history of higher education were probably certain to appear. The first use of the model by an historian appears to have been John Hardin Best's "The Revolution of Markets and Management: Toward a History of American Higher Education since 1945," *History of Education Quarterly*, 28 (Summer, 1988), pp. 177-189. Shortly thereafter Sheldon Rothblatt experimentally applied the model to higher education in 19th century England in his essay review, "Supply and Demand: The 'Two Histories' of English Education," *History of Education Quarterly*, 28 (Winter, 1988), pp. 627-644.

4. The Thorndike quotation is from Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1896-1957* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 114, n. 6. The numbers on college students that follow in the text are from an ongoing study by the reviewer on the history of American higher education.

5. The will is discussed in Philip J. Greven, Jr., *Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 251-53.

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